The archbishops were still on the roll, so the same day the Archbishop of Paris had his turn. Here again we get an indisputable glimpse into the arcana. Like Kenrick's speech, that of Darboy is printed; but unlike Kenrick's, it was actually delivered.[412] We shall, therefore, give the principal portions of it, wishing that we were in a position to do so with a speech from the other side—
Most eminent, most reverend Fathers,—I approach the consideration of the First Dogmatic Constitution, De Ecclesia, submitted to your examination,—a task which would be ungrateful did not love of the truth and affection and reverence towards the brethren render it easy and not unwelcome. I will treat the proposed Decree with a mind, as I trust, free from all party spirit, wishing not to offend any one, and fervently hoping that you will ingenuously receive what I am about to say, as I shall ingenuously present it.
It seems to me that there are three things to be looked at: first, the origin of this proposed Decree; secondly, its scope and nature; thirdly, its practical consequences.
As to the origin of this proposed Decree, and its introduction at the present time into the Council, I shall state a few self-evident propositions without discussing them, or rather shall recall to mind a few facts, from which the reverend Fathers will be able to judge whether the whole matter has been conducted according to order, and whether the dignity of an assembly so venerable has been sufficiently consulted:—
1. It is certain that the pivot on which our proposed Decree altogether turns is the fourth chapter—that which treats of the infallibility of the Pontiff.
2. It is certain that this question of infallibility has been the principal object of the Vatican Council—so much so indeed that it has been indiscreetly said by many that, in a certain sense, it was the sole object of it.
3. It is certain that this principal question of infallibility was not intimated in the Bull of Convocation, nor in the documents relating to the convocation of the Council.
4. It is certain that this question has been urged forward from without, that is, by writers lay and clerical, in a way contrary to ecclesiastical and traditional methods, adopted against all rules of subordination and decorum; an agitation got up by means of demagogues, so to speak, in order that the consciences of the bishops sitting here might be placed under pressure, and that they might be subjected to fear that, if they resisted they should not be able to return to their dioceses and govern them without difficulty.
5. It is certain that thus the matter has been brought to such a pass that the Vatican Fathers, albeit piously and generously following their own conscience, have been said, nevertheless, to have conceded more than was meet to these violent manifestations, and to factitious opinions, when they petitioned for the introduction of the question of infallibility; and because of this tumult, which has been raised at the doors of the Council Hall, the liberty and the dignity of us all have evidently been somewhat lowered. This is unbecoming, and opens the way to grave inconvenience; indeed, it is not to be tolerated without injury and opprobrium to this venerable assembly, which ought to act from its own impulse, and ought to be not only free, but manifestly free.
6. It is certain that the question, as this day proposed, comes on out of the natural and logical order; and thus occasions some prejudice which will damage the cause itself.
7. It is certain that the premature introduction of the question, especially with the present inversion of proper order, is of little service to the Holy See—nay, is detrimental to its honour; for since, according to the Rules of Procedure, contained in Multiplices Inter, petitions are remitted to a Special Congregation, which reports upon them to the Pontiff, and since the Pontiff can freely accept or reject the conclusions of that Congregation, it follows that the promoters of the petition for introducing the question of infallibility, and for placing it first in order, publicly led the Holy Father into the position of enacting and deciding in his own case, and for his personal privilege; in doing which—certainly without intention on their part—they have ill consulted his high dignity, if they may not be said to have even detracted from it.
If these seven positions be true—and they seem to be most true—we cannot approach and determine this question of infallibility, raised under such circumstances, and introduced in such a manner, without preparing the way for the cavils of the impious, and for objections lowering to the moral authority of this Council. This is the more to be guarded against, because already writings and documents are in circulation which aim at shaking its strength and title; so that, far from calming the minds of the people, and securing the things which make for peace, it would seem, on the contrary, to be sowing the seeds of new disputations and discords among Christians.
If, therefore, I may give a practical conclusion to this portion of my speech, I would say: (1) They did well who held this question to be inopportune; (2) They will do well who shall judge it opportune to abstain from a definition.
Now, as to the second portion of my speech,—the scope and nature of this proposed Decree,—I shall indicate a few points, but not develop them.
1. The object of the proposed Decree is not to frame a doctrine on infallibility, for all know and with Catholic faith believe in the infallibility of the Church, which has held that tenet for nearly twenty centuries. Its object is to define, and to propound as an article of faith, that the chief Pontiff is infallible by himself alone, and that indeed this privilege of inerrancy extends as widely as the infallibility of the Church itself. It is to be noted that the proposed Decree does not treat of the former kind of infallibility, admitted by all, according to which the invincible and irrefragable force of Decrees or dogmatic decisions commanding the faith of all the faithful, as of all pastors, lies solely in the common consent of the bishops conjoined with the Pontiff. But this proposed Decree treats of the separate and absolute personal infallibility of the Pontiff, though it is not openly called so.
2. The proposed Decree does not treat of personal infallibility as a mere opinion, or as recommending a point of doctrine, but as declaring a dogma of the faith. Heretofore, indeed, there was some discussion as to the opportuneness and expediency of introducing this question in the present Council; but that discussion was closed from the time that the chief Pontiff decreed that the subject could no longer be passed over in silence. But now the other part of the question has come to be discussed, namely, whether or not the personal infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff can opportunely and expediently now be declared an article of the faith, and ought to be so declared? This is precisely the matter and object of the present discussion.
3. Further, in order that the object may be rightly carried through, and may have a successful issue, these three things are necessary: (1) A formula, or definition of the doctrine; (2) Proofs of it, both solid and excluding all doubt; (3) Its acceptance by all with moral unanimity.
The first necessity:—It is necessary to compose a formula or definition of the doctrine. That this is most difficult is apparent from the case of those who first drafted the proposed Decree, as well as of those who revised it. Terms are used which are vague, and fitted to give rise to endless discussion. What is meant by exercising the office of supreme teacher of all Christians? What are the complete external conditions which mark the exercise of this office? When will it be known that the Holy Pontiff has spoken in such a character? The promoters of the proposed Decree say that this will be obvious, as for instance the meaning of the term "œcumenical" is obvious; but they inflict a wound on themselves. For a Council is not held to be œcumenical by the faithful dispersed throughout the world, unless it is received as such by them perhaps with what amounts to moral unanimity. Hence if the nature, character, and force of Decrees emanating from the Pontiff are to be declared and known by the same method, the promoters of the Decree have accomplished nothing, since the ultimate reason for admitting infallibility will be the universal consent of the bishops. Do they or do they not regard the consent of the bishops as unnecessary in laying down definitions of the faith? If they do regard it as unnecessary, they do a thing that is new, unheard of, and intolerable. If they do not regard it as unnecessary, they say a thing that is old, and received by all, and draw up their battle array against a foe that is not in the field. In either case they neither can nor ought to be silent as to the necessity or inutility of the concurrence of the bishops. Silence on their part in such a matter, and in such circumstances, would drive the faithful to new doubts, and would prepare the way for new difficulties. They do not define the matters to which infallibility extends, otherwise than by saying that it extends to those to which the infallibility of the Church extends; but such an indication is altogether insufficient till the holy Council shall have defined the matters to which the infallibility of the Church does extend. Hence, again appears the logical vice from which this proposed Decree on the primacy suffers through being brought forward before the Decree on the Church in general. Moreover, when dealing with the Church, we know that her infallibility is always exercised within the limits of matters to which it extends, both because we are advised that it is so by the common consent of the bishops, and also because the Church is holy and cannot sin. But, on the contrary, when dealing with the Holy Pontiff, the promoters of the proposed Decree, whatever they may say, exclude on the one hand the consent of the bishops, and on the other hand they have not yet attempted to prove that every Pontiff is holy and impeccable. So far for what relates to the discovery of a formula.
The second necessity:—A formula of definition having been found, it is necessary to prove it by solid arguments, excluding all doubt. Let it then be proved:—(1) That this doctrine of personal infallibility is contained in Holy Scripture interpreted always in one sense, as well as in the tradition of all ages;—(2) That it has always been received by consent of the Fathers, the doctors, the bishops, and theologians; not only by some of them, but by so many as amounts to a moral whole;—(3) That it perfectly accords with all the Decrees and authoritative acts of Œcumenical Councils, or even with the Decrees passed in the fourth and fifth sessions of the Council of Constance. Even were the œcumenicity of those sessions to be denied—which I do not admit—they still show what was the common opinion of theologians and bishops;—(4) That this doctrine is not gravely impugned by historical facts, and that other acts of the Holy Pontiffs are not in conflict with it;—(5) And, finally, that this is one of those truths which can be defined by General Councils in union with the Pontiff, as being demonstrably one of those which had been received by all, everywhere, and always as revealed truth.
The proposed Decree does not supply such arguments, and the Fathers, as you well know, have not had time to weigh it; therefore we ought to refrain from defining it. In a matter of this kind, which involves the laying of an irrevocable burden on the conscience of the faithful, there is grave peril if you act prematurely, without absolute certainty. But there is no risk to be run in deciding it to be a matter that requires to be more fully discussed, and then afterwards determining it with all safety of conscience.
The third necessity:—It is necessary that this doctrine of personal and independent infallibility, clearly stated, as we have said, and solidly proved, should be received by the Fathers with moral unanimity; else it is to be feared that this declaration of doctrine will seem to many to be a pontifical Constitution indeed but not a Decree of a Council. To impose a truth upon all Christians, to be held as an article of faith, is a duty and a right so grave that a bishop must not exercise it without great circumspection.
Hence, as you well know, the Tridentine Fathers, whatever sophists may say to the contrary, did not arrive at their decisions in matters of dogma by majority, but with moral unanimity.
As to the practical consequences of the proposed Decree, I would particularly note two points; for this personal infallibility is not required and proposed as a matter of faith, except in order that unity in the Church may become closer and that the central authority may be stronger, and that thus a remedy may be more effectually applied to every evil. As to unity and central authority, they ought to exist and to be maintained, not as we may fancy them, or as our reason may persuade us, but just as our Lord Jesus Christ instituted them, and as our Fathers hitherto have held them. For it is not for us to constitute the Church arbitrarily, and to change the conditions of a divine work. The necessary unity, that namely of faith and communion under the paternal rule of a central authority, exists and always has existed among Catholics; and that unity of doctrine and communion, and that central authority of the Holy Pontiffs, which flourished without a dogmatic definition of infallibility, abides unimpaired.
Let it not be said that this unity would become stricter after the central authority had been rendered stronger, for the consequence does not follow. It is not enough to be one, but we must also have that kind and that degree of unity which are required by the nature and character of the case, and by the law and necessity of life. Nay, it may be that a thing shall wretchedly perish, precisely for the reason that it has been reduced to an overstrained unity; for in that condition its internal forces cannot exercise themselves and discharge their vital functions, being broken and crushed by the bond of an overstrained and exaggerated unity. So in respect of moral force, the unity of men, when acting freely and with vigour under law, is looser yet more comely than is the unity of bondsmen sluggishly existing under tyranny.
Therefore, let us not separate the bishops from the Holy Pontiff, nor the Pontiff from the bishops. Let us faithfully hold the ancient rule of faith and the things ordained of the Fathers, and that all the more because the proposed definition will give rise to many and serious inconveniences.
It can scarcely be doubted that this remedy will be powerless for healing the evils of the day; and indeed it is to be feared that to very many it will be injurious. The matter must be looked at not merely in a theological point of view, but also in its aspects towards civil society; for surely we do not sit here as so many head-sacristans, or superiors of little Congregations, but as men received into a share of his solicitude by the chief Pontiff, who holds the care of the entire Church. Let us, therefore, prudently survey the condition of the world.
Will personal and independent infallibility raise again from the grave the extinct Churches on the African shores? or will it awake out of sleep that East which once bloomed with so many talents and virtues? Will it be easier for our brethren, the Vicars Apostolic, to bring back Pagans, Mohammedans, and Schismatics, to the Catholic faith, if they teach them that the Pope is infallible by himself? Will the definition encourage and animate Protestants, and other heretics, to draw near to the Roman Church, laying aside all their prejudices and animosities? So far for distant regions.
But what of Europe? I say it with grief—the Church is banished from everything. She is banished from those Congresses in which peace and war between nations is determined, and in which, in former times, the authority of the Holy See prevailed; whereas now decisions affecting that See itself are taken, and it may not give its opinion. The Church is banished from the legislative bodies in several kingdoms of the Church; and if here and there some prelates or priests are found in them, it seems a wonder. She is banished from the schools where grave errors stalk with impunity; from the laws which profess to be secular in their nature, and hence are irreligious; from the family where civil marriage taints morals. Almost all those who are at the head of human affairs in Europe either shun us or keep us at a distance.
Again, in these straits of the Church, what remedy is offered to the world in travail? The promoters of the proposed Decree wish us to lay a new and, therefore, heavy and odious load on those who are already shaking from their indocile shoulders burdens imposed of old time and rendered venerable by usage of our Fathers. They almost crush all who are of weak faith, with a new and inopportune dogma, a dogma never heretofore defined, and to some extent damaged by wounds received in this discussion, and one to be pronounced by a Council, of which many assert and declare that its liberty is less evident than it should have been. It is hoped by this definition of a personal and separate infallibility to be able to heal everything, to strengthen faith in all, and to improve morals. But in vain is it hoped. The world is sick or dying, not for want of knowing the truth, or the teachers of it, but because it shuns the truth and will not submit to it. If, therefore, the world rejects the truth, when it is preached by the whole body of the Teaching Church—that is, by eight hundred bishops scattered all over the world and infallible in connexion with the Holy Pontiff—how much more will it reject that truth when it is preached by one Infallible Teacher, and that teacher recently declared to be such! But again: in order that authority may prevail and effectually operate, it is not enough that it be affirmed; it must also be accepted. It does not suffice, therefore, to declare the Pope infallible, personally and separately from the bishops, but he must be received as such by all, if he is not to exercise his office in vain. For instance, what avails an anathema when the authority of him who excommunicates is disregarded? And, most reverend Fathers, pray permit one instance more. The Syllabus went all through Europe, and what evil has it healed, even in those places where it was received as an infallible oracle? At that time two kingdoms remained wherein religion still flourished, ascendant not only in fact, but also by law; I mean Austria and Spain. Yet in those two kingdoms this Catholic order has fallen to the ground, although commended by infallible authority,—ay, perhaps, at least in Austria, exactly for the reason that it was commended by it.
Let us, therefore, look at matters as they stand. The separate and independent infallibility of the most Holy Pontiff, so far from removing the objections and prejudices which turn many away from the faith, is increasing and aggravating them. Very many even of those who are not hostile to the Catholic religion are now meditating what they call separation of the Church from civil society. Not a few of those who lead public affairs lean in this direction, and they will gladly seize the opportunity, given by the proposed definition, to carry this separation into effect. Besides, what will be done in France will soon be imitated more or less throughout Europe, certainly not without serious loss to the Church and the clergy. Whether they mean it or not, the promoters of the proposed Decree are, by their definition, instituting a new order of things full of risks, and that all the more if they do not more exactly determine the matters to which personal infallibility extends; and [if they do not determine] whether it will be possible to assert that the Pope, when defining in matters pertaining to morals, does by that act pronounce as to the civil and political conduct of kings and nations, and as to the laws and rights which are now reputed to belong to the public authority. No one skilled in politics can fail to see what seeds of contention our proposed Decree contains, and to what perils the temporal power of the Holy See itself is exposed. But to enter into this fully would be tedious, perhaps indiscreet; for certainly I could not adduce here all the arguments which come to my hand, without touching upon several things which prudence counsels me to avoid. I have relieved my conscience as far as possible. Accept my words for the worth which your judgment may award to them. I know, indeed, that disadvantages are attached to any course, and that we are not always to abstain from acting because disasters may follow; but I do not ask the venerable Fathers to fall suddenly into my views, but rather ask that they may maturely consider and balance the arguments in favour of the one view and the other. I also know that we are not to make puerile concessions to public opinion, but no more are we pertinaciously to thwart it. It is wiser and more adroit to adjust many things with it, and in any case to take it into account. And, finally, I know that the Church does not need the temporal arm, but neither does she repel the assent and aid of civil society; and, as I take it, she did not, in the days of Constantine, weakly sigh for a renewal of the days of Nero.
Quirinus says that a suppressed murmur running through the ranks of the majority as Darboy spoke, seemed to herald coming storms (p. 553).
On May 23, Ketteler is said to have made a real impression—indeed, Vitelleschi intimates that he made converts (p. 162)—by a strong representation of the effect of the proposed Decrees on what remained of episcopal jurisdiction. On the same day Ginoulhiac, who had been Bishop of Grenoble, but had just been made Archbishop of Lyons, did what was looked upon as a deed of high courage by opposing the definition.
At the same time an incident occurred which caused all Rome to talk of the Pope's personal energy in pushing his policy, and to whisper as to the mysterious connexion of political movements in different countries with the silent will of Rome. Though Portugal no longer occupied, in the eye of the world, the place she once held, her importance to the Papacy was still great. News arrived that the Duke of Saldanha had, by a military pronunciamento, assailed the King in his palace, and compelled him to accept a new Ministry, with himself for its head. He was of the clerical party, and immediately found a pretext for quarrelling with the minister representing Italy. The tidings of these events no sooner reached Rome than the Pope visited the national church of the Portuguese in the city. His organ, the Osservatore Romano, in announcing the fact, said that his Holiness had wished to inspect the restoration of the Church made by the Duke of Saldanha when ambassador in Rome. The impression made was that the Pope wished, before all the bishops and princes, to give the Duke the only mark of approbation in his power. Vitelleschi observes that a pronunciamento is the worst form of revolution, because it disturbs the highest expression of order and violates the faith which holds soldiers to their flag (p. 165). What, however, is revolution when directed against the supernatural order, is restoration and reconstruction when it favours the sacred cause.
The time for the definition was now rather peremptorily fixed by the authoritative organs. The day of Mary, the day of Joseph, the Epiphany, and the Ascension, and other very good days, had all in turn failed; but it was to be on St. Peter's Day, and was not that the fittest day of all?
The Archbishop of Westminster, in the name of the committee, spoke, on May 25, for nearly two hours. Indeed, morning by morning the committee availed itself of the right of reply granted to its members exclusively, by setting up one of them to refute the objections advanced in the previous sitting. Kenrick says that he knew not which to admire most—Manning's diction, his delivery, his power, of command and frankness, or his ardour in urging and almost commanding the new definition.[413]
"I thought," says Kenrick, "of what used to be said of Englishmen living in Ireland, that they were more Irish than the Irish themselves. The Archbishop is certainly more Catholic than all the Catholics I have known hitherto. He himself feels no doubt as to pontifical infallibility, personal, separate, and absolute; and he will not permit others to feel any. He asserts that the doctrine is of faith, and as such he hardly asks the Council to define it, but rather predicts that it will do so—perhaps after the manner of those prophets who strive to bring events to pass by foretelling them. So far as concerns myself—as one whom sixty years that have passed over me since I began to learn the rudiments of the faith, have perhaps left as well instructed on the point in question as one who joined the Church about twenty years ago—I dare to assert that the opinion, as it is found in the proposed Decree, is not a doctrine of faith, and that it cannot become such by any definition whatsoever, even that of a Council. We are custodians of the deposit of faith, not lords of it. We are teachers indeed of the faithful committed to our care, in so far as we are witnesses."
Manning resented, graviter illud tulit, the attempt which had been made to raise a case of conscience in the mind of the bishops by asserting that any bishop would incur the guilt of a mortal sin who gave a vote in favour of infallibility without having duly investigated the question for himself; because his act would contribute to impose a new yoke on the faithful. This Manning held to be injurious to the dignity and the honour of the bishops; as if, says Kenrick, he denied that bishops could sin, or denied that they would be guilty of mortal sin if through negligence or idleness they failed rightly to inform their judgments.
Manning contended that infallibility was a supernatural grace—charisma—and, therefore, that it properly attached to a person. He would not hear of conditions being connected with the exercise of infallibility. He asserted that he who had bestowed this supernatural grace would also give the means for its due exercise.[414] Moreover, he took the ground that the Council had already, in the conclusion of the Decree which had been passed, committed itself to the doctrine of infallibility, and that it could not now recede. Kenrick replied that the assertion of Manning was one of several things which he had heard with stupefaction. They had been assured, he stated, as we have already seen, in the clearest terms by the reporter of the committee, that the clause referred to contained no doctrine, and that it was only a fitting conclusion to the four chapters of the Decree. Then follows the statement that the reporter had either himself been deceived or had knowingly deceived the minority.