The rapid principles of Frederic, and the evolutions of the echellon and column adapted to the concentric method of movement, upon oblique as well as direct lines; and all executed with a combined precision before unusual, constitute the great features of the modern tactics. Simplicity of method in instruction is the key to it.

It must be evident to the humblest understanding, that a great part of the success of armies in war must depend as much upon the knowlege of the enemies’ mode of movement and action, as well as in the perfection, precision, and promptitude of execution in their own. Voltaire, whose history of Europe is alike admirable for its conciseness and authenticity, since all his information on military affairs was drawn from the military depot established at Versailles, speaking of the battle of Rosbach, attributes the defeat of the French under Soubise to their ignorance of the new methods of movement which had been introduced by Frederic II. The soldiers saw that the old method of battle was changed; they did not comprehend the motions of the Prussians, which were not merely novel, but as exact as the movements on a parade; they believed they saw their masters in the art of war, they were dismayed and fled.

This anecdote, which has many resemblances in ancient history, is of great moment in directing the understanding to the consideration of military institution. It leaves no doubt of the necessity of knowing the art of war as it is practised by other nations, and especially the importance of practising that which has proved superior to all others.

A fatality has attended all the efforts which have been made for several years to introduce a suitable organization of the militia, and a correct military system. The genius of ignorance appears to have cast a spell over all the attempts that have been made. Like the projector who was so much occupied by the erection of a weathercock, that he set about it before the foundation for the steeple was laid, every attempt has been made at the wrong end; a part has been mistaken for a whole, composed of numerous parts, and the wrong part has always been chosen first. America, which has been so original in the revolution as to give rise to the institution of rifle corps, which have decided seven-eighths of the battles that have been fought in Europe since; has been led to resort constantly to the very system of which America proved the futility, for precepts and examples; instead of profiting by the march of science, we have gone for instruction to the worst military institutions of Europe. When any person intrusted with the military concerns of the U. States wants information, it is to authorities exploded and condemned by men of military knowlege, reference is made. A minister of England in addressing that nation in 1806, at the very moment when it was announced to that nation that the bellum ad internicionem had only then begun..... that “the war was now at the foot of her walls,” had the honesty, which times of danger extracts even from ministers, to declare....“The military system of England was equally in want of repairs, or rather a thorough rebuilding, even to its foundation stone.” There is no truth more certain, yet it is to this tattered and defenceless fabric we resort for models on every occasion. The bill for establishing a quarter-master general’s department, which was before congress in 1809-10, is a scion of this decayed tree; no doubt that as long as the present apology for a system exists, the proposed department may serve, as a crutch is of use to a body stricken with paralysis.

Military science even in France, where it has now reached the greatest perfection, has had to struggle with selfishness and the occasional and almost insuperable difficulties, which the appointment of ministers incompetent and inexperienced in military affairs, threw in their way. Folard is reputed to have died broken-hearted, by the persecution which he experienced from stupid generals and ministers who looked to nothing but official patronage. Levrilliere, whose admirable improvements in the various departments of artillery, to whom is owing the reduction of the length and the weight of metal of guns of the same calibre, was persecuted out of France, and obliged to take refuge in the army of Austria, where his services proved so formidable as to induce his recall, and the final adoption of his vast improvements; those improvements which, by lessening the weight of artillery, have led to the powerful institution of horse artillery.

Wise nations are never disposed to reject the useful because it is not of their own invention. The Austrians after the battle of Austerlitz immediately abolished their old discipline, and the archduke Charles instituted a better system upon the principles of the modern French. Even the French themselves, surrounded by triumphs, have not yet deemed the science of war perfect. New dispositions of the column were adopted in Egypt; it was only in 1808 that the regulations for the exercise and manœuvres of Cavalry were completed; and even since the campaign which closed with the battle of Wagram, they have made some important alterations in the arms of their cavalry, founded either on the experience of inconvenience in their own, or of some superior advantages in those of their enemy.

The conclusions which we draw from these facts are, that the prevalence of erroneous opinions on the military institutions is a subject of very serious concern; because it is evident, that so long as a nation or a government, which has the care of the national concerns, and a great influence over its opinions, suffers ignorance and prejudice to occupy the place of intelligence, a similar fate may be considered as the consequence, whenever the nation shall be attacked, as other negligent or ignorant nations have been, by a power of superior knowlege and capacity in the art of war.

Nothing more plainly shews the misconception which generally prevails, especially in the legislatures of the Union and the several states, than the contradictory motives which are assigned for leaving the militia and military system in their present state of disorganization. Some plead that the art of war is laid down in Steuben; others that Steuben carried us through the revolution; when in fact both Burgoyne and Cornwallis were taken before Steuben’s tract was introduced; others are for arming our militia with pikes alone, forgetting that an open country is that for which pikes are best adapted; and that to render pikes effective there must be a most perfect discipline of manœuvre, which may render the line as potent and firm as the column, and as easily displayed, concentrated, and formed to various fronts as the best disciplined infantry; when the new modes of movement are mentioned, they are called novelties, though the principal of them are as old as the battle of Pharsalia, and were in practice at the battle of Lutzen; other exceptions are, that besides being new, the modern discipline is too difficult to learn, too perplexed and fatiguing; that the multiplied manœuvres require more time and labor, and must be in a great measure useless; and that so satisfied are the British of this that they have reduced them all to nineteen manœuvres. Nothing so truly depicts the want of judgment or a proper attention to the subject, as observations like these.....the truth is that the modern principles of instruction are fewer in number, more easily taught and understood, and less irksome to the soldier; better adapted to engage the soldier’s attention and afford him gratification; that the variety and number of evolutions is not more various than the eternal variety of ground by which military movements and dispositions are always governed; and that the new discipline, by teaching the first elements well, enables the military body to be moved by these principles on any ground, and not only to form any disposition that it is possible to form, but without having been previously formed in such new dispositions; the elementary principles of modern discipline being peculiarly adapted to the understanding, and the movements by small bodies, enabling every officer of a small portion of troops to move his particular corps by the mode best adapted to the ground.

It must always be the fault of the government if its military institutions are erroneous. If there were but a single regiment, that should be instructed according to the best principles, and made to practise whatever was most useful and necessary in the art of war. In a nation of freemen the regular force should constantly exhibit their exercises and evolutions, so that every citizen should be familiar with the best practice of the use of arms and of manœuvres. The eye may be said to have an infallible memory, it is above all other of the organs of sense the best medium of intelligence. The United States troops are usually cooped up in garrisons, as if they were, like the king of Prussia, forming a system in secret, while in fact there is nothing worthy of the name of discipline carried on, and in too many instances nothing understood. Perhaps the troops of the United States have not, as a part of discipline, fired a ball at a target for twenty years. Field artillery, or mortar practice, probably not more frequent. The maxim of economy is an important one in a free state, but there is an economy more destructive than the greatest profusion; and that is the economy of practical and useful knowlege.

We speak of these things reluctantly, but the evil is almost a disease, and requires the regard of the intelligent men in all parts of the nation.