The following were captured: 24 unwounded and 5 wounded prisoners, 1 Lewis gun, 1 rifle with telescopic sights, 20 ordinary rifles, and a large number of steel helmets, belts with ammunition pouches, packs, haversacks, and gas helmets.
Our casualties consisted of one man slightly wounded in the forehead by a splinter from a hand grenade. He was bandaged in the advanced dressing-station and immediately returned to the patrol.
(Signed) WAGENER,
Captain and Company Commander.
40 copies, as appendices to the Report of the 110th Reserve Infantry Regiment on the raid of the 11th April, 1916.
A more narrative form of report is represented by the following extract from Gen. Bragg’s report during the Civil War:
“To meet our successful advance and retrieve his losses in the front of his left, the enemy early transferred a portion of his reserve from his left to that flank, and by 2 o’clock had succeeded in concentrating such a force on Lieutenant General Hardee’s front as to check his further progress. Our two lines had, by this time, become almost blended, so weak were they by losses, exhaustion, and extension to cover the enemy’s whole front. As early as 10 a. m. Major General Breckinridge was called on for one brigade, and soon after for a second, to reinforce or act as a reserve to General Hardee. His reply to the first call represented the enemy as crossing Stone’s River in heavy force in his immediate front; and on receiving the second order he informed me they had already crossed in heavy force and were advancing on him in two lines. He was immediately ordered not to wait attack but to advance and meet them. About this same time a report reached me that a heavy force of the enemy’s infantry was advancing on the Lebanon Road about five miles in Breckinridge’s front. Brigadier General Pegram, who had been sent to that road to cover the flank of the infantry with the cavalry brigade (save two regiments, detached with Wheeler and Wharton), was ordered forward immediately to develop such movement. The orders for the two brigades from Breckinridge were countermanded, whilst dispositions were made at his request to reinforce him. Before they could be carried out, the movements ordered disclosed the facts that no force had crossed Stone’s River; that the only enemy in our immediate front there was a small body of sharpshooters, and that there was no advance on the Lebanon Road.
“These unfortunate misapprehensions on that part of the field (which, with proper precaution, could not have existed) withheld from active operation three fine brigades until the enemy had succeeded in checking our progress, had reëstablished his lines, and had collected many of his broken battalions.”
The above example, in addition to its value as a narrative report, illustrates the dependence of a commander upon proper information.
ROUTINE ORDERS
Routine Orders preserve their normal tenor in peace or war. They have to do with the administration of the military service, so that a state of campaign has very little influence upon their character.