Facts and Speculations on the Origin and History of Playing Cards

by William Andrew Chatto

"For if I am at liberty to promise and give my property, absolutely and unconditionally, to whomever I please, why may I not promise and give a certain sum, in the event of a person proving more fortunate, or more skillful than I with respect to the result of certain movements and combinations, upon which we had previously agreed? And why may not this person fairly avail himself of the result either of his skill or of a favorable concurrence of fortuitous circumstances, on the issue of which I had voluntarily contracted an obligation? Even though but one of the parties obtains an advantage, yet there would be nothing contrary to equity in the transaction, providing that the terms had been previously agreed on by both. Every person is at liberty to determine the conditions on which he will cede a right to another, and may even make it dependent on the most fortuitous circumstances. A fortiori, a person may fairly avail himself of his winning, when he has risked on the event as much as he was likely to gain. In fact, play [le jeu] is a kind of contract; and in every contract the mutual consent of the parties is the supreme law: this is an incontestable maxim of natural equity. [321]

"In the Scriptures we do not find games of hazard forbid. The ancient Jews appear to have been entirely ignorant of this kind of recreation, and even the name for it is not to be found in the Old Testament. On the dispersion of the Jews, however, after the Babylonian captivity, they learnt to play from the Greeks and Romans, as may be inferred from the cases of conscience on this subject discussed by the Rabbis. Notwithstanding this, games of hazard are nowhere forbidden in the New Testament, though no tolerance is there shown to any kind of vice. There is, indeed, only one passage that contains the least allusion to play; and even in this, the term—which is metaphorically derived from a game of hazard,—when taken in the worst sense, would only amount to a condemnation of the abuse of play. [322] If in some versions a word,—ραιζειν—used by St. Paul, in his First Epistle to the Corinthians, chap. x, v. 7, has been translated 'jouer,' it is merely in consequence of the equivocal signification of this word, or perhaps from the original term not being fully understood, which in this place signifies 'to dance,' as is apparent from the passage in the Old Testament to which it alludes, Exodus, xxii, 6. From the profound silence of the sacred writers, and from other reasons already advanced, it may, in my judgment, be safely concluded that play considered in itself, and apart from its abuse, is a matter of perfect indifference. [323] —"Carried about with every wind of doctrine by the sleight of men."—Ephesians, iv, 14.—Dr. Rennell, quoting the passage in the notes to his sermon against Gaming, observes, that "The connexion between the artifices of gamesters, and the shifting depravity of heretical subterfuge, is strongly marked by the Apostle.">[

"Few persons are so rigid as to condemn absolutely games of every kind; an exception being usually made in favour of those which are determined by skill alone. Most theologians and casuists, however, have pronounced strongly against all games into which hazard enters, as if such were at all times unlawful. The Rabbis, who are of the same opinion, and who even consider them as means of fraud between Jew and Jew, assert that 'a man, during the whole course of his life, should do nothing but devote himself to the study of the law and of wisdom, to the practice of charity, or to some employment or business which may be serviceable to the community.' [324] If this decision be taken literally, it is manifestly absurd, and requires no further notice. Even in putting a reasonable interpretation upon these words, and considering them as condemnatory of such persons as employ themselves in play alone, they still do not apply to play, considered in itself, but merely restrain it to its legitimate use. The Jewish doctors themselves acknowledge that the prohibitions of play in force amongst them, are founded on the regulations of their ancestors; that is, that they are not derived either from the law of Nature, or the positive ordinances of God; but that they depend entirely on the civil law established by those who had the power of making new regulations whenever such might appear to be necessary for the welfare of the state. This is so true, that they in a manner permitted Jews to play at games of hazard with Gentiles: at any rate, their prohibition was extremely feeble, since they declared that, in such a case, a Jew was only culpable of having spent his time about a frivolous thing.

"Among the works of St. Cyprian we find a treatise, or kind of homily, on gaming,—De Aleatoribus,—which though of high antiquity, and evidently written by a Bishop, is probably not the composition of the saint to whom it has usually been ascribed. The author, whoever he may have been, calls games of hazard the nets of the devil; and affirms that they were invented by a certain learned man at the prompting of the evil spirit, and that he placed his portrait and name on the instruments of the game in order that he might be worshipped by those who used them. [325] He, consequently, maintains that whoever plays at such games offers sacrifice to their author, and thus commits an act of idolatry. Such chimerical arguments, when divested of all figure, only show that games of hazard are frequently the cause of disorder. A Flemish clergyman, in a historical treatise on this subject, published about the middle of the seventeenth century, gravely maintains that all games of hazard are contrary to every one of the ten commandments. [326] It may be easily imagined that he is obliged to employ many devices in order to give a colour of plausibility to this paradox; and that whenever he advances anything really pertinent, it applies only to the abuses, which, more or less, may insinuate themselves into every kind of game. A prelate of distinguished merit, Sidonius Apollinaris, Bishop of Clermont, in Auvergne, who flourished in the fifth century, was of a different way of thinking; for he was accustomed to amuse himself at Trictrac, as he relates in his letters without testifying any compunction, and without even saying that he had abandoned the amusement on his being advanced to the office of Bishop, though he mentions that he had then given up poetry.

"Others have imagined that they have discovered in the very nature of games of hazard something which renders them essentially sinful; supporting their views by an argument which, though extremely specious, is yet easily refuted. For instance, they say that God presides over what we call chance, and directs it in a special manner; and that, as chance enters into all games of hazard, such games are manifestly sinful as requiring the intervention of Divine Providence in affairs which are not only trivial, but also subject to many incommodities.

"This conclusion would be demonstrative if the principle from which it is drawn were true; but how is it known that the results of chance are always determined by the special will of the Deity? Is his intervention directly perceptible, or can it be known by any apparent indication? From the knowledge that we have of his goodness and wisdom, can it reasonably be supposed that he does so intervene? On the contrary, is it not derogatory to the Supreme Being to suppose that he should immediately interfere in affairs of such small consequence as most of those are which are determined amongst men by means of lots or chance? The very supposition contains within itself the best reasons for concluding it to be untenable.

"If the Deity indeed were to act by a special will in all matters which are determined by lot or chance, and more especially in games of hazard, it would hence follow: 1. That men have the power to compel, and in a manner, force the Deity to exercise an especial Providence whenever they may think good; for it is certain that they can determine some matters by lot whenever they please. 2. It will also follow that the Deity 'performs miracles every day in favour of persons who are most assuredly undeserving of them, and in places where no one could suspect that his presence would be displayed in a manner so extraordinary.' [327] Besides, what likelihood is there that, when a couple of lacqueys or porters sit down to play at dice or lansquenet, Providence should more especially interfere in their game than in events which affect the destiny of nations, such as battles, revolutions, and other important actions of a similar kind? There is even something ridiculous in supposing that when two men are playing at draughts, or billiards, their game is only the object of common and ordinary Providence, but that when they sit down to play at dice or cards, a special Providence then intervenes, and determines the chances of the game [328]....

"I am, however, willing to allow that even at play there may sometimes be an extraordinary manifestation of Providence, either directly, or by means of some invisible intelligence determining the lot or chance. I can conceive that the Deity should dispose of events in such a manner that a worthy man, for instance, who might be in danger of giving himself entirely up to play, should be cured of his passion by a great and sudden loss. But, even admitting this, there is no reason to conclude that the Deity interferes on all occasions, and in favour of all sorts of people; and, after all, without a direct revelation, it never can be positively known that he really does interfere in such matters. I could just as readily believe what the eloquent Jesuit Maffei relates of Ignatius Loyola, in his life of that saint; namely, that, playing one day at billiards with a gentleman, who had urged him to try the game, he, by a miracle, proved the winner, as he was utterly unacquainted with the game." [329]

In concluding the first book, Barbeyrac observes: "To refute in detail all the objections of rigid moralists would require an entire volume. What I have already said, however, appears to me sufficient to remove any vain scruples which may have been excited on the subject. I am, indeed, rather apprehensive that those who are too fond of play will think that I might have spared myself the trouble of proving that which they had no doubts about; and that it was quite unnecessary to explain to them at so great length that play, considered in itself, contains nothing contrary to the law of Nature or the precepts of the Gospel. The plan of the work, however, required that I should commence with this; and the opportunity being thus afforded of showing the fallacy of the austere portrait which some writers have drawn of Christian morality, I have availed myself of it. On this subject I also feel myself justified in referring to the schools of Pagan philosophy, where we are taught that 'we should do nothing without being able to give a reason for it; in small matters as well as in great.' [330] Now, assuming that out of a hundred persons who are accustomed to play daily, there is scarcely one who has ever asked himself how, or in what manner, it may be lawful, it is not surprising that so many people should convert a thing in itself perfectly harmless into a subject of disorder, employing it as a means of gratifying their inordinate love of pleasure, their idleness, or their avarice."