"God bless you and give you success. Your brother in Christ."
The first man selected to carry out this order was Major Lot Smith. Setting out at 4 P.M., on October 3, with forty-four men, after an all night's ride, he came up with a federal supply train drawn by oxen. The captain of this train was ordered to "go the other way till he reached the States." As he persistently retraced his steps as often as the Mormons moved away, the latter relieved his wagons of their load and left him. Sending one of his captains with twenty men to capture or stampede the mules of the Tenth Regiment, Smith, with the remainder of his force, started for Sandy Fork to intercept army trains.
Scouts sent ahead to investigate a distant cloud of dust reported that it was made by a freight train of twenty-six wagons. Smith allowed this train to proceed until dark, and then approached it undiscovered. Finding the drivers drunk, as he afterward explained, and fearing that they would be belligerent and thus compel him to disobey his instruction "not to hurt any one except in self-defence," he lay concealed until after midnight. His scouts meanwhile had reported to him that the train was drawn up for the night in two lines.
Allowing the usual number of men to each wagon, Smith decided that his force of twenty-four was sufficient to capture the outfit, and, mounting his command, he ordered an advance on the camp. But a surprise was in store for him. His scouts had failed to discover that a second train had joined the first, and that twice the force anticipated confronted them. When this discovery was made, the Mormons were too close to escape observation. Members of Smith's party expected that their leader would now make some casual inquiry and then ride on, as if his destination were elsewhere. Smith, however, decided differently. As his force approached the camp-fire that was burning close to the wagons, he noticed that the rear of his column was not distinguishable in the darkness, and that thus the smallness of their number could not be immediately discovered. He, therefore, asked at once for the captain of the train, and one Dawson stepped forward. Smith directed him to have his men collect their private property at once, as he intended to "put a little fire" into the wagons. "For God's sake, don't burn the trains," was the reply. Dawson was curtly told where his men were to stack their arms, and where they were themselves to stand under guard. Then, making a torch, Smith ordered one of the government drivers to apply it, in order that "the Gentiles might spoil the Gentiles," as he afterward expressed it. The destruction of the supplies was complete. Smith allowed an Indian to take two wagon covers for a lodge, and some flour and soap, and compelled Dawson to get out some provisions for his own men. Nothing else was spared.
The official list of rations thus destroyed included 2720 pounds of ham, 92,700 of bacon, 167,900 of flour, 8910 of coffee, 1400 of sugar, 1333 of soap, 800 of sperm candles, 765 of tea, 7781 of hard bread, and 68,832 rations of desiccated vegetables. Another train was destroyed by the same party the next day on the Big Sandy, besides a few sutlers' wagons that were straggling behind.
On October 5 Colonel Alexander assumed command of all the troops in the camp. He found his position a trying one. In a report dated October 8, he said that his forage would last only fourteen days, that no information of the position or intentions of the commanding officer had reached him, and that, strange as it may appear, he was "in utter ignorance of the objects of the government in sending troops here, or the instructions given for their conduct after reaching here." In these circumstances, he called a council of his officers and decided to advance without waiting for Colonel Johnston and the other companies, as he believed that delay would endanger the entire force. He selected as his route to a wintering place, not the most direct one to Salt Lake City, inasmuch as the canyons could be easily defended, but one twice as long (three hundred miles), by way of Soda Springs, and thence either down Bear River Valley or northeast toward the Wind River Mountains, according to the resistance he might encounter.
The march, in accordance with this decision, began on October 11, and a weary and profitless one it proved to be. Snow was falling as the column moved, and the ground was covered with it during their advance. There was no trail, and a road had to be cut through the greasewood and sage brush. The progress was so slow—often only three miles a day—and the supply train so long, that camp would sometimes be pitched for the night before the rear wagons would be under way. Wells's men continued to carry out his orders, and, in the absence of federal cavalry, with little opposition. One day eight hundred oxen were "cut out" and driven toward Salt Lake City.
Conditions like these destroyed the morale of both officers and men, and there were divided counsels among the former, and complaints among the latter. Finally, after having made only thirty-five miles in nine days, Colonel Alexander himself became discouraged, called another council, and, in obedience to its decision, on October 19 directed his force to retrace their steps. They moved back in three columns, and on November 2 all of them had reached a camp on Black's Fork, two miles above Fort Bridger.
Colonel Johnston had arrived at Fort Laramie on October 5, and, after a talk with Captain Van Vliet, had retained two additional companies of infantry that were on the way to Fort Leavenworth. As he proceeded, rumors of the burning of trains, exaggerated as is usual in such times, reached him. Having only about three hundred men to guard a wagon train six miles in length, some of the drivers showed signs of panic, and the colonel deemed the situation so serious that he accepted an offer of fifty or sixty volunteers from the force of the superintendent of the South Pass wagon road. He was fortunate in having as his guide the well known James Bridger, to whose knowledge of Rocky Mountain weather signs they owed escapes from much discomfort, by making camps in time to avoid coming storms.
But even in camp a winter snowstorm is serious to a moving column, especially when it deprives the animals of their forage, as it did now. The forage supply was almost exhausted when South Pass was reached, and the draught and beef cattle were in a sad plight. Then came another big snowstorm and a temperature of l6 deg., during which eleven mules and a number of oxen were frozen to death. In this condition of affairs, Colonel Johnston decided that a winter advance into Salt Lake Valley was impracticable. Learning of Colonel Alexander's move, which he did not approve, he sent word for him to join forces with his own command on Black's Fork, and there the commanding officer arrived on November 3.