Indeed it is almost as strong, if not quite so, as Gibraltar or the Dardanelles. But from the way the Americans hammered at it, military authorities say that only the signing of the armistice prevented the taking of it by assault. As it was, the close of fighting saw Negro troops on German soil.
The fortitude and valor of the Negroes, especially in the action against Metz, won them high praise from their commanding officers. Entire units were decorated by the French with the Croix de Guerre. Fourteen Negro officers and forty-three enlisted men were cited for bravery in action and awarded the Distinguished Service Cross by General Pershing. This is a splendid showing considering that up to November 10th, 1918, the greater portion of the division had to content itself with making daily and nightly raids on the German front line trenches to harass the foe and capture prisoners. This, however, required daring and courage and, in some ways, was more trying and dangerous than being in a big engagement. A total of 57 citations by the American military authorities, besides honors bestowed by the French, is a splendid showing for a division which won most of its honors during its first great baptism of fire.
The casualties of the 92nd Division amounted to an aggregate of 1,511 of all kinds. Six officers were killed in action and one died from wounds. Among the non-commissioned officers and privates 103 were killed in action, 50 died from wounds, 47 were missing in action and five were taken prisoner. Forty enlisted men died from disease. Sixteen officers and 543 enlisted men were wounded; thirty-nine officers and 661 enlisted men were gassed. The number of gassed was unusually large, a reason being, perhaps, that the men in the front line trenches were exceptionally daring in making raids into the enemy's territory. One of the main reliances of the Germans against these raids was poison gas, a plentiful supply of which they kept on hand at all times, and which they could utilize quickly and with great facility.
The small number in this division who were taken prisoner by the enemy verifies the assertion made before that the Negro would sacrifice his life or submit to deadly wounds rather than be captured. When only five out of a total of about 30,000 fell into the Germans' hands alive, it gives some idea of the desperate resistance they put up. Perhaps the stories they had heard about the wanton slaughter of prisoners by the Hun or the brutalities practiced on those who were permitted to live, had something to do with the attitude of the Negroes against being captured; but a more likely solution is that their very spirit to advance and win and to accept death in preference to being conquered, caused the small number in the prisoner list, and the large number in the lists of other casualties.
Considering the desperate advance made by the 92nd Division from Pont a Mousson the morning of November 10th, through a valley swept by the tremendous guns of Metz and thousands of machine guns, the casualty list really is slight.
Advancing over such dangerous ground to gain their objective, it appears miraculous that the division was not wiped out, or at least did not suffer more heavily than it did. An explanation of this seeming miracle has been offered in the rapidity of the advance.
No two battles are ever fought alike. Offensives and defensives will be planned along certain lines. Then will suddenly obtrude the element of surprise or something that could not be foreseen or guarded against, which will overturn the most carefully prepared plans.
No soldiers in the world were ever trained to a higher degree of efficiency than the Germans. Mathematical precision ruled everywhere; the ultimate detail had been considered; and all students of military matters were forced to admit that they had reduced warfare seemingly, to an exact science. But it was a mistake. The Germans were the victims of surprise times innumerable. Some of the greatest events of the war, notably the first defeat at the Marne in its strategic features, was a complete surprise to them.
Everything about war, can, it seems, be reduced to a science except strategy. Certain rules can be laid down governing strategy, but they do not always work. Generally speaking, it is psychology; something which exists in the other man's mind. To read the other man's mind or make a good guess at it, defeats the most scientifically conceived strategy. Napoleon outwitted the best military brains and was himself the greatest strategist of his time, because he invariably departed from fixed military customs and kept his opponent entirely at sea regarding what he was doing or intended to do. Very seldom did he do the thing which his enemy thought he would do; which seemed most likely and proper according to military science. He thought and acted quickly in crises, relied constantly on the element of surprise and invented new strategy on the spur of the moment.
It was the big new strategy, the big new surprises, with which the Germans found themselves unable to cope. The strategy of Foch which developed in the offensive shortly after the battle of Chateau Thierry in July and was well under way in the early part of August, was a surprise to the Germans. Pershing surprised them in his St. Mihiel and following operations, especially the battles of Argonne Forest, and had a greater surprise in store for them in the Lorraine campaign had the war continued.