to them. Those who had before frequented them did not discontinue their visits, and those who were ignorant of such places and seeking them, on seeing the emblazonment by the doors, cried out—that is just what we wanted, and turned in. The society at last discovered their mistake. They found that they were encouraging what they wished to abolish, and discontinued the plan. My learned friend, who is counsel for the society, can confirm me when I assert that they do not now carry it into practice. Precisely the operation that these lanterns had with regard to houses of ill-fame, have these trials upon obnoxious writings. They are illuminated by the rays which are shed on them by these proceedings. They attract every eye, and are read in the light (as it were) of the notoriety which is thus thrown upon them by these prosecutions.
Gentlemen, it just occurs to my recollection, that I have omitted in its proper place something which I ought to have mentioned, and urged to you, and I beg your indulgence to supply the omission. You will remember that in one of the passages charged as libelous, the words “I will not, now, say a word about insurrection” are to be found, and my learned friend, Mr. Gurney, suggested to you that it was an excitement, at some future period, to insurrection. I, gentlemen, repeat that these words are not only no excitement to insurrection, but an express disavowal of it. If you infer that he means insurrection at any future time, you must also suppose that the insurrection he contemplates is conditional, and in speculation of conduct in the government that may justify it. Is there any extrinsic evidence to show that he means something beyond the words? None—and the words themselves are a literal disclaimer of any intention of insurrection. And it is by the words then that you will judge of his design,
and not take it from the vague and partial declamation of the counsel for the prosecution, whose opinions ought no more than my own, to have any weight with you, except as they are supported by reason. If you can find any such meaning as an intention to excite insurrection in the words, so much the worse for the defendant; but, if you cannot, and I am sure you cannot, then you will not hesitate to adjudge the words innocent. What! may not I, or any man, say there is no occasion for insurrection at this moment, but there may be at a future time? Good God! are there no possible situations in which resistance to a government will be justifiable? There have been such situations, and may again. Surely there may be. Why, even the most vehement strugglers for indefeasible right and passive obedience have been forced (after involving themselves in the most foolish inconsistencies, and after the most ludicrous shuffling in attempting to deny it) to admit, that there may be such a conjuncture. They have tried to qualify the admission indeed—admitted, and then retracted—then admitted again, and then denied in the term, what they admitted in the phrase, till, as you shall see, nothing ever equalled the absurdity, and ridiculousness of the rigmarole into which they fell, in their unwillingness to confess, what they were unable to deny. Yes, gentlemen, there are situations in which insurrection against a government is not only legal, but a duty and a virtue. The period of our glorious revolution was such a situation. When the bigot, James, attempted to force an odious superstition on the people for their religion, and to violate the fundamental laws of the realm, Englishmen owed it to themselves, they owed it to millions of their fellow-creatures, not only in this country, but all over the world; they owed it to God who had made them man to rise
against such a government; and cast ruin on the tyrant for the oppression and slavery which he meditated for them. Locke, in the work from which I have already cited to you, in the chapter entitled, “On Dissolution of Government,” contends with Barclay, an advocate for divine right and passive obedience, and refutes him on this very question, and proves that subjects may use force against tyranny in governments. He cites Barclay who wrote in Latin, but I read to you from the translation.
“Wherefore if the king shall be guilty of immense and intolerable cruelty not only against individuals but against the body of the state, that it is the whole people, or any large part of the people, in such a case indeed it is competent to the people to resist and defend themselves from injury, but only to defend themselves, not to attack the prince, and only to repair the injury they have received; not to depart, on account of the injury received from the reverence which they owe him. When the tyranny is intolerable (for we ought always to submit to a tyranny in a moderate degree) the subject may resist with reverence.”
In commenting on this passage, Mr. Locke, mixes with his reasonings the ridicule it deserves:—“‘He (that is Barclay) says, it must be with reverence.’ How to resist force without striking again, or how to strike with reverence, will need some skill to make intelligible. He that shall oppose an assault only with a shield to receive the blow, or in any more respectful posture without a sword in his hand, to abate the confidence and force of the assailant will quickly be at the end of his resistance, and will find such a defence serve only to draw on him the worse usage: this is as ridiculous a way of resisting, as Juvenal thought of fighting, ‘Ubi tu pulsas, ego vapulo
tantum,’ and the result of the combat will be unavoidably the same as he there describes it.
Libertas paupcris hæc est.
Pulsatus rogat, et pugnis concisus adorat,
Ut liceat paucis cum dentibus inde reverti.
“‘This is the liberty of the slave: when beaten and bruised with blows, he requests and implores as a favour to be allowed to depart with some few of his teeth.’ This will always be the event of such an imaginary resistance, when men may not strike again. He, therefore, who may resist must be allowed to strike. And then let our author, or anybody else, join a knock on the head, or a cut on the face, with as much reverence and respect as he thinks fit. He that can reconcile blows and reverence may, for aught I know, deserve for his pains, a civil respectful cudgeling whenever he can meet with it.”
So much, gentlemen, for the doctrine of non-resistance. Therefore the author of this paper in stating that there may be times when insurrection may be called for, has done no more than a hundred other writers, and among them Locke, have done before him.