The following is a more usual form of letter of instructions. This time it goes directly from the commander-in-chief to the general-in-chief:
May 24, 1862.
From Washington, 24th.
Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan,—
I left General McDowell’s camp at dark last evening. Shield’s command is there, but it is so worn that he cannot move before Monday morning, the twenty-sixth (26th). We have so thinned our line to get troops for other places, that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one (1) regiment infantry, two (2) companies cavalry, putting General Banks in some peril.
The enemy’s forces under General Anderson, now opposing General McDowell’s advance, have as their line of supply and retreat the road to Richmond.
If, in conjunction with McDowell’s movement against Anderson, you could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy’s supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the two (2) forks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy’s retreat, you will prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving an accession of numbers of nearly fifteen thousand (15,000) men, and if you succeed in saving the bridges, you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not, while you are building the Chickahominy bridges? McDowell and Shields both say you can, and positively will, move Monday morning. I wish you to march cautiously and safely.
You will have command of McDowell after he joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long dispatch to us of the twenty-first (21st).
A. LINCOLN,
President.
As you see, the above example does no more than suggest to General McClellan from a strategic standpoint certain courses open to him. The general-in-chief on the spot is the one to make the decision.