The light troops of both those people were much heavier than modern battalions, and had more power and solidity for a shock or conflict. However, the Roman discipline, notwithstanding its superiority, is not calculated for our times; because, as we are obliged to engage first at a distance, ours, by its cannon, would destroy the Roman order of battle in a very short time, and would be exposed to a loss much less considerable itself, supposing even the artillery was equal on both sides; we should then, in order to perfect our arrangements, endeavor to procure them all the advantageous qualities of the legionary regulations, as the only means of giving them the superiority.
Many people are of opinion, that we now imitate the Romans, and that we give battle according to their system, because our troops are drawn up in lines, some of which are full, and others vacant. But it is shewn, that three battalions have the same front, and the same inconveniences that eight thousand men ranged in the phalanx order. Our lines are formed by brigades, regiments, or battalions, and the distance of one corps from the other is equal to the front of one of those corps: so that those lines, both full and vacant, are composed of detachments equal in front; each has a phalanx of six, eight, or twelve thousand men. This order of battle consequently, can be no more at most than a kind of medium between those of Greece and Rome.
Tactics of Bonaparte. It is well known that the greater part of the victories of Bonaparte may be imputed to the admirable system adopted by this general; a system which, however often repeated, has still been attended with the same success—a system, to which the established tactics have as yet applied no remedy, or rather, to which the confirmed habits of men, educated in the ancient system, are as unwilling as unable to accommodate themselves.
The minor discipline is his great secret; the simple methods of the first drills, are merely facings and wheelings in a discretionary order, all his rules, are like general principles, the results of which may be produced by a different process of the same elements. All his movements are at rapid time; and the rotation of evolutions, though laid down in regulation, is not pursued in practice, the soldier is taught not so much how to execute a set of movements, as how to perform any that the variety of ground and the incidents of action, never twice alike, call for. These are the elementary rules, on which the system is founded.
His system of action is comprehended in the following principles:
1st. To select some partial point of attack, most frequently the enemy’s centre, but occasionally one or other of the wings—and then, strengthening that part of his own army which is opposed to the point of attack, by drafts from the other divisions, to bear down upon the point of attack, with the advantage of numbers, and consequently of greater physical force.
2d. To counteract the effect of the weakness of the other divisions, by assigning them a defensive part only; a purpose which evidently requires a less power than is necessary to attack.
2. By some advantage of position. This is either natural, as a strong position properly so called, or relative, as where the weaker divisions are so placed as either to be protected by the stronger, or, in case of dispersion, to be enabled to fall in with the main body.
3d. The necessary, the inevitable effects of this system are—
That the part of the enemy, which is the point of attack, is almost invariably broken, driven back, in a word, defeated.