[232]. The Nautical Almanack.

[233]. In this interval, that is to say, towards the close of the year 1788, Dr. Rittenhouse’s eldest daughter was married to the late Jonathan Dickinson Sergeant, Esq. of Philadelphia.

[234]. A few days after this date (about the 20th of August,) the writer of these memoirs was nominated by the president to the senate, and by their advice and consent thereto was appointed, to be one of the judges of the western territory (now the state of Ohio, &c.): the other judges, nominated and appointed with him, were Samuel Holden Parsons and John Cleves Symmes, Esquires. Major-General Arthur St. Clair, who may, in some respects, be considered as a modern Bellisarius, was at the same time appointed, in like manner, to be governor of that territory.[[234a]] The writer declined the honour intended for him by this appointment, which was unsolicited on his part: he resigned it in a day or two after.

The promptitude with which this mark of president Washington’s approbation of the person recommended to him by Mr. Rittenhouse, was bestowed, is an evidence of the respect in which the president held that gentleman’s recommendation; and it is the more so, as Mr. Rittenhouse’s letter was the only one addressed to the president on that occasion.

[234a]. For many interesting particulars concerning the sufferings and ill-requited services of this respectable veteran—of a man who once filled the chair of congress, and uniformly possessed the friendship and confidence of Washington, see his Narrative, lately published.

[235]. According to Dr. Ramsay, “the depreciation began at different periods in different states; but, in general, about the middle of the year 1777, and progressively increased for three or four years.” In the first four or five months of 1780, it depreciated to 50 or 60 for one. “Its circulation,” continues Dr. Ramsay, “was afterwards partial; but, where it passed, it soon depreciated to 150 for one. In some few parts, it continued in circulation for the first four or five months of 1781; but in this latter period, many would not take it at any rate, and they who did, received it at a depreciation of several hundreds for one.”

Hist. Am. Revol.

In October, 1779, it was resolved by congress, that no further sum in this paper-money should be issued, on any account whatever, than would, when added to the sum then in circulation, amount to 200 millions of dollars. In their circular letter of the 13th of September preceding, addressed to their constituents, congress asserted the practicability of redeeming all the continental bills at par, with gold and silver; and rejected, with indignation, the supposition that the states would ever tarnish their credit by violating public faith. “These strong declarations in favour of the paper-currency,” says Dr. Ramsay, “deceived many to repose confidence in it, to their utter ruin.” In addition to the amount of many millions of dollars, in paper-emissions of the several states, congress, soon after, actually continued to issue their own paper, until it amounted in the whole to the enormous sum of 200 millions of dollars! That which was of little value before, now became of less, and soon afterwards good for nothing. The inevitable consequence was, that thousands of meritorious citizens were entirely ruined, and others greatly injured in their property.

[236]. The judiciary is the only department of government, in a republic, the officers of which ought (conformably to the principles of that form of government) to be permanent in their stations. Judges, in order to secure their independence, and thereby enable them to administer justice faithfully and impartially, should hold their offices quamdiu se bené gesserint: and, should they violate the condition of this tenure, the constitution should provide, as that of Pennsylvania, in conformity to those of the union as well as her sister states, does, that they should no longer continue in office. Thus, this branch of the government would have formed the only safe and effectual check, against such unconstitutional attempts as might be made upon the chartered rights of individuals or the public, by either the legislative or executive power. But, unfortunately, the dependent nature of the judiciary, under the constitution of 1776, rendered it incompetent to that end. Hence, as was noticed by the writer of these memoirs on a former occasion,[[236a]] “the framers of the first constitution of the state of Pennsylvania discovered the indispensable necessity of providing some tribunal for preserving the constitution entire. They accordingly instituted a periodical body, in the nature of a judicial inquest, and styled the council of censors; whose duty it was, “to enquire whether the constitution had been preserved inviolate in every part; and whether the legislative and executive branches of government had performed their duty, as guardians of the people, or exercised other or greater powers, than they were entitled to by the constitution.” “This censorial tribunal was, however, ill calculated to answer the purposes of its institution. It was, itself, a temporary body, appointed immediately by the people. In the alternation, and casual ascendency, of different parties in the country, a contingency inseparable from the nature of a popular government, the council of sensors became the representatives of the passions, the prejudices, the political interests, of whatever party might happen to be the predominant one at the moment of their election. If this should prove to be the same party with that which had borne the sway, during the seven years immediately preceding their election, they would be disposed to sanction the proceedings of that party: otherwise, they would be likely to censure and pronounce unconstitutional, the official measures of an adverse party, without just cause, impelled thereto by a spirit of party-hostility.

“Under a government thus constituted, all would be uncertain and insecure. From the deficiency of one stationary and independent department in its administration, the rights of the people and the best interests of the state would, eventually, become the sport of opposite and contending parties; these rights and interests would be sacrificed at the shrine of some desperate and unprincipled faction; the constitution itself, destitute of any steady disinterested support against their machinations, would be overthrown: till, finally, the people, having no longer any rallying point of security for their persons or property, would be driven from anarchy and licentiousness into the arms of despotism.