[190] Man’s Place in the Cosmos, a book consisting of essays and reviews published by the author during the last four or five years. They all advocate “humanism in opposition to naturalism,” or “ethicism in opposition to a too narrow intellectualism.”
[191] The Will to Believe, 1897.
[192] “Progress in Philosophy,” art. Mind, 15, p. 213.
[193] Practical Ethics; Essays.
[194] Mental Development—Social and Ethical Interpretations (a work crowned by the Royal Academy of Denmark). We can see in this book how a psychologist has been led into a far-reaching study of social and ethical development in order to gain an understanding of the growth of even the individual mind. We may indeed say that the individualistic intellectualism of the older psychology is now no more. It was too “abstract” a way of looking at mind. Professor Royce, it is well known, has given, from the stand-point of a professed metaphysician, a cordial welcome to the work of Professor Baldwin. In an important review of Mr. Stout’s two admirable volumes on Analytic Psychology (Mind, July, 1897), Professor Royce has insisted strongly upon the need of supplementing introspection by the “interpretation of the reports and the conduct of other people” if we would know much about “dynamic” psychology. It is this “dynamic” psychology—the “dynamics” of the will and of the “feelings”—that I think constitutes such an important advance upon the traditional “intellectual” and “individualistic” psychology.
[195] The Psychology of the Moral Self. Macmillan, 1897. I have tried, in a short notice of this book in the Philosophical Review (March, 1898), to indicate the importance of some of its chief contentions.
[196] Philosophical Lectures and Remains, edited by Professor Bradley.
[197] Editor of La Science Sociale. His recent work on the Superiority of the Anglo-Saxons (À quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-Saxons?)—a chapter in the study of the conditions of race survival—ran through seventeen editions in a few months, and set the whole press of France and Germany (other countries following suit) into commotion, as well as calling forth pronunciamientos from most of the prominent editors and critics of France,—men like Jules Lemaître, Paul Bourget, Marcel Prevost, François Coppée, Édouard Rod, G. Valbert, etc.
[198] Now Professor A. Seth Pringle-Pattison.
[199] In different ways by all of the following English writers: Professor A. Seth (“It is not in knowledge, then, as such, but in feeling and action that reality is given,” Man’s Place, etc., p. 122, etc. etc.), by Mr. Bradley (Appearance and Reality), by Mr. Balfour (in his Foundations of Belief), and by Professor James. Professor Eucken, of Jena, in his different books, also insists strongly upon the idea that it is not in knowledge as such, but in the totality of our psychical experience that the principles of philosophy must be sought. Paulsen, in his Einleitung in die Philosophie, and Weber, in his History of Philosophy (books in general use to-day), both advocate a kind of philosophy of the will, the idea that the world is to be regarded as a striving on the part of wills after a partly unconscious ideal. Simmel, in an important article in the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, IV. 2, expresses the idea (which it would be well to recognize generally at the present time) that truth is not something objectively apart from us, but rather the name we give to conceptions that have proved to be the guides to useful actions, and so become part of the psychical heritage of human beings. Professor Ribot, of Paris, has written more extensively upon the will and the feelings than upon the intellect,—a fact in keeping with the scientific demands of our day.