3. The acquisition of interests through the war.
Finally, during the past few years, the relation of the United States to the rest of the world has been changed by reason of the interests acquired through the war. The fact that the Treaty of Versailles did not receive the approval of the Senate does not in any way impair the rights and interests which the United States acquired as one of the victors in the war. Those interests, obtained at great sacrifice and acknowledged by Germany in the separate treaty which the United States made with that country in 1921, are spread over virtually the entire world. They are of incalculable value, present and future. No policy of isolation is now possible unless the country is ready to abandon these privileges altogether, and, for reasons which will presently be stated, the surrender of these various American interests is out of the question. In the new world order the United States cannot hold off from the rest of the world. The policy of a nation is determined by what it regards as its own vital interests.
Wide scope of these interests.
The New American Interests.—Some important interests in various parts of the world were acquired by the United States before the war; others have been obtained or intensified as a result of it. The scope and nature of these interests may best be explained, perhaps, by grouping them under four main heads, according to their general geographical location, namely, Europe, Central and South America, the Far East, and the Near East. It is not possible to arrange them in the order of their relative importance, for only the future can determine what this order of importance may turn out to be. Certain it is, however, that in all four world-areas the interests of the United States are of vast consequence not only to the American people but to the cause of world peace and prosperity. Above and beyond all, moreover, is the vital interest of America in the maintenance of international amity. Apart from the loss of life, America’s participation in the World War cost the country, directly and indirectly, more than thirty thousand million dollars. That is indeed a heavy price to pay for helping to settle a quarrel which the United States had no part in promoting. It surely requires no argument to prove that America has a vital interest in avoiding another such calamity.
America’s interests now extend to everything that may threaten peace.
America and Europe.—The war resulted in placing Great Britain, France, Italy, and the other victorious countries of Europe under heavy obligations to the United States. To a certain extent these obligations are sentimental; in return for America’s help towards winning the war the other victorious countries are under a natural obligation to give the United States an adequate share in determining the permanent conditions of peace. This they have been willing to do; but it involves responsibilities which the United States has shown no great willingness to accept. The old tradition of non-interference in strictly European affairs is still strong and this has led the American government to distinguish, wherever possible, between questions of local and of world-wide concern. The distinction, however, is practically impossible to make. The boundaries of some small European state may seem to be a matter of no concern at Washington; but if a disagreement over this question should bring once more a general European clash of arms, the importance of the issue would speedily be recognized. So long as the general preservation of world-peace is among the primary interests of the United States, as it seems bound to be, no menace to peace, anywhere, at any time, can be lightly regarded by the people of America.
The Loans to Associated Nations.—But the war did not result in the creation of sentimental obligations only. Obligations of great importance and a tangible nature on the part of Europe to America grew out of it. During the conflict the United States loaned large sums of money to Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia, and the other Associated Powers.[[298]] These loans were made generously, in the midst of a grave emergency; but nothing definite was arranged as to when or how they should be repaid. |How the loans were made.| In view of the disorganized conditions in Europe created by the war no request for the payment of interest was made by the United States during the conflict or for some years after its close. In 1922, however, Congress authorized the President to appoint a commission of five persons to arrange with the European countries for the funding of the debts by the issue of bonds. These bonds will be given to the United States.
Now it must be reasonably clear to anyone who gives the matter a moment’s thought that until these bonds are paid off by the various European countries (which will be thirty or forty years hence) the United States will be vitally interested in what Washington called the “vicissitudes” of the Old World. |America’s mortgage on Europe.| America, in effect, holds a mortgage on Europe, and it is the practice of mortgage-holders to keep a sharp eye on their invested funds. Great Britain, France, and the other debtor countries expect to redeem these loans, in considerable part, out of reparation payments made to them by Germany. If Germany does not pay them, it will be much harder for them to pay America.[[299]] In this roundabout way, therefore, the United States has acquired a tangible interest in the pledges made by the German government.
America’s Interest in the Industrial Reconstruction of Europe.—The sum total of America’s interest in the peace and prosperity of Europe is not represented, however, by these ten billion dollars of loans. The commercial relations of the two continents have become so intimate that whatever is an injury to the one is a detriment to the other. Europe is America’s best customer. Our exports there are greater than to all the rest of the world put together. |Importance of Europe as a market.| The farmer, the cotton grower, the manufacturer—all depend in part upon the European market. There is not sufficient demand at home for all the foodstuffs, materials, and manufactured goods which the United States can now produce. The European market, however, has been broken down as the result of the long conflict and it is greatly to the interest of the United States that it should be built up again. This can only be done by keeping the world at peace until the damage done by the war has been repaired. For that commercial reason, if for no other, the United States cannot well afford to remain entirely isolated from the rest of the world.
The United States and Latin-America.—The relations of the United States with most of the Latin-American states have been at all times friendly. We have never been at war with any of them except Mexico. When these various countries revolted against Spanish control about a hundred years ago, the people of the United States, remembering their own experience, were in sympathy with them. The announcement of the Monroe Doctrine was regarded by Latin-America as an act of friendliness. And for more than a century since that time the United States has served as a protector to the sister republics of the southern continent. When the War with Spain began in 1898 Congress announced that the United States had no intention to annex Cuba and this pledge, at the close of the war, was kept. Cuba was given her independence. Naturally this evidence of good faith made a strong and favorable impression upon the Central and South American states.