The history of France abounds with instances in which stratagems of every kind have been successfully practised.—It seems the peculiar talent of the inhabitants of that country to derive advantages from well concerted feints, &c. in war, and to secure their victories more by science than by downright hardihood.
It has been wisely observed, by a French writer, under the article of Stratagêmes de guerre, that a general who is defeated in a general action, may attribute his failure to fortune, although it is universally acknowleged, that chance or fortune has a very trifling share indeed in pitched battles, while art and science regulate the different movements, and finally determine their issue. Whoever, therefore, suffers himself to be surprised by his enemy, cannot be said to stand wholly exculpated from ignorance or neglect, since it must have been in his power to have avoided the snares laid for him, by means of vigilant spies, and unremitting attention. This remark appears to us not only to be generally correct, but it seems more immediately applicable to all generals that have secret service money at command. The influence of that commodity, (upon which no embargo can be laid) will be felt in every garrison, town, or sea-port; and those who have the management of it must be dull indeed, if they do not feel their way into the secret preparations of an enemy, before they hazard an attack against him.
Besides the different stratagems which may be used by an able general, to bring about the overthrow of the whole or part of an army, by leading it into an ambuscade, there are various ones which may be practised against a fortified place. To effect the latter purpose, you may contrive to get soldiers in disguise through the gates at unguarded hours; to introduce them through subterraneous passages, or by any other means that may offer. Before any attempt of this sort is made, every part of the fortifications should be narrowly reconnoitred, and as much knowlege be obtained of the interior situation of the place as can be procured by means of good spies, or from deserters. You must, above all things, be well assured, that the garrison does not strict duty; that the different guards are negligently attended to; that the soldiers who compose them are in the habits of drinking or gaming; that their officers miss their rounds, or go them without system or regularity; that the gates are ill guarded, and the avenues to them ill watched; and that there are certain places or entrances which are not watched at all; for it would be impossible to surprize any place that has been regularly fortified, while the garrison did its duty.
If it should appear practicable to surprise a town by taking advantage of the negligence of the sentries, &c. at some particular gate, previous means must be taken to introduce some soldiers dressed like market women, or in the garb of some religious order. You may then contrive to get a waggon or cart, seemingly loaded with hay or straw, but with soldiers concealed beneath it, so placed in the entrance of the gate that it will serve as an obstacle when it may be found necessary to shut it. In order to do this effectually, let a pin be taken out, so that the wheel comes off, or the axle tree gets broken. The instant this is done, the soldiers who had entered the town in disguise must join the drivers, the men that have been concealed in the waggon get out, and the whole must rush upon the port-guard. While this happens, the troops that have been placed in ambush round the fortifications, will advance with promptitude and firmness, and endeavor to get possession of the town before a sufficient force can be collected to repel the attack. In the year 1789, a rabble from Courtray took advantage of the carelessness of the imperial troops who were in garrison at Gand, in Flanders, and by seizing upon the gate and port-guard, brought about a temporary rebellion in the country. This indeed was done without stratagem; but the circumstance proves, that when the centries of a fortified place are negligent in their duty, a surprise is always practicable. We are precluded by the limits of our undertaking from going more fully into this important branch of military science. Several treatises have been written on the subject. Among others one appeared in 1756, intitled Stratagêmes de Guerre, illustrating from history the various stratagems which had been practised by some of the ablest generals during a long period of time down to the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. It was published by M. Carlet de la Rousiere, an officer in the French service, and acting engineer in the isles of France and Bourbon. It contains much curious matter. See Am. Mil. Lib.
Stratagem and force united. Count Turpin, page 43, vol. I. in his essay on the Art of War, judiciously remarks, that when an enemy, superior in force, is in possession of a pass, from which he cannot be dislodged but by art, stratagem and force should be blended together as often as possible. Onosander, the Greek general, set fire to a wood which was at the foot of a mountain in the enemy’s possession, and which he wanted to go over; the flames and smoke forced the enemy to abandon it, and leave the passage free for him.
STRATARITHMOMETRY. In war, the art of drawing up an army, or any part of it, in any given geometrical figure; and of expressing the number of men contained in such a figure, as they stand in order of battle, either at hand, or at any distance assigned.
STRAW. According to the British regulations, published by authority in 1799, relative to the forage, &c. which troops are to receive in the home encampments, it is directed, that straw is to be allowed at the rate of one truss of 36 pounds to each paillasse for two men, being a full bedding; at the expiration of sixteen days to be refreshed with half a truss to each paillasse; at the expiration of 32 days to be removed, and a fresh bedding of one truss is to be given, and so on every succeeding period of sixteen and thirty-two days.
For the sick, in the hospital, the straw is to be changed as often as it may be deemed necessary.
Two trusses per troop or company are to be allowed for batmen, or servants, not soldiers; and three trusses per troop or company for the washerwomen, to be changed every sixteen days, not having paillasses.
Thirty trusses of straw per troop or company are allowed on first taking the field for thatching the women’s huts.