[First Discourse of the Bishop of Peterborough, delivered in Norwich Cathedral, March 28th, 1871.]
On Tuesday evening, March 28th, the Right Rev. Dr. Magee, Lord Bishop of Peterborough, preached the first of a series of Sermons on Christianity and Freethought, before a large congregation in the nave of the Cathedral. According to the Dean’s previous arrangements, the nave was occupied by men, and the south aisle by ladies. The nave was brilliantly lighted, and the Lord Bishop of Norwich and the full chapter took part in the service.
After prayers were intoned and a hymn sung, the Right Rev. Prelate selected his text from the Gospel according to St. John, viii. 33: “How sayest thou, Ye shall be made free?” His Lordship said:
The scene that is described in this chapter makes, I think, a fitting introduction to the series of sermons of which I am here to-night to preach the first. These sermons are meant to be pleadings for Christ. Their object is to win back to him those who may have left him, to cause those who have not left him to cling to him more strongly; to win back disciples to Christ, and to confirm disciples in their discipleship. That is what I and those who are to follow me here have in view. For this reason I ask you to-night to study this story in the life of Christ, because it is one in which we see how Christ himself, long ago, first won and then lost disciples.
The scene commences with a large accession of disciples to Christ. We read, that as he spoke these words many believed on him, and the scene ends with many of those very believers taking up stones to cast at him. First they believed on him, shortly after they seek to take his life; and after this is over, we read how his own disciples came to him again, and said to him, “Master, tell us.” Now, brethren, we Christians believe that in this scene was a prophecy of the whole history of Christ’s life upon earth in his Church; the story of those who come and those who go, of those who believe in him at first, and of those who cease to believe in him, and also the inner history of those that never forsake him. We believe that when the noisy strife of things has passed away, and the execrations of those that hated him have ceased to ring upon the ear, there still will be heard the voice of the Church, saying “Master, tell us,” that which others will not, or cannot listen to; “Master, to whom shall we go? thou hast the words of eternal life.” But it is not on those who thus stay with Christ that I ask you to fix your attention. I ask you to-night to contemplate with me, not those who remain with him, but those who leave him. I ask you to understand a little of that mental history that is here shown us, telling us how they passed from belief to doubt, and from doubt to rejection of Christ.
It will be profitable to us, I think, both to those who believe and to those who unhappily disbelieve in Christ, that we should study a little this early instance of Freethought and disbelief. It will be good for those who do not believe in Christ to look at this scene, because it will show this fact, that there were those who disbelieved in Christ. It will show this fact, that this is not a religion whose origin is lost in the dim distance of time; it is not a legendary faith of which no one can say when it began or who first taught it, as it arose in historical times; a faith continuing from the very first, not without question or dispute, but in spite of the question and notwithstanding the dispute. It will show that Freethought is as old as Christianity itself, and when we read how long it is since men had the same doubts and difficulties, it will occur to us that after all there must be a wonderful power in this faith that struggles into acceptance in spite of those doubts and difficulties, and that there must be some marvellous vitality in the faith that has survived 1800 years, something that is worth inquiring into. This bush that is burning and never burned, is worth turning aside to look at. It will be good for us to look at those early unbelievers, because it strengthens our faith to be reminded that unbelief is no new thing, and that Christianity has survived more than 1800 years.
It is good for another reason; it teaches us to try to understand the feelings of those who don’t believe; it teaches us to try to put ourselves in their place, to try to understand how it is they don’t agree with us; to make all allowances for the honesty of their disbelief, to try to enter fairly into their motives and feelings. If we don’t do this, we are in danger of being hard, and bitter, and unjust in contending for him, but not in his spirit; forgetting that there is not one of those who disbelieve in him, for whom he has not died, forgetting that an unbeliever is not an enemy to be driven back from the fortress, but an exile to be won back by earnest reasoning to his Father in Heaven. Let us learn, above all, that in all our arguments for Christianity we should be filled with the spirit of him for whom we plead, and that we should manifest the truth in love.
We ask you then to contemplate this scene, in which we find Christ winning and losing disciples, and learn something. And the first thing we have to remark is this, how very little those that come and go seem to have been influenced by what we call the evidences of Christianity. They were doubtless drawn to Christ by the fame of his miracles, it does not seem to have been his miracles that converted them. It was as “he said those words many believed on him.” Then he said something else, and they left him. It was not that they doubted of his ability to work miracles, but because something he said offended them. They came to him not altogether in consequence of his miracles, and they left him in spite of his miracles. It teaches us that the religion of Christ was not received unquestioningly, even in the case of his miracles, for in spite of his miracles they ventured to question his doctrine; so that those who say Christianity was received in an ignorant age are contradicted by the story of Christianity itself, for many of those who saw his miracles rejected him.
There is another reason for noting this, in order to observe the power of prejudice and passion in influencing men’s belief or disbelief. There are few men who believe strictly in accordance with their reflecting faculties. The desires, prejudices, and passions of men largely share in the making of their beliefs; and if this be true of beliefs, it is equally true of men’s unbelief. If there be those here who do not believe in Christ, I ask them: Are you quite sure that your unbelief is the result of calm, and thoughtful, and careful study of what Christianity has to say for itself? Are you sure you have not hastily taken up some objections against Christianity without waiting for the answer? Are you quite sure that you have not misunderstood some words of Christ—some words that, having offended you, you have passed away without waiting for the reason? Are you sure that there is no unreason in your unbelief, you that say there is so little reason in our belief? It is because I am deeply convinced of this that I am here. It is because I believe that misconception, prejudice, and hasty adoption of other men’s opinions upon slender grounds, make a large part of ignorant belief, often a large part of ignorant unbelief. It is because these misunderstandings may be removed, that I am here to speak of the subjects I have announced. It is because I believe it is useless to argue against prejudices, that I shall endeavour to remove those prejudices, and mistaken feelings and opinions, that make men unwilling to listen to arguments for Christianity. Those who follow me will bring many arguments for Christianity, and I am here to-night to prepare the way for them.
I ask you, then, to turn again to this story, and to see why it was that those new disciples left Christ. It was for this reason, that they were offended because he appeared to deny them the possession of liberty. When they became his disciples he said, “Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.” Then they answered him, “We be Abraham’s seed, and were never in bondage to any man; how sayest thou, Ye shall be made free?” He had offered them liberty, and this implied that they were not free, and this they regarded as the gravest of affronts. We, the children of Abraham, the aristocracy of humanity, those whom the Lord delivered out of Egypt, whose slaves are we that you venture to offer us freedom? The offer is an absurdity and an affront, and you are denying us freedom in the very words; and so left him, for they deemed it an insult to their birthright of freedom. We, who understand the story, can see how much these men were mistaken. Our Lord was offering them moral freedom, and they supposed that he was offering them political freedom.
There was a misunderstanding as to the nature of liberty; he offered them a liberty for which they were not desirous. It was a dispute about liberty between Christ and those first Freethinkers. Now, may there not be some misunderstanding still? That is the subject of my sermon to-night. It is Christianity and Freethought. What do you understand by Freethought? Something opposed to Christianity; and by a Freethinker, one who rejects all or a part of Christianity. Why do such men give themselves that name? Because it expresses their conviction that Christianity is opposed to freedom of thought, that it puts a restraint on the human intellect. They say that Christianity shackles the human mind. “I boast of my freedom,” says the Freethinker; “you require me to submit the freedom of my intellect to the authority of a book. My mind resents such an attempt to fetter it, I submit to no authority. You priests and bigots that come to me with your authority, and threaten me with penalties for daring to think thus and thus, you are convicting yourselves of falsehood before you utter another word, for you are opposed to freedom. I cannot listen to your evidences of Christianity. No proof of miracle will make me give up my freedom of thought.” How often do we hear of the bigotry of the priest, and the enlightened Freethought of the age. Mark then, we have the issue raised between Christianity and Freethought. Let us understand it clearly, before we go further. It is true that Christianity comes with a claim of authority. It is true that Christianity says, Believe this and that, because Christ has said it. He is seeking men now, as he did, with authority; and it is true that Christianity does warn men of certain penalties, heavy and grievous penalties, if they don’t believe what Christ says. Christianity is authoritative teaching, accompanied with threats of penalties. Now we are told, that is just the point at which Christianity comes into collision with Freethought. Freedom of thought will not endure to hear of authority, and resents the very idea of penalty.
Now we have put before us the issue between Christianity and Freethought. It is necessary that we should define for ourselves what is Freethought. The word is on men’s lips, and I am not sure that they understand what they mean by it. Let us try to understand what is Freethought. It may mean one of three things. It may mean freedom as opposed to necessity, it may mean freedom as opposed to authority, or it may mean freedom as opposed to responsibility. As regards the first of these, by freedom as opposed to necessity, we mean that a man is free to think in one way or another, that it is not absolutely necessary for him always to think in one way or another; that is to say, his thought is not the necessary product of physical constitution, that his thoughts do not grow out of him, as the blade grows out of the seed or the flower out of the plant; that it is not mechanical or necessary, but that a man has the power to choose how he will think. Then as to freedom as opposed to authority, we mean that a man is not bound to think like other men—that is, his thought is not subject to any other man’s, and he has a right to say, “That is your opinion and not mine.” Freedom of thought as opposed to responsibility means that a man is not answerable for his belief, and that whatever he thinks on any subject, he is never to suffer for his belief in any way whatever. These three are the only possible meanings.
Now let us take them in their order.
First, freedom of thought as opposed to necessity. Does Christianity deny this freedom? On the contrary, it asserts and vindicates it. Christianity teaches that man is free, and terribly free, to will his own belief. It teaches this by the fact that it tells us a man is answerable for his belief, for a man cannot be answerable for that in which he has no choice, any more than he has of the colour of his hair. If he be answerable, it can only be because he has the power of choosing. It is remarkable that many people who call themselves Freethinkers, insist on it that man is not answerable for his belief any more than for the colour of his hair. They thus deny the freedom of thought. Freedom and responsibility always go together; so you see in this view of Freethought, Christianity, so far from denying it, asserts it against many Freethinkers; and in this respect the Christian is the Freethinker, and maintains the doctrine of Freethought.
Second, freedom of thought as opposed to the idea of all authority. We are told that thought cannot be free if it submits to any authority, and it is quite true in the abstract. Attend to this. It is true that the abstract idea of freedom is opposed to the abstract idea of authority, in thought or religion. But it is equally true, that these are opposed in everything else. It is just as true in politics, in which the idea of freedom is opposed to the idea of authority. Where there is absolute freedom, there cannot be authority. Where there is absolute authority, we cannot understand logically how there can be any freedom. Starting from the maxim, “Man is free,” we arrive logically at the conclusion that there can be no authority for that man. Starting from the axiom, “Authority is supreme,” is to arrive at the logical conclusion that there is no room for liberty. The two ideas are logically opposed, the one to the other. But are they so in practice? Is it a fact that freedom is found inconsistent with authority? Is it not true that men reconcile them every day? Is it not true that thought is free, and yet thought submits itself to authority? Many cherished opinions are received on authority, not because we have proved them ourselves. We take the opinion of a lawyer on law, and of a doctor on medicine, as authority. Morality itself is largely received upon authority. We are always submitting ourselves to authority. Logically, freedom and authority are separate, but there never was a society in which the two did not come together. They are like the chemical elements, which have a strong affinity for each other, and are never apart, except when separated in the laboratory of the chemist, but the moment they are liberated they are together again. It is just the same with Freethought and authority. Men are always submitting themselves to authority, and if they did not they would never learn or know anything. When we speak of the authority of a revelation from God, we mean that we bring to Freethought, to judge of, the reasons for believing that the teacher knows more about the things he teaches than others. That is a very large part of what is called “the evidence from miracles.” Men speak as if the miracles were the evidences of the morals of the Gospel. That is not what we say. What we say is this, Our Lord coming down from heaven (as we believe) to tell us of another and supernatural world of which he knew and we did not, gave evidence of that knowledge by bringing down the supernatural.
Let us suppose we were walking through one of the church-yards of this city with another person, and the discourse fell upon the resurrection. If you said it was impossible for any authority to prove it, and the person said, I know there can be a resurrection of the dead, and I will give you a proof of it; and suppose he bade the dead rise, and they sprang alive out of the earth; do you mean to say that would be no authority from him on the question of the resurrection of the dead? Would it be a tyranny over Freethought to be told that the dead can rise? So you see Freethought is not inconsistent with the authority of a revelation, for this reason, that the revelation submits its proof to your Freethought.
I am not saying that I have proved the miracles, I am only saying that by miracles we are not violating Freethought; but on the contrary we are maintaining it. I speak as unto wise men, judge ye what I say.
I now come to the third idea of freedom, that is, freedom as opposed to responsibility; and this is, I really believe, what men mean when they speak of Freethought as opposed to Christianity. They say, “You threaten us with penalties for unbelief, and our whole soul revolts against that. It would be tyrannical to punish a man for his opinions. We cannot endure men to do this. Do you mean to say that God will be less just than man and persecute us for our opinions?” Let us see whether we clearly understand this question. This objection goes to the principle that no man should be punished for his opinions. I will ask you to consider this question. Is it true that no man under any circumstances should be punished for his opinions? And again is it true that men do not suffer for their opinions? It is true that so long as he keeps his thoughts to himself, he will not be punished for them, for the simple reason that they are not known; but when he utters them, he may be punished. Is it not true, that a man who utters a seditious, a libellous, or indecent thought is punished and should be punished? And why? because the law of liberty of the individual comes into collision with the higher law of the general welfare, and must give way to it. There are other penalties; society punishes a man more sharply than the law. There are offences of thought and speech which the law does not and should not punish, and yet which society visits very heavily. Let a man entertain evil and unkind thoughts of his neighbour, and show it by his looks, and we know how society visits him for his Freethought. Every man knows that if all the thoughts of his heart were laid bare, before his fellow men, he might pass a miserable and outcast existence, because society defends itself against this injurious exercise of Freethought.
Then pass a step further, and think of the constitution of nature and of the laws of the world. Does this world of nature allow of Freethought? Do these natural laws allow a man to make mistakes with impunity? Let any man think wrong of the powers of nature, that fire will not burn nor water drown, and he will soon find himself visited with a sharp and merciless punishment, for there are no laws so merciless as those of nature. He that transgresses them ignorantly or wittingly, is beaten alike with many stripes. The great revolving machinery of the world will not arrest its revolutions because of the cry of a human creature that by a very innocent error, even by his mistaken action of Freethought, is ground to pieces beneath them. If the man of science warns us of the consequences of transgressing the laws that he has discovered, we should be at liberty to think differently from him, but it will be at our own proper peril, if we exercise our Freethought. As sure as you do, so you will suffer from it. It is not the prophet or his warning that brings down the penalty, it is not the book upon sanitary law that brings diptheria or scarlet fever, it is not the sinking of the mercury in the glass that brings the storm; the written proof in the one case, the mute proof in the other, foretell the evil, but do not create it. Nature and science, then, have their warnings, and threatenings, and penalties; and nature and science avenge themselves on Freethought.
And mark this, the more and more you lose sight of personal will, the fainter and fainter seems to grow the chance of forgiveness, less and less room there seems to be for Freethought; there is something in the words, “I believe in God the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth,” there is something in the loving will that has power to save the Freethought of his erring creatures from the soulless and merciless machinery of law.
Now we see how little room there is for Freethought in this world of law. Let us introduce into the world a fact; let us introduce the idea of a God; let us suppose for the sake of argument that there is a God. Can it be a matter of indifference how he feels toward us, and how we should feel and act toward him? How can there be a possibility of thought without consequences as regards God, if there be no possibility of thought without consequences as regards the very least of God’s works? Does it make no difference to us whether he is an Almighty tyrant or a father to us, whether or not he can suspend the terrible laws of nature which we dread? Can we hear about this God, and not wish to learn all about him? Can there be anything more absurd than the saying, Let us have religion and no theology? Is that more sensible than to say, Let us have sun, moon, and stars, and no astronomy; let us have plants and no botany; let us have the earth and no geology? If God be a fact, there must certainly come theology out of that fact. As geology grows out of the fact with which it deals, so does theology grow out of a fact. Of all the errors of the time there cannot be a greater absurdity than a religion without theology, for every religion teaches our obligations to a higher being. If there be a God, there must be a theology. I will ask you what is this creed of Christendom? It is nearly all the assertion of facts:
“I believe in God the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, and in Jesus Christ his only son our Lord, who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead and buried; he descended into hell, the third day he rose again from the dead; he ascended into heaven, and sits at the right hand of God the Father Almighty: from thence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead.”
All these assertions of facts you may say are not facts; but if they be facts, you are bound to think rightly about them. You are bound to think right about them under penalties, but no more so than as to other facts. You are as much bound to think right as to the fact of a God as to any other fact. But men say, These facts are not so certain as the facts of physical science. We answer, They are more certain to us; they are to us facts as certain as the great lights of heaven. We cannot conceive the possibility of ourselves doubting them. We may say, Perhaps there is a God, and we have a right to say, The perhaps may become a certainty. If we think right, and you think wrong, you must suffer the consequences. If a man of science puts into your hand a book, and warns you of the danger of infection, and you say you don’t believe it, because you are sceptical about the teaching, he cannot compel you to believe it, but meantime you will suffer; the proof may come in sickness and in death, and you will not escape. And we say, not in anger and bitterness, not in hard denunciation of the wrath of God—God forbid that we should do it; but we speak in the same tone of warning, and not threatening, and we say, If you doubt, remember time is passing, and if you think wrong, there is danger of the judgment. We say, Take heed how you grope in the dark and stumble. We cannot alter the facts if they are facts, and they will affect your happiness. We say, There is in this nothing uncharitable, no violation of Freethought any more in religion than in science. We say that the consequences of thinking erroneously in religion may be as perilous as the consequences of thinking erroneously as to physical facts. It remains to be shown what are the facts of our religion. All that we say now is, that an error about the facts may be fraught with serious consequences, and we no more violate Freethought than when a physician warns you.
Now, then, I trust we have disposed of those prejudices that lay upon the threshold of our inquiry, these prejudices against Christianity as being opposed to Freethought; for if Freethought means freedom as opposed to necessity, religion does not deny it; if Freethought means freedom as opposed to authority, religion does not create the distinction, it is just as easy to reconcile it with religion as with the state of society. If you mean by Freethought, freedom without responsibility as to consequences, there is no such thing either in society or in nature, and you have no right to expect it in religion. All that we say is, that we are not to expect freedom of thought without its responsibility. Christianity gives us glimpses of the means of escape from the operation of material laws in the mercies of the loving Father of the human family.
FIRST REPLY
OF
MR. C. BRADLAUGH.
CHRISTIANITY AND FREETHOUGHT.
[Delivered in the Free Library, Norwich, April 3, 1871.]
When on the 7th of February the Very Reverend the Dean of Norwich issued his circular announcing that a series of discourses would be delivered by “some competent preacher,” “having for their object the vindication and establishment of the Christian faith,” and “directed against modern forms of infidelity,” I felt deep interest, not I presume confined to the ranks of the party which has permitted me to be its advocate upon this occasion. The circular was in point of fact an announcement that the Church of England felt it necessary to challenge and give battle to modern infidelity; and that having determined that the struggle should be a real one, it intended to select its best man, and by his mouth to vindicate and establish the faith, which modern infidelity is doing so much to undermine, not only in the busy North, but even in the quiet and church-shadowed capital of East Anglia.
When on my arrival in Norwich I learned that the influence of the Dean and Chapter of this cathedral city had in no sense been exerted to give me the sort of opportunity to be heard in reply to their advocate, which I had a reasonable right to expect, and when I knew that after our friends making a circuit of the city, in the vain endeavour to hire a building meet for such an occasion, it was difficult to ensure the use of the Free Library Hall, I felt that even in Norwich the approved mode of encountering modern infidelity seemed to be that of free speech for the church advocate and gagged mouth for the pleader on behalf of heresy. When I sat in the fine nave of the old cathedral, and weighed the accessories of choir and organ, intoned litany, and prayer responses instrumentally accompanied; when I looked at the large number of clergy present, headed by two bishops, and supported by the wealth and fashion of the district, I could not but feel that so far as mere scenic effects went, our side was sadly lacking in such accessories to win adhesion. When, too, I saw the selected “competent preacher,” the Right Rev. Dr. Magee, Lord Bishop of Peterborough, whose fame as an eloquent orator, an erudite and polished disputant, has long since been widely spread, I knew that our cause laboured under every possible disadvantage save one. It had but its truth and justice. Prestige, talent, skill, fashion, were allied to serve the Church. When, moreover, I found that in the local press religious men, headed by Church of England clergy, sought to excite prejudices against me before even a word had been spoken on my side, I could not help thinking that even if defeated in a struggle so unequal it would leave the Church but little to boast of in its victory. But I plead neither for mercy nor favour; fair encounter has been asked and denied, and I take the risk of battle. Although we are to-day the challenged, the Church refuses tourney ground to our party, and we must contend as best we can.
In treating the subject of “Christianity and Freethought,” in reply to the address of the Bishop of Peterborough, I am entitled to narrow, and shall narrow, the question covered by this reply, to one merely between the Freethinker and the Church of England Christian only. The litany, hymns, and prayers which formed the preface to the Bishop’s advocacy are here fair weapons to use against him. I do not stand here to-night to plead against Roman Catholic Christianity, or against Wesleyan, Independent, or Baptist nonconforming Christianity, nor do I plead against Unitarian Christianity. I am here to reply to the Church and State Christianity, the thirty-nine articles Christianity; to the system with which the Lord Bishop of Peterborough has identified his brilliant talents and great powers of speech, and with all the faults and corruptions of which he must rest burdened so far as this controversy is concerned. Here he must not throw aside any one of the three Creeds, here every line of the Prayer Book affects his teaching. The Christianity he must defend is that which the 9 and 10 William IV., cap. 32, maintains; the Christianity by law established.
I pass without comment the fact that the text selected by the Lord Bishop was not only from the Gospel whose authenticity is doubted by many Christians, but from a chapter specially regarded as an interpolated one. On this head, I leave Dr. Magee to debate with Dr. Davidson. But I am bound to draw attention to the very extraordinary exposition given of the contents of this chapter, which we are invited to study. Dr. Magee says that the people who were with Jesus, “were doubtless drawn to Christ by the fame of his miracles,” and that when they left him “it was not that they doubted of his ability to perform miracles.” Now, so far as this chapter is concerned, there is not the smallest particle of reference to miracles at all, and, therefore, Dr. Magee’s words on this head, and even admitting his alleged authority, were only so much foundationless verbiage. And when Dr. Magee says that this chapter teaches that “the religion of Christ was not received unquestioningly, even in the case of his miracles, for in spite of his miracles they ventured to question his doctrine,” I can only express my deep regret that the many occupations of the Lord Bishop of Peterborough should have left him without the time to master the actual contents of the chapter on which his sermon was based.