Absolute authority over bishops and people having been asserted, next comes the assertion of authority over princes. This is done in a paragraph in which only students would see anything of the kind. The fourth paragraph of the third chapter begins by speaking of the Pope's right to free communication with the pastors and flocks of the whole Church. What could appear more natural, or less dangerous? Had we not seen how much the communications of the Pope amount to, we should have taken that as a meek and harmless claim. But the close of the paragraph shows that what the Pope means is the right of giving to his own edicts the binding force of a higher law in every country, whether the government consents or does not consent. As primacy means dictatorship, so communication means promulging laws in regard to which no human being has the right of reply, inquiry, complaint, or appeal; has, we repeat, no office whatever except that of obedience. We have seen that "teach" in our Lord's commission to the apostles means so to give law to the nations that they can never be justified in resisting. No prince can have any title to exercise an exequatur, placet, or any other form of check upon an edict of the Pope. Every man who denies the validity of a Papal law, because it is prohibited by the government of the country, is solemnly condemned; he interrupts the communication between the authority of the Pontiff and the conscience of his subjects. Indeed, the condemnation extends to all who even say that his decrees may be lawfully impeded in their execution. The reason of this appears in the next paragraph. The Pope is there formally declared the Supreme Judge of the faithful. Therefore all may justly resort to his judgment in all matters subject to ecclesiastical inquiry, and none may appeal from his judgment, for there is no authority greater than his. Matters subject to ecclesiastical inquiry must always include all those wherein the interests of the Papacy are in anywise involved. Next, even the old appeal to a General Council is formally condemned. Yet even that condemnation is bungled. None may appeal from the judgment of the Pope to a General Council "as an authority superior to the Roman Pontiff." Then, will lawyers say, we can only appeal to a General Council as an authority equal to the Roman Pontiff.
If these fourth and fifth paragraphs of the third chapter of the Decree on Primacy were read by a dozen educated Englishmen unused to Roman Catholic interpretations of Papal laws, nearly all of them would put aside clause after clause as not being of importance. They would take the damnamus and reprobamus as so much sulphur, and let it pass. Far otherwise Vitelleschi. "From a practical point of view," he says, "the declarations of infallibility could add nothing to the weight of this paragraph" (p. 177). Vitelleschi looks upon the express declaration of infallibility, in the next chapter, as no more than "indulgence in the luxury of self-assertion, to which absolute principles are prone." Yet when Mr. Gladstone pointed out the true range of the authority here set up, many of our politicians treated him as a statesman who had strayed out of his domain into theology. Since then, specimens of minimizing interpretation have been put into our own tongue, as curious as any furnished by the history of finesse. If there be one Canon expressing a rule absolute that needs no exception to prove it, we have it in the words, Rome never minimises. She always interprets her own documents as a legatee interprets a will, that is, in her own favour.
On June 15 the Council disposed of all the matters that stood in the way of the great question. Seventy-five speakers had entered their names. Two speeches were actually made on that day by Cardinals Mathieu and Rauscher.[433] The latter said that he could never assent to the doctrine of the Draft without mortal sin. "We knew all that from your pamphlet," cried Deschamps, interrupting. "But you have never refuted it," replied the Austrian.[434] The following day was the grand procession of the Corpus Christi. If the "good press" was parsimonious in information regarding debates and decrees, it was profuse in description of the spectacles. On the 17th, Pius IX entered on the twenty-fifth year of his pontificate. This year, according to Roman tradition, is fatal to the Pontiffs, it being held that Peter reigned twenty-five years, and that none of his successors was to reign longer. Vitelleschi declares that the twenty-fifth year proved fatal to Pius IX, as well as to the rest, because in the course of it he ceased to be a mere mortal. This phrase from a Liberal Catholic will seem natural when set beside one of M. Veuillot, on the day on which Pius IX completed the twenty-fifth year of his pontificate: "We are reminded of the radiance of Jordan and of Tabor, of the thunders of the Temple, 'This is my beloved Son, hear ye him'" (vol. ii. p. 468). On the next page he says, "God has left us His priest, His angel, the sacred interpreter of His law, the anointed intercessor between Him and the world ... a second Peter, a second Moses on the threshold of a new world." It remains to be seen whether the twenty-fifth year of Pius IX was or was not that of the final fall of the temporal power. If the speeches on the doctrine and polity of the Church were concealed, the Pope's speech this day, in reply to the Sacred College, was blazed abroad. He divided the bishops into three classes—the ignorant, the time-serving, and the good. So flowed abroad fresh streams from that fountain which, all the time, was sending forth both sweet waters and bitter.
On June 18, the debate on the fourth chapter, that is, on infallibility, really began. It was a day of Cardinals. Pitra, Guidi, Bonnechose, and Cullen were the sole orators. Hitherto, what with the heat and what with the feeling that all was over, no interest had attached to the renewed debates after the violent close of the general discussion. But the torpor was suddenly shaken. A speech by a Roman, a Dominican and a Cardinal (Guidi), came upon the city, says Vitelleschi, like a sudden thunderclap in a cloudless sky. The Cardinal, like nearly all the members of the Sacred College, was a "creature" of Pius IX. According to Vitelleschi, he began his speech as a Cardinal should, but, according to Quirinus, he offended at the very first. Unhappily, in a matter of difference of this kind, the writers who enjoyed "the radiance of infallibility" give us no light. So we are left at the mercy of those whose assertions were all lies in general, but somehow, when attacked in detail, generally proved to be truths in particular. In the present case, we do not remember that even M. Veuillot attempts to impugn any of the facts stated. However Guidi may have begun, he affirmed that the doctrine of Papal infallibility, as contained in the proposed Decree, was unknown to the Church up to the close of the fourteenth century. Proofs of this doctrine were to be sought in vain in either Scripture or tradition. As a practical question, when had the Pope ever defined one dogma alone, and without the Church? An act, he continued, might be infallible, but a person never. Hitherto infallible acts had proceeded from the Church, either by counsel of the Church dispersed, or by a Council. Inquiry was indispensable to ascertain "what was believed everywhere, and whether all Churches were in agreement with the Roman Church." After such inquiry, the Pope sanctioned "finally," as St. Thomas says; and thus only could it be said that "all taught through the Pope." Quoting Bellarmine, and even the modern Jesuit Perrone, he showed that "the Popes had never acted by themselves alone in defining doctrine, or by themselves alone in condemning heresies." At these words, Spaccapietra, an Italian, but Bishop of Smyrna, led in a disturbance. One bishop cried "Scoundrel!" another cried "Brigand!" Vitelleschi even speaks of violent gestures (p. 189). Guidi said he had the right to be heard, and that no one had given the right of the Presidents to the bishops; but he added, "You will have the opportunity of saying Placet or Non placet." Hereupon, from all ranks of the Opposition burst out a cry of "Optime! optime!"—excellent! excellent! "Do you agree with us?" asked a bishop of Manning. "The Cardinal's head is bewildered," was the reply. On this, says Quirinus, a bishop could not refrain from saying to the powerful Archbishop of Westminster, "It is your own head, Monsignor, that is bewildered, and more than half Protestant." If this language was really used, we must doubt whether it was infallible.
Guidi went on to advocate a change in the wording of the Decree, to the effect that the Pope acted with the concurrence of the bishops, and that after having, at their request, occasioned by prevalent errors, made inquiry in other Churches, he acted with the consent of his brethren, or with that of a collective Council. He contended that this was the doctrine of St. Thomas; that the word "final" implied something to precede, and that "supreme teacher and judge" presupposed "other teachers and tribunals." He concluded by proposing two Canons, the first of which declared Papal Decrees or Constitutions to be entitled to cordial faith and reverence, and not to be reformable; but the second said, If any one shall say that, in issuing such Decrees, the Pope can act arbitrarily without the counsel of the bishops as testifying to the tradition of the Church, let him be anathema.[435] On finishing his discourse, he at once handed his manuscript to the secretaries.
Quirinus relates that Valerga audibly said, in reply to some question, "Guidi is misguided." But his neighbour replied that Guidi's speech contained nothing but the truth. "Yes," rejoined the Patriarch of Jerusalem, "but it is not always expedient to speak the truth." The excitement was great. Groups of prelates who had left the Hall might be seen standing about everywhere in earnest conversation, while within doors Bonnechose and Cullen were discoursing to a thin audience with absent minds. It was related that Guidi did not speak as a solitary individual, but represented fifteen bishops belonging to the Order of Dominicans. He had gathered them together in the central convent of the Minerva, where he himself resided. They had considered the question, and accepted the views which he had now presented to the Council. This was much against the feeling of Father Jandel, their general, who was perfectly free from any taint of the episcopal system, a thoroughly right-minded Papist. Guidi asked how the Cardinals had taken his speech, and Cardinal Mathieu replied, "With serious and silent approval."
Rumours were soon afloat in Rome as to what followed between Guidi and his royal master. What we now give is traced by Quirinus to the authority of the Pope himself, who is notoriously fond of telling the people with whom he chats how he has lectured this or that dignitary.[436]
The "creature" was summoned to the presence of his master soon after the sitting, and was greeted with the words, "You are my enemy. You are the coryphæus of my opponents. Ungrateful towards my person, you have propounded heretical doctrine." "My speech is in the hands of your Presidents, if your Holiness will read it and detect what is supposed to be heretical in it. I gave it at once to the Under-Secretary, that people might not be able to say that anything had been interpolated into it."[437] "You have given great offence to the majority of the Council. All five Presidents are against you, and are displeased." "Some material error may have escaped me, but certainly not a formal one. I have simply stated the doctrine of tradition, and of St. Thomas." "I am tradition. I will require you to make the profession of faith anew. La tradizione son' io, vi faro far nuovamente la professione di fide." "I am and remain subject to the authority of the Holy See, but I venture to discuss a question not yet made an article of faith. If your Holiness decides to be such in a Constitution, I certainly shall not dare to oppose it." "The value of your speech may be measured by those whom it has pleased. Who has been eager to testify to you his joy? That Bishop Strossmayer, who is my personal enemy, has embraced you. You are in collusion with him." "I do not know him, and have never before spoken to him." "It is clear you have spoken so as to please the world, the Liberals, the Revolution, and the government of Florence." "Holy Father, have the goodness to have my speech given to you."
It was said that the Pope stated afterwards that he had not sent for Guidi as a Cardinal, but as Brother Guidi, whom he had himself lifted out of the dust. The saying, "I am tradition," made an impression in Rome much like the celebrated one of the French monarch, "I am the State." It simply packed up and labelled the thought that had been more or less confusedly before the minds of all. Quirinus speaks of having often had the words "I am the Church" in his thoughts—l'Eglise c'est moi. We do not see that the Pope could have said anything more sensible or more exactly representing the theology and history which the favourite champions had put before the world. Quirinus very properly thinks that this formula fits well with the pregnant saying of Boniface VIII, "The Pope holds all rights locked up in his breast." Truths and rights go together. Tradition consists of truths, and the Pope is all truth. Rights are based upon the truths, and the Pope holds them all in his own breast. And if the poor old man himself at last uttered these sad words, it was only after the incense had smoked around him thousands and thousands of times, hiding the realities of heaven from him by clouds that were only fumes. For this others were responsible, at least in part. Under the influence of it, what wonder if his senses had become confused? Mankind will have reason to be thankful that one Pope lived long enough to be thoroughly overcome by the smoke of the sacrifices. The ordinary reason assigned in Rome for Popes being short-lived is, that it is necessary to prevent the effects of their power upon themselves.
The gravamen of Guidi's offence could not be removed by any subsequent submission. Seeing that the Canon he proposed had emerged into the light, the record could not be got out of the book of history that a Dominican, a divine of repute, a Cardinal in high credit, did up to that last hour of liberty hold that it was a heresy worthy of anathema to affirm the very doctrine which was soon to be part of "the faith." The record could not be prevented from going down to future ages that what was, on June 18, and under the dome of St. Peter's, liable to be called a heresy, was on July 18 under the same dome, promulged by the voice of the Pope as truth, and as binding on every human being who would be saved. Nor can craft ever blot out from the history of the eccentricities of intellect the instance offered by the fact that after this had been done, grave and learned men, even of advanced age and high office, went throughout the civilized world soberly affirming that the only reason why the dogma was then proclaimed, was that it had been clearly revealed by our Lord and His apostles, and had in every age been held as revealed truth by all Catholics, in all places.