China and Japan.
Apart from affairs in the Philippines the problems of the Far East, so far as the United States is concerned, center around two present-day international phenomena, the weakness of China and the strength of Japan. China is a vast country with at least three or four times the population of the United States. Although nominally a republic its government is weak, inefficient, unable to exercise firm control over all parts of the country, and without effective means of national defence. Quite naturally, therefore, China offers a temptation to any strong country desiring exclusive trade advantages for itself. Her nearest neighbor, Japan, would speedily be able to secure entire control of the Chinese Republic and make China a vassal state were it not for the deterring influence of the other great powers of the world.
In 1899, after the close of the Spanish War, the government of the United States addressed a note to all the great powers urging that they agree to seek no further special trade advantages in China, that the integrity of Chinese territory be preserved, and that the principle of “equal and impartial trade” should be adopted. |The “open door.”| To this suggestion all the powers agreed. This policy thus accepted has become known as the policy of the “open door”, and until the outbreak of the World War it was substantially followed, except that the various powers retained the commercial advantages that they had already acquired.
During this war, however, Japan attacked and captured Kiao-Chao, a port which had been leased by China to Germany for a long term of years, and this territory the Japanese continued to hold after the war was over. Not until the Washington conference of 1922 did Japan agree to give it up. |Recent developments.| In 1918, moreover, the government of Japan made a list of twenty-one demands upon China for special privileges, and although some of these demands were later modified or withdrawn entirely, several important privileges were wrung from the Chinese. In connection with these negotiations the United States government gave assurance in the so-called Ishii-Lansing agreement that the United States would recognize the “special interest” of Japan in Chinese affairs. It is avowedly the policy of Japan to acquire, if she can, the same predominance in Asia that the United States has exercised in North and South America.
The Conference on Pacific Problems. Regarding it as highly desirable that all controversies affecting the Far East and the Pacific should be amicably settled, thus forestalling the growth of large naval armaments on both sides of the Western ocean, President Harding in the summer of 1921 proposed that the Washington conference should discuss these questions and should endeavor to secure a satisfactory solution of them. |The Washington conference.| The conference did so, and embodied the results of its negotiations in certain agreements, particularly in what is commonly known as the “Four Power” treaty. By the terms of this treaty the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan mutually agree to respect the integrity of each other’s possessions in the islands of the Pacific.[[300]] The nations represented at the conference also agreed to refrain from the erection of fortifications in certain places now unfortified.
Out of the negotiations at Washington, moreover, came the agreement on the part of Japan to restore Kiao-Chao and the adjacent province of Shantung to China. First and last, therefore, the Washington conference succeeded in promoting an amicable agreement on most of the questions at issue. It did not, however, take up the question of Japanese immigration to the Pacific Coast of America, nor did it discuss the grievances of the Japanese immigrants already there. These matters are left for further negotiation through the regular diplomatic channels.
America and the Near East.—The expression “Near East” is commonly regarded as including the areas which lie at the eastern end of the Mediterranean and thereabouts; it comprises Turkey, Armenia, Syria, Palestine, Arabia, Mesopotamia, and other territories in the same general region. As a result of the war the Turkish Empire has been disintegrated; most of its territories have been virtually placed under the control of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Greece through the instrumentality of mandates (see p. [636]). The United States was offered the mandate for Armenia, but declined to accept it.
The oil question.
Now some of these territories are rich in natural resources. Mesopotamia, for example, is known to possess extensive oil fields. The question arises, therefore, whether the European countries which hold the mandates are to have the lion’s share of this natural wealth. And it is a question of considerable importance when one bears in mind the fact that the oil fields of the United States will probably be exhausted before many decades have passed (see p. [330]). The direct interest of the United States is less immediate, perhaps, than in the other areas (Europe, Central and South America, and the Far East), but it is sufficiently vital to deserve mention.
The Wide Scope of America’s Interests.—From this brief and general survey some idea of the scope of American interests can be gained. But the preceding paragraphs have not listed them all. The people of the United States have a sentimental interest in many foreign problems where no economic considerations are at stake. Ireland is an example. America’s interest in a just and peaceful settlement of the Irish question is not inspired by economic motives. It arises in large part from the sentimental desire to see a people, with whom there are close ties of kinship, attain contentment and prosperity. So with Poland and the new Slavic countries of Continental Europe. America would regret to see them lose a status of independence which was gained at so great a sacrifice.