Government by representatives.
Popular Rule through Representatives.—Although public opinion exerts a guiding influence upon the course of government, the actual work of making the laws and putting them into operation must be performed, for the most part, by individuals selected for this purpose, that is by elective or appointive officers. We say “elective or appointive” because these are the two ways in which officers of government may be chosen; they may be elected by popular vote, or they may be appointed by some authority which, in turn, has been elected by the people. The members of all legislative bodies in the United States (Congress, the state legislatures, city and town councils) are directly elected by the people. The chief executive officers in the nation, state, and city (President, governors, and mayors) are chosen in the same way.[[25]] In many states it is also the custom to choose some other executive officers, such as the attorney-general, state auditors, superintendent of education, as well as the judges and prosecuting attorneys by direct popular election. Subordinate officers of administration, on the other hand, are for the most part appointed. In the national government all officials of administration subordinate to the President are appointed by him, likewise all judges and court officers. In the state and local governments, some subordinate officers are elected but most of them are appointed by the governor, the county commissioners, or the mayor, as the case may be.
When we should elect and when appoint.
Election or Appointment, Which is Better?—We often encounter the question: Which is the better plan of securing good men in public office—to elect them or to have them appointed? The answer to this question depends upon what we expect the officials to do. If the function of the official is to represent the people in deciding questions of general policy as in the case of a congressman, a state legislator, or a municipal councilman, the people ought to choose him. It is the right and the duty of the people to choose their own representatives. If they did not do so, we should not have “representative” government. But if the function of the official is not to decide questions of general policy but to do work which requires skill and experience, it is better to make the office appointive. The rule, in brief, may be stated as follows: When you want representation, elect; when you want skill or experience, appoint. Some difficulty arises, however, in the case of officials who are expected both to represent the people and to perform functions which require expertness. Take, for example, the state treasurer or the state auditor. These officials represent the financial interests of the people; they are also called upon to perform functions which require skill and experience. Officials in this dual class are in some states elected; in others they are appointed by the governor. Whether we ought to use one method or the other depends upon where we place the emphasis—upon representation or upon administrative efficiency. Account should also be taken of the fact that if too many officials are elected the ballot will be long and complicated. In that case some poorly-qualified candidates are likely to be chosen because voters will not go through a long list carefully (see p. [132]).
Should a representative obey his own conscience or the will of the voters?
The Function of a Representative.—The function of a representative, as the term implies, is to represent. But how is he to be guided in the performance of this function? Is it the duty of a representative in Congress or in a state legislature to reflect the public opinion of his district whether he personally agrees with it or not? Should he obey the dictates of his own conscience and follow his own view of what the public welfare demands, or should he disregard these things and consider only the opinions of those voters who elected him? Let us suppose, for example, that a congressman personally believes in free trade. He is absolutely convinced, let us assume, that this is the only right policy. But he also knows, let us say, that the voters of his district are overwhelmingly in favor of high protective duties because they believe that wages will be higher if foreign goods are shut out. What is the duty of this congressman when called upon to vote for or against a protective tariff? Which should control—his own conviction or the opinions of those who elected him as their representative?
Edmund Burke’s views.
Many years ago the eminent Irish orator and statesman, Edmund Burke, gave his opinion on this matter in a speech to the voters of Bristol, whom he represented in the British House of Commons. A representative, according to Burke, ought to give due weight to the opinions of those who elected him, but he ought not to sacrifice his own best judgment to any man or to any group of men. It is the function of a representative to master all the details of public problems, which the people of his district cannot be expected to do, and to make his decision accordingly. “I maintained your interests against your opinions,” he said to the voters of Bristol in defending his actions. “A representative worthy of you ought to be a person of stability. I am to look, indeed, to your opinions, but to such opinions as you and I must have five years hence. I am not to look to the flash of the day.”
Public officials in the United States do not usually talk that way. They dilate upon the wisdom of the people, and profess their own readiness to conform to whatever the people demand. They are prone to forget that a representative in Congress or in a state legislature does not represent his own district alone. He is in effect a representative of the whole people in nation or state. It is poor patriotism to sacrifice the best interests of the whole to the desires of any single community. At the same time when public opinion is strong and clear, we expect the representatives of the people to hearken to it. When it is vague or in doubt, the representative must depend upon his own judgment. If a representative cannot, because of his own conscientious belief, do what the people expect him to do, his duty is to resign. Representatives, however, do not often resign for this or any other reason.
The Appointment of Public Officials.