It was in this position of affairs that the seers of the Vatican beheld all human institutions as if reduced by a cataclysm to a dark and roaring chaos. And on their principles chaos it was. Not only had kings and lawgivers withdrawn themselves from under the authority of the supreme tribunal, not only had civil courts been withdrawn from under the authority of the external tribunal, but almost all governments had ceased to enforce by law the attendance of their subjects on the internal tribunal of the Church which they thus degraded to the level of a voluntary confessional. In each of the three circles of all-embracing authority, therefore, order was now disrupted, and chaos had broken in. The seer could see but one remedy. Society must be reconstructed, and that upon the basis of one world-wide monarchy.
It is but slowly that minds accustomed to judge by ordinary standards learn to attach a precise meaning to such expressions as the above, in the language of the Vatican. Even after having learned how definite is the meaning, we do not soon begin to associate ideas of deliberate plan and serious expectation, with what would seem to be only dreams of the cloister. We therefore give a few clear sentences from Il Genio Cattolico, a publication praised by the authoritative Unitá Cattolica.[37] It describes the true ideal of the Papacy as being "an immense variety of languages, traditions, legislations, letters, commerce, institutions, and alliances, under the moral and pacific empire of a single Father, who, with the sceptre of the word, upholds the equilibrium of the world. The Papacy is not, as German jurists call it, a State within the State, but is a cosmopolitan authority, the moderator of all States, the supreme and universal standard of law and justice. It is a world-wide monarchy, from which all other monarchies that would call themselves Christian derive life, order, and equilibrium."
Coupling this distinct conception of the appointed place of the Papacy in the human commonwealth with the equally distinct conviction that modern society is in ruins, the writer proceeds: "What is the remedy? The recognition of a common father, who shall teach subjects to obey as sons, and sovereigns to rule as fathers; a supreme judge, to declare and give sanctions to the rights of the one and the other. Without this, how can the want of balance in the conflicting forces be redressed?"
With views thus radical and all-comprehending did the Court of Pius IX proceed to build up, after a very ancient ideal, an empire over all peoples, nations, and languages, the test of which should be acceptance of the religious symbol set up by the autocrat. In the projected reconstruction the ultimate end, the restoration of facts, would always include these cardinal points. Every man and every woman in Christendom, and, by a due extension of "the kingdom of God," every man and every woman living, must be bound by law to appear, at the least annually, in the internal tribunal of the Church, the confessional. In order to this, every civil magistrate must be set in obvious and in practical subordination to the ecclesiastical magistrate or bishop, by the subjection of the civil court to the external tribunal of the Church, the ecclesiastical court. In order to this, every king or lawgiver must be set also in obvious and in practical subordination to the supreme tribunal of the church, the Pope, by a restored state of international law, giving to the Pontiff, or, to speak accurately, recognizing in the Pontiff what God had given to him, full power to deliver sentence as supreme judge upon the rights of all kings, and upon the merits of every law.
We for the sake of clearness, say three tribunals, though technically they are only two, the Pope being in both supreme. Whether the subject enters by the foro externo or by the foro interno, by the ecclesiastical court or by the confessional, both in the ultimate instance conduct him to the one bar, that of the Judge of judges. The supreme tribunal is he, in all causes not purely material, in all causes whereinto enters any moral or religious consideration. Protestants would seem generally to imagine that the ecclesiastical court is a higher tribunal than the confessional. Not so. When a conflict arises between the sentence of the external tribunal and that of the internal, the suitor at the bar of God's kingdom is bound by the judgment of the internal tribunal![38]
In Carleton's Traits and Stories of the Irish Peasantry, where the only symbol of any tribunal is a rickety chair standing on an earthen floor full of holes, the priest of God has no sooner put on robe and stole than "the tribunal" is as truly constituted as when in the palace of Charles V sat Domenico Soto with the imperial penitent kneeling before him, and said, "So far you have confessed the sins of Charles, now confess those of the Emperor." In that tribunal has the peasant bride to learn, and has the Queen to learn, that not the husband is the head of the woman, but the priest of God. In that tribunal has the shoeless Connaught child and has the imperial prince to learn that not the parents are the head of the children, but the priest of God. In that tribunal has the debtor and has the creditor, the executor and the legatee to learn that not the law of the civil bench obliges, but the law pronounced by the priest of God. In that tribunal have all these to learn that not even the law which falls from the ecclesiastical judge in the external tribunal is to be taken, but that which in the internal tribunal, in holy secrecy, between the conscience alone and the judge alone, falls with full force of binding and of loosing from the lips of the priest of God. So in the other, the external tribunal, has every citizen to learn, and every public servant, that not the magistrate is the head of the town, and not the chief magistrate is the head of the city, but that the bishop is head of both one and the other, for he is the head of the priests of God. Finally, at the supreme bar have the princes, the governors and captains, the judges, the treasurers, the counsellors, the sheriffs, and all the rulers of the provinces, to learn that not the president, not the grand duke, not the king, not the emperor, is the head of the nation, but the thrice-crowned King of kings, the Great High Priest of God.
This kingdom, it is held, with some stretching of the facts, did in the Ages of Faith prevail, and it is to be restored.
The restoration of facts could not be effected without a foregoing restoration of the idea of Hildebrand. Constantine had founded a State Church. Leo III, with Charlemagne, had founded what Mr. Bryce accurately describes as a Catholic State, with the Pope as spiritual and the Emperor as temporal head. Cardinal Manning points out that in this Mr. Bryce makes the holy Roman Empire a two-headed monster.[39] Nevertheless Mr. Bryce gives the true human history, though doubtless Cardinal Manning, following Boniface VIII, gives the correct Papal doctrine. According to that doctrine, the dualism of a double-headed State amounted to a sort of Manicheism. History, which is guilty of tainting many with one heresy or another, must bear the fault of Mr. Bryce's Manicheism. But Hildebrand would abolish all dualism. The whole world must have one head. Constantine's idea of a State Church had its merit of unity, but it was unity by perversion of rights. The true idea was that of a Church State, embracing the whole world, and placing all mankind as one fold under one shepherd. This true idea was to be restored.
We shall in its place, be taught how we err in calling power over temporal affairs temporal power. More accurately, does Cardinal Manning speak of "the supreme judicial power of the Church in temporal things."[40] He speaks of "the indirect spiritual power of the Church over the temporal State,"[41] thus showing the error of the notion that spiritual power means only power over spiritual affairs. He speaks of "the Christian jurisprudence in which the Roman Pontiff was recognized as the Supreme Judge of Princes and People, with a twofold coercion, spiritual by his own authority, and temporal by the secular arm."[42]
The turn of phraseology in the last sentence is probably not undesigned. Had it been employed by a Protestant, Ultramontanes, if writing in Italy, would have cried out, Ignorance and inaccuracy! Does the Cardinal mean that the authority whereby the Pope through the secular arm applies temporal coercion is not his own authority? No, assuredly. Yet he leaves us in a position to slip into some such idea. In such coercion as that of which he speaks it is not that the secular power acts of its own authority, but that it acts with its own arm, but with the Pope's authority. The interesting doctrine of the Brahman as sprung from the Creator's head, and the King-caste as sprung from his arm, reappears in the Papal system, in which the priest anointed on the head and the prince anointed on the arm symbolize respectively the authority that gives law and the force that carries it out.[43] But Cardinal Manning's definition of Christian jurisprudence as that wherein the Pope is recognized as supreme Judge of Prince and People is not only strict, but it also explains a whole set of terms—Christian government, Christian law, Christian order, Christian civilization, and so forth.