the passage, for I feel that it cannot bear with any heavy pressure against me. “To talk of the British Constitution is, in my opinion, a sure proof of dishonesty.” Here it will be seen that the only exception that can be taken to this sentence is the mere mode of expression. If a man were to talk to me of the Constitution of England, and, by omitting all notice of its aberrations in practice from its theory, by which he would leave it free to me to suspect, that he would insinuate that the theory and the practice were the same, I should certainly say, that he was exhibiting want of candour. I might, perhaps, think dishonesty, rather too strong a term for such conduct; but I should not scruple to say, that he was disingenuous, and he would be guilty of a species of dishonesty; for all the disingenuousness is to a degree dishonest; and, since the meaning is the same, why should we quarrel at a mere difference of expression? The author proceeds to say, “If we speak of the Spanish Constitution, we have something tangible; there is a substance and meaning as well as sound.” So that it is clear he was saying, that we had no Constitution in comparison with that just promulged by the Spanish nation. The Spaniards we know have recently gained by their own glorious efforts, that political liberty to which they had been so long strangers; and their Legislature had just published a code of fundamental laws, few in number, but most comprehensive in securing freedom to the people, for whom they are framed. They are (comparatively with the laws of countries, in which the frame of government is old, and complicated) not numerous, but the mind may collect them almost at a glance, and possess itself of them with a single effort of the understanding. In this view of the subject, without doubt, the Constitution of Spain is tangible; and in this sense he is
justified in asserting that our own Constitution is not tangible; for is it not notorious that our laws are spread through so many Acts of Parliament of doubtful and difficult construction, and so many books of reports, containing the common law of the land (and in which there are no few conflicting decisions) that the whole life of a man does not suffice to achieve a knowledge of them. So multifarious and infinite and perplexed is our code, that even amongst those whose profession is the law it is not possible to meet with an accomplished lawyer.
The defendant here fainted, and was taken out of court. After the interruption which this circumstance occasioned had subsided, Mr. Cooper proceeded—
Gentlemen, I lament in common with many others that this evil has attended an extended degree of civilization and trade—that our laws have become too numerous and complicated for the capacity of the mind. That they are so, is not my opinion alone, but that of the Legislature itself. I believe that a committee of the Houses of Parliament has been sitting and still sits for the object of reducing our laws to some limit in their number and some order as to their design; without which our Constitution, to use the words of the writer, cannot be tangible; a tangible shape, at present it does not possess, for that cannot be tangible which spreads itself over a boundless extent, that eludes, and defies the grasp of the human intellect.
Having disposed of thus much of this paragraph, I come to the words, on which my learned friend, Mr. Gurney, laid such extreme stress in his address to you. “Our very laws, are corrupt and partial both in themselves, and in their administration. In fact corruption as notorious as the sun at noon-day is an avowed part of the system, and is denominated the necessary oil for the wheels of Government.
It is a most pernicious oil to the interests of the people.” This is strong language I admit, and would perhaps be censurable as imprudent, at least, if the very expressions themselves, which the writer uses, did not guide us directly to the facts to which he alludes, and explain the passage. He alludes most manifestly to the celebrated exclamation of a person at the time that he was in the seat of office, the first commoner of the realm, and who instead of being reproached for his words has retired from his office with the honours which he has merited for his services in it. It transpired in the House of Commons, that seats had been trafficked for as articles of sale and purchase for money.
Mr. Justice Best.—Is that a subject at all relating to the question which is now before the jury?
Mr. Cooper.—My Lord, I am going to use the declaration of the Speaker, as a matter of history, and to show, that the words charged as criminal were an allusion to it; and if so, were not criminally used. I do not wish, nay I would avoid the introduction of any improper or inflammatory topics. I would not attempt to serve my client by such means. When it was exposed, that there had been certain trafficking for seats in the House of Commons, the Speaker used these words (and it is to them, I would show the jury, the writer of the paper alludes), “practices are as notorious as the sun at noon-day at which our ancestors would have started with indignation,” and that gentlemen—
Mr. Justice Best.—Will you allow me to ask you Mr. Cooper, I want to know where you get that from.
Mr. Cooper.—My Lord, from all the reports of the speeches in the newspapers of the day which were never contradicted.