Honneurs funebres. Fr. funeral honors. See [Burials].
HONOR, in a military sense, is an expression, to which custom has given different meanings. Honor consists in the constant practice of virtue. Aristotle calls it the recompence of virtue; the testimony of the excellence of a man who distinguishes himself by virtue. An Italian writer calls it a state of inviolable dignity, above all calumny, and all suspicion. Honor gives many advantages: it procures us the consideration of the public; it advances our fortunes. The best recompence of a brave action is, undoubtedly, the satisfaction of having done it; but nevertheless the honor resulting to us from it is a real good, which should be dear to us.
Honor, in a general acceptation may be properly called a consciousness of worth and virtue in the individual, and a lively desire to preserve the reputation of virtue. As a term it is variously used in military life, and frequently misunderstood by young and unexperienced officers in their first outset. As a quality of the mind, it cannot be too much encouraged or too much cultivated among military men of all ranks and descriptions. The possession of it is a guarantee for good conduct, a bond of fidelity, and a certain barrier against military corruption. Men are excited to deeds of valor and enterprize by a sense of honor, who would otherwise remain inactive, or only perform the mere drudgery of service. This species of honor, is in fact, the root of that Esprit de corps which makes the whole body of an army tenacious of reputation, and solicitous to preserve it unsullied from the colonel down to the lowest drum boy.
This term may likewise be considered as esteem, reputation, the glory which is attached by mankind to talents and the virtues.
Affair of Honor. We have already given a general outline of this term under [Duelling]. The propriety or impropriety, as well as the legality or illegality of which mode of terminating human differences is thus explained by the celebrated English lawyer John Selden. His words are under the head [Duel]; we shall quote them under that of affair of honor.
“A Duel may still be granted in some cases by the law of England, and only there. That the church allowed it anciently appears by this, in their public liturgies there were prayers appointed for the duellists to say, the judge used to bid them go to such a church and pray, &c. But whether this is lawful? If you make any war lawful, I make no doubt but to convince you of it. War is lawful, because God is the only judge between two, that is supreme. Now if a difference happen between two subjects, and it cannot be decided by human testimony, why may not they put it to God to judge between them, by the permission of the prince? Nay, what if we should bring it down for argument’s sake, to the sword men; one gives me the lie: it is a great disgrace to take it the law has made no provision to give remedy for the injury, (if you can suppose any thing an injury for which the law gives no remedy) why am not I in this case supreme, and may therefore right myself.
“A duke ought to fight with a gentleman; the reason is this: the gentleman will say to the duke, it is true you hold a higher place in the state than I; there is a great difference between you and me, but your dignity does not privilege you to do me an injury; as soon as ever you do me an injury, you make yourself my equal; and as you are my equal I challenge you; and in sense the duke is bound to answer him.”
In addition to what Selden has said upon duelling, we shall quote a passage from Dr. Robertson’s History of the reign of Charles the V. which will shew that this mode of determining private disputes is extremely ancient.
“It is evident” observes that author, “from Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 118, that all questions which were decided among the Romans by legal trial, were terminated among the Germans by arms. The same thing appears in the ancient laws and customs of the Swedes, quoted by Jo. O. Stiernhook de jure Sueonum et Gothorum vetusto, 4to Holmiæ 1682, lib. i. c. 7. It is probable, that when the various tribes which invaded the empire were converted to Christianity, their ancient custom of allowing judicial combats appeared so glaringly repugnant to the precepts of religion, that for some time, it was abolished, and by degrees, several circumstances which I have mentioned led them to resume it.
“It seems likewise to be probable from a law quoted by Stiernhook in the treatise which I have mentioned, that the judicial combat was originally permitted in order to determine points respecting the personal character or reputation of individuals, and was afterwards extended not only to criminal cases, but to questions concerning property. The words of the law are ‘If any man shall say to another these reproachful words ‘You are not a man equal to other men’ or, ‘You have not the heart of a man,’ and the other shall reply ‘I am a man as good as you,’ let them meet on the highway. If he who first give offence appear, and the person offended absent himself, let the latter be deemed a worse man even than he was called; let him not be admitted to give evidence in judgment either on man or woman, and let him not have the privilege of making a testament. If he who gave the offence be absent, and only the person offended appear, let him call upon the other thrice with a loud voice, and make a mark upon the earth, and then let him who absented himself be deemed infamous, because he uttered words which he durst not support. If both shall appear properly armed, and the person offended shall fall in the combat, let a half compensation be paid for his death. But if the person who gave the offence shall fall, let it be imputed to his own rashness. The petulance of his tongue hath been fatal to him. Let him lie in the field, without any compensation being demanded for his death. Lex Uplandica ap. Stiern, p. 76. Martial people were extremely delicate with respect to every thing that affected their reputation as soldiers. By the laws of the Salians, if any man called another a hare, or accused him of having left his shield in the field of battle, he was ordained to pay a large fine. Leg. Sal. tit. xxxii, § 4. 6. By the law of the Lombards, if any one called another arga, i. e. a good-for-nothing fellow, he might immediately challenge him to combat. Leg. Longob. lib. i. tit. v. § i. By the law of the Salians, if one called another cenitus, a term of reproach equivalent to arga, he was bound to pay a very high fine, tit. xxxii. § i. Paulus Diaconus relates the violent impression which this reproachful expression made upon one of his countrymen, and the fatal effects with which it was attended. De Gestis Longobard. lib. vi. c. 24. Thus the ideas concerning the point of honor, which we are apt to consider as a modern refinement, as well as the practice of duelling, to which it gave rise, are derived from the notions of barbarians.” See Robertson’s History of Charles V. pages 271, 272.