Chapter VII
EXPERIENCE IN ENGLAND
Attack on fleet at Boulogne. Torpedoing of Dorothea (1805). Effect of Trafalgar on Fulton’s work. Copies of “Drawings and Descriptions.” Intent of government not to proceed with the submarine. Correspondence with Lord Hawkesbury and Mr. Pitt (1804). Commission of investigation appointed. Decision adverse to a submarine. Nevertheless Pitt signs contract.
Two years had passed since the execution of the contract, during which time Fulton remained actively at work for the Government. He made an attack on the French fleet at Boulogne by means of his bombs but without success. He explained the cause, and probably correctly, but nevertheless he was charged with failure. Then he repeated the experiment with altered details in the mechanism and blew up a brig called the “Dorothea” on October 15, 1805, in the presence of Pitt and other officials. Success was again in sight, but only to vanish as quickly as it appeared.
Six days after the destruction of the “Dorothea” came the great event that made secure England’s control of the sea. On October 21st, Nelson destroyed the combined French and Spanish fleets in the decisive battle of Trafalgar. After that England had no need of submarines, torpedoes or Fulton. Her ships of oak were absolutely supreme, and she saw the force of Lord St. Vincent’s criticism.
The parallel between 1805 and 1922 is close. Then as now, and for similar reasons, England was, and is, opposed to the use of submarines in warfare.
Mention was made above that the “Descriptions” he left in England had been copied. Fulton did this with nearly all his important papers, and the copies were in manuscript, not letter press tissues. In this case the copy is in the possession of Edward C. Cammann, Esq., a great grandson, and bears several dates. To the main recital are added 41 pages of the same size paper, of which 12 pages contain material entitled “London August the 16th, 1806. Notes on observations of the Arbitrators, Particularly of Capt. Hamilton and Sir Charles Blagden in answer to objections stated by them.” The balance are taken up by letters to Lord Grenville dated September the 3rd, and “Further considerations on the instantaneous and clockwork bombs.”
Before leaving England he also copied the drawings. These copies are on thin paper and are obviously tracings of the original “Drawings” that are on bristol board. In the course of time the tracings have become separated from the manuscript copy and are now the property of the New Jersey Historical Society at Newark, N. J. The latter plates are signed and dated 1806, whereas the originals bear date 1804. In the eleventh clause of the contract Fulton stated that he had “deposited the drawing and plans of his submarine scheme of attack in the hands of a confidential friend with the view to their being delivered to the American Government in case of his death.” As it is unlikely that Fulton made two sets of carefully prepared drawings in 1804, the evidence is presumptive that the plans above referred to are the ones that have recently been found in England and that form the basis of this book. The American Consul at the time, especially as he was a man of character and responsibility, would be the natural depositary for papers of semi-official character. Of the original drawings, numbers 1, 6, 8, 10 and 11 are unfortunately missing. Through the courtesy of the Historical Society their copies have been used to make good the deficiency.
By the spring of 1806, Fulton had no misapprehensions as to the intent of the British Government. It was quite clear to him, as his letters show, that the authorities had decided not to use his devices for either submarine or torpedoes. It is also likely that he had received an intimation that his salary would be discontinued. Professional recognition was to be denied him, and unless he was also willing to forego hope for substantial pecuniary recompense he must have recourse to the arbitration clause of his contract.
Whether the necessity for such action came as a surprise to Fulton, one thing is clear from his letters. In spite of a liberal contract, carrying a generous salary and full allowance for his disbursements, Fulton had not been happy from the very first. He was impatient at every delay and intolerant of every suggestion. He would not, or could not, understand that the progress of government affairs is always slow, and that no government official, no matter how exalted his rank, could make decision promptly without reference to his professional advisors. The similar errors in judgment that he committed in France he repeated in England.
His letters, of which he wrote many, are from the very first couched in terms that it must be confessed are impatient, dictatorial and fault-finding, and never in that diplomatic and conciliatory form that has always been considered proper when addressing high government officials. This is particularly true when one remembers that he was corresponding with men holding office under George III, a period when those directing government did not hesitate to arrogate to themselves full autocratic powers and to regard all who were not in their own class as far removed inferiors. From others than their associates they were not inclined to accept dictation or brook carping criticism. That the several ministers with whom Fulton dealt tolerated the tone of his communications and overlooked his demands and complaints, is most striking testimony of the high regard in which they held his devices. Just so long as France was in a position to threaten their power on the ocean they intended to keep and hold Fulton safe.