Further than this, as a simple matter of fact,
the currency difficulty with India at the present moment is purely governmental and commercial. The Indian Government has yearly to remit a very large sum to this country in discharge of its gold obligations. In 1873-74, before the great fall in silver commenced, the amount remitted was £13,285,678, which, at the rate of exchange of 1 rupee = 1s. 10.35d., meant 142,657,000 rupees. During the year 1892-3 the amount remitted was £16,532,215, which, at the average rate of exchange in that year, 1s. 2.985d., required a payment of 264,784,150 rupees. If this could have been remitted at the exchange of 1873-74, it would only have needed 177,519,200 rupees, making a difference of 87,274,950 rupees. The result of this is to turn what would be a surplus of revenue into a large deficit. At an estimated exchange of 1s. 4d. per rupee for the past year, a surplus of revenue over expenditure was shown of 1,466,000 rupees. The exchange having fallen to an average of rather less than 1s. 3d., this surplus has been converted into an estimated deficit of 10,819,000 rupees. Notwithstanding the improvement of the revenue by 16,533,000 rupees over the budget estimate, the situation at the close of 1892 was fraught with a double danger to the Indian Government. The fall of silver—which had been such that during the year exchange could scarcely be maintained at 1s. 2 5⁄8d. for the rupee by the refusal to sell bills in India below that rate—might still proceed. And, secondly, in case of failure attending the
Brussels Conference, the United States would be inevitably driven to abandon her single-handed attempt to keep up the price of silver by her silver purchases. In that case an unexampled fall of silver might be expected. The only practical solution of the difficulty was the adoption of a gold standard for India, and in order to do so at a workable rate for the rupee it would be necessary to anticipate such further fall.
So much, in very brief, for the Government situation. For the commercial,—the harassment of trade by fluctuations of exchange, the check to investments, the handicapping of the Lancashire manufactures, and so on,—all this ground is still strewn with the débris of debate and difference. As far as the currency question, pure and simple, is concerned—such, that is, as is conceived of throughout this book, viz. metallic—it is almost incapable of presentation or realisation. Through the extraordinary preference of the Indian for the precious metals as metals or as a commodity, quite apart from currency use, the ordinary action of such monetary laws as have been at work in Europe for centuries is nullified—to how great an extent it is quite impossible to estimate. The minting of silver has been such as might be expected under the conditions of free minting of a cheapening metal—i.e. it has risen on an average to the full amount of the net imports of silver. But, conversely, there has been no such reactionary influence of such mintings
on the gold store of the country as would have taken place in Europe. The importations of silver have gone hand in hand with a net importation, not exportation, of gold, with no traceable evidence of bimetallic action.
The establishment of the gold standard for India is, therefore, primarily and in greatest part a governmental measure. As far as relates to such purely scientific phenomena and considerations, as have governed the European currencies for centuries, India still presents field for little or for very questionable observation.[22]
TABLE OF THE SURPLUS OR NET IMPORTS OF THE PRECIOUS METALS INTO INDIA
| Year. | Gold. | Silver. | Council Bills. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1835-6 | £329,918 | £1,611,896 | £2,045,254 |
| 1836-7 | 419,724 | 1,338,882 | 2,042,232 |
| 1837-8 | 430,870 | 1,966,944 | 1,706,184 |
| 1838-9 | 258,925 | 2,645,130 | 2,346,592 |
| 1839-40 | 226,643 | 1,650,471 | 1,439,525 |
| 1840-1 | 137,312 | 1,401,670 | 1,174,450 |
| 1841-2 | 165,623 | 1,283,228 | 2,589,283 |
| 1842-3 | 211,161 | 2,952,445 | 1,197,438 |
| 1843-4 | 406,523 | 3,695,442 | 2,801,731 |
| 1844-5 | 710,100 | 1,988,561 | 2,516,951 |
| 1845-6 | 544,476 | 932,490 | 3,065,709 |
| 1846-7 | 846,949 | 1,378,249 | 3,097,042 |
| 1847-8 | 1,039,116 | (-491,191) | 1,541,804 |
| 1848-9 | 1,348,918 | 313,904 | 1,889,195 |
| 1849-50 | 1,116,993 | 1,273,607 | 2,935,118 |
| 1850-1 | 1,153,294 | 2,117,225 | 3,236,458 |
| 1851-2 | 1,267,613 | 2,865,357 | 2,777,523 |
| 1852-3 | 1,172,301 | 4,605,024 | 3,317,122 |
| 1853-4 | 1,061,443 | 2,305,744 | 3,850,565 |
| 1854-5 | 731,290 | 29,600 | 3,669,678 |
| 1855-6 | 2,506,245 | 8,194,375 | 1,484,040 |
| 1856-7 | 2,091,214 | 11,073,247 | 2,819,711 |
| 1857-8 | 2,783,073 | 12,218,948 | 628,499 |
| 1858-9 | 4,426,453 | 7,728,342 | 25,901 |
| 1859-60 | 4,284,234 | 11,147,563 | 4,694 |
| 1860-1 | 4,232,569 | 5,328,009 | 797 |
| 1861-2 | 5,184,425 | 9,086,456 | 1,193,729 |
| 1862-3 | 6,848,159 | 12,550,155 | 6,641,576 |
| 1863-4 | 8,898,306 | 12,796,719 | 8,979,521 |
| 1864-5 | 9,839,964 | 10,078,798 | 6,789,473 |
| 1865-6 | 5,724,476 | 18,668,673 | 6,998,899 |
| 1866-7 | 3,842,328 | 6,963,074 | 5,613,746 |
| 1867-8 | 4,609,467 | 5,593,961 | 4,137,285 |
| 1868-9 | 5,159,352 | 8,601,022 | 3,705,741 |
| 1869-70 | 5,592,117 | 7,320,337 | 6,980,122 |
| 1870-1 | 2,282,121 | 941,937 | 8,443,509 |
| 1871-2 | 3,565,344 | 6,512,827 | 10,310,339 |
| 1872-3 | 2,543,362 | 704,644 | 13,939,095 |
| 1873-4 | 1,382,638 | 2,451,383 | 13,285,678 |
| 1874-5 | 1,873,535 | 4,642,202 | 10,841,615 |