In the enabling act Pataha City was designated as the official head until the next election to occur on January 9, 1882. Hence ensued an active, almost fierce, campaign between the four places to which the race finally narrowed—Pataha City, Assotin City, Pomeroy and Mentor. The rivalry between the near neighbors, Pomeroy and Pataha, became very bitter. Each accused the other of double dealing and of trading against each other in such a way that many believed that Assotin City, on the extreme southeastern verge of the county, would win the coveted honor. The result of the election, however, was to give Pomeroy a considerable plurality, though not a majority—Pomeroy, 411; Assotin City, 287; Pataha City, 259; Mentor, 82.
The county officers chosen at this first election, eight republicans and four democrats were as follows: County commissioners, J. W. Weisenfeldt, J. J. Kanawyer, and Eliel Oliver; sheriff, W. E. Wilson; auditor, Scott Rogers; probate judge, Benjamin Butler; treasurer, J. N. Perkins; assessor, H. H. Wise; surveyor, E. D. Briggs; superintendent of schools, W. H. Marks; coroner, E. A. Davidson; sheep commissioner, S. T. Jones.
The different precincts, with the vote of each for sheriff, were these: Pomeroy, 260; Pataha, 184; Tuscanon, 8; Meadow, 28; River, 90; Pleasant, 69; Columbia Center, 108; Asotin, 66; Cottonwood, 201. This gives a total of 1,014, and that number indicates the rapid growth of the region, for the entire population in 1875, only seven years earlier, was estimated at not to exceed 500.
The county seat contest thus resulted in favor of Pomeroy, but there was a curious after-clap to this which made up one of the noted law cases of the Territory.
A suit was brought, entitled "Rice vs. County Commissioners of Garfield County," to restrain the commissioners from meeting at the point, Pomeroy, which they had, after canvassing the votes, declared the duly appointed county seat. The case was tried as an equity case by Judge S. C. Wingard, Territorial judge at Walla Walla, and his decision was that the county was without any seat. The ground of this decision was purely technical, one of those decisions which delight lawyers and judges, in that it emphasizes the letter of the law, and usually is repugnant to common people, in that it disregards the plainly obvious intent of the sovereign people and seems to render them the victims and slaves of their own instruments. The point was this: The Enabling Act, though designating a Board of County Commissioners to provide for an election and canvass the votes for county officers and issue certificates to them, and though the Enabling Act had also in section 4 provided for an election of county seat, yet there was no specific power granted to the commissioners or to any one to canvass the votes for the county seat. Hence, the judge ruled, there had been no legal choice, and the county was without an official seat. The findings of the court are summarized in the following paragraphs:
1. That all that part of the act pleaded in complaint respecting the submission of the location of the county seat of Garfield County to the determination of the legal voters, that is to say, all that portion of section 4 of said act beginning with the words "at which time" to the determination of said section be, and the same is hereby declared by the court, unconstitutional and void.
2. That the said pretended election in said complaint mentioned is by the court held a nullity and set aside.
3. That said defendants are forbidden from making Pomeroy the seat of government of Garfield County.
4. That said defendants and each of them are enjoined from requiring any or all of the county officers of said Garfield County to remove their respective offices to said Pomeroy or there discharge the duties of their said respective offices.
5. That defendants and each of them are enjoined from incurring any indebtedness against said county or expending any of its funds in or about removing county officers to said Pomeroy, or in any manner attempting to make Pomeroy the seat of government of said Garfield County. That the following parts of the prayer of said complaint are refused by the court, to-wit: The court refuses to enjoin defendants from locating their offices at said Pomeroy, or from transacting there the county business of said Garfield County, or from their furnishing offices for all or any part of the county officers of said county.