"On neurological grounds, therefore, nurture is to be considered of much less importance than nature, and in that sense the capacities we most admire in persons worthy of remark are certainly inborn rather than made" (p. 344).
"Size, therefore, has a meaning; but it is by no means entitled to dominate the whole interpretation of the central system" (p. 352).
"No amount of education will cause enlargement or organization where the rough materials, the cells, are wanting; and, on the other hand, where these materials are present, they will in some degree become evident, whether purposely educated or not" (p. 355).
"Races which have progressed farthest in civilization are also those which possess a large brain-weight; but the converse of this proposition is by no means true, for the tables also show that there are races possessed of a large brain-weight and yet uncivilized" (p. 359).
Having now reviewed all pertinent anatomical differences, Dr. Boas declares (p. 317): "Our conclusion is, that there are differences between the physical characters of races which make it probable that there may be differences in faculty. No unquestionable fact, however, has been found yet which would prove beyond a doubt that it will be impossible for certain races to attain a higher civilization."
This conclusion is drawn so mildly that it seems hard to quarrel with it. But we must observe that it is not exactly a question of "higher civilization," but of the highest, as high as the Caucasian has attained or can attain: no one doubts that the Guinea Negro may be improved—he has been improved right here in the United States; the question is, can he keep pace with the White man? and everything thus far suggests, and almost compels, the answer, No! Again, it is not precisely a question of "impossibility" but of "improbability." All things are possible with God and even to the thought of man; but for the practical reason, the improbability here admitted is controlling. Once more, it is not by any means a matter of one "unquestionable fact;" such a single decisive indicium is nowhere easy to find and can seldom be demanded; it is the consensus of all the indications that is practically conclusive, and it is this consensus that has been so unfortunately disregarded.
The remaining ten pages of this address are devoted to "the psychological characteristics of primitive people." "This investigation is extremely difficult and unpromising"; nor do we think there can be much profit in following it up closely, since hardly anywhere is the ground traversed solid beneath the feet. The method employed is a continuation of that with which we are already familiar. One by one are taken up the counts of the indictment brought against the primitive mind by ethnologists, such as Wuttke, Klemm, Eichthal, De Gobineau, Nott and Gliddon. Thus, Wuttke and Klemm characterize the civilized races as active, all others as passive, and refer even American civilization to contact with some earlier form. Eichthal thinks of society as an organism, the White race representing the male, the Black the female, principle. De Gobineau designates the Yellow as the male, the Black as the female element, and admits only the White as noble and gifted. Nott and Gliddon ascribe only animal instincts to the lower races, but the civilizing instinct to the White only. All such schematism seems to us highly unscientific and is justly rejected. Tylor and Spencer analyze the primitive mind ingeniously, but do not assume that it is racially determined, though something of the kind seems implied in evolution. Waitz alone meets with sanction in declaring: "According to the current opinion the stage of culture of a people or of an individual is largely or exclusively a product of his faculty. We maintain that the reverse is at least just as true. The faculty of man does not designate anything but how much and what he is able to achieve in the immediate future and depends upon the stages of culture through which he has passed and the one he has reached." This is declared to be "the true point of view" and to be "expressed most happily." To us it seems far out of focus and expressed about as emptily and unhappily as possible. Certainly it is not the clearest thinking that regards a proposition and its "reverse" as "at least just as true." Remembering that faculty is related to facio, we accept the statement as to what it "designates;" but to say that it "depends upon the stages of culture through which he has passed and the one he has reached," is like saying that a youth's mathematical faculty depends upon the fact that he "has passed through" the Freshman, Sophomore, and Junior "stages of culture" and "has reached" the Senior. He may do this with the genius of Gauss, or he may do it in a perfunctory manner, without the ability to grasp and master such elementary notions as derivative and integral. If Waitz should now reply that such a youth has not really "passed through these stages," then we answer that he thereby assigns a new meaning to the phrase and evacuates his words of all definite import. In common parlance, the mathematical faculty of Gauss, his power to do in the immediate future, was amazing in his childhood, before he reached any notable "stages of culture" in mathematics. Still more striking is the case of Pascal. We do not deny that there may be some occult sense in which Waitz's words are true; but it is scarcely worth guessing at and, when divined, it will hardly add much to the clear deliverances of Bischoff, Donaldson, and others. [ [24] ]
The address before us now examines (p. 319) some of the "mental qualities" held to be "racial characteristics" of the "primitives," and rejects them one by one as "not proven." Such are "impulsiveness," "inability of concentration," "lack of originality." In our judgement, the most important of all instincts of civilization is the speculative, the pure-scientific, the impulse to know simply for the sake of knowing—most splendidly present in the Greek and the Teuton. It seems hard to believe, and certainly there is not a scintilla of evidence, that any such is a native quality of the Negro or Australian mind. But in these pages we find no firm basis for contention; the facts are not yet definitely ascertained. Enough that, if along these lines no case is made out against the primitive—and we have carefully refrained from trying to make out any—yet avowedly no case is made out for him; and the evidence, as far as it goes, is certainly not in his favour.
In conclusion, page 324 raises the important question whether "the faculty of man has been improved by civilization, and particularly, if that of primitive races may be improved by this agency." Civilization and domestication cause analogous anatomical changes, and it is likely that "mental changes" "go hand in hand with them." But no more.
No "progressive changes of the human organism," "particularly no advance in the size or complexity of the structure of the central nervous system caused by the cumulative influences of civilization can be proved." There are considerable psychic changes consequent on domestication and civilization; but these are due to environment. Any changes progressive or transmissible by heredity seem doubtful. None of this do we contest. On "relapses," we need not pause.