A military dictionary

by William Duane

Violer la Neutralite, Fr. To violate the laws of neutrality.

Demeurer dans la Neutralite, Fr. To remain in a state of neutrality.

Neutrality. The state or condition of one who is neuter, a middle condition between a friend and an enemy. In a military sense, remaining strictly indifferent, whilst other powers are at war, without assisting any party with arms, ammunition, or men. When a country, calling itself neutral, furnishes a quota or contingent to any nation that is at war with another, it cannot be said to observe the strict laws of neutrality. Of all precarious and difficult situations that perhaps is the most so, in which a weak nation is placed when two powerful nations wage war on each side, and the exact laws of neutrality are expected to be observed by the intermediate country. Bayle speaking of neutrality, humorously exclaims, heureux les pacifiques quant a l’autre monde, mais dans celui-ci, ils sont misérables: happy are the peaceable with respect to the next world, but they are miserable in this! in trying to derive advantages from the dissensions and broils of others, they insensibly become the victims of both parties. The French writer humorously says, Ils veulent être marteaux, cela fait que continuellement ils sont enclumes à droite et à gauche: they would fain be hammers, instead of which they become anvils, and get beaten both right and left. This happened to the Venetians in 1701, who endeavored to remain neutral during the campaigns that took place between the French and the Imperialists. The Danes afford another illustration of the inefficacy of a neutrality without power to resist, the destruction of Copenhagen, and the plunder of their navy, is an atrocity unparalleled. The treatment experienced by the United States, is only inferior to the barbarity exercised against Denmark. Genoa, Florence, Holland, and Switzerland were all forced from their neutrality by England, and fell victims. The observance of a strict neutrality is unquestionably a matter of extreme difficulty, and requires uncommon ability. Few princes possess those qualities of the head and heart that distinguished Hieron king of Syracuse, who so dexterously managed his neutrality in the war between Rome and Carthage. His subjects were considerably benefited by the conduct he observed, whilst his own reputation was not a little increased by the sound policy that dictated it.

Armed Neutrality. The depredations committed by the naval force of Great Britain, during the first years of the American revolution, excited a general indignation among the maritime powers of the north of Europe. A project said to be devised by Dr. Franklin, and suggested to the count de Vergennes, was communicated to the courts of Russia and Prussia, and taken up with the zeal of a patron by the empress Katherine of Russia, the result was, that in the year 1780, Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark, had entered into engagements to arm their fleets, in order to support the neutrality of their commerce; Holland was invited, and consented to engage, but was attacked by Great Britain by surprize before she had ratified the agreement; the other neutral nations were brought to engage in it, and Great Britain was under the necessity of recognizing the principles of the armed confederacy. This event, novel in history, was productive of signal advantages to neutral nations; it formed a new epocha in maritime history, and wrested from England the audacious usurpation of the sovereignty of the seas.

The principles of the armed neutrality were again resumed during the French revolution; but the British, by employing corruption in the northern cabinets, procured the assassination of the emperor Paul of Russia, and at the same time brought a large fleet before Copenhagen which they bombarded, in consequence of which Russia was brought into the war, and Denmark obliged to bend to circumstances. Sweden was already a party in the war.

During the progress of the French revolution, instances have occurred in which a wise neutrality might have been made productive of great national good. But, alas! there are few statesmen, who have ability or political virtue enough, to resist the intrigues or views of those cabinets, who being themselves involved in war, leave nothing untried to drag their neighbors into the same troubled state. Montesquieu has observed, with his usual good sense, that nations seldom know how to avail themselves of natural advantages. What becomes a matter of hard necessity in one country, is frequently found to exist in another, from crooked and interested policy, or from ignorance in administration. Some countries are calculated to be neutral; some to avail themselves of insular situations; and to impose by maritime operations; and others, to make up for the natural disadvantages of continental position, by means of standing armies.

It has been remarked, (with what justice we leave politicians to determine) that no power, being or affecting to be neuter, should be allowed to arm itself, because it is impossible to have perfect confidence in a quarter from whence hostilities may commence according to the exigency of circumstances, (so properly called by the French, la force des circonstances;) or the alluring prospects of ambition.

It is more than probable, that the armed confederacy of the north sprung originally from a secret understanding with the agents of France, and manifested itself more strongly on the declaration of Russia. Great Britain of course took the alarm; and, as a French writer very justly observes on the subject of armed neutrality, has sent her fleets, to ascertain the point at the gates of Copenhagen.

The second expedition of the British against Copenhagen is one of the most extraordinary in the annals of the world. The pretence set up is best expressed in the language of Jackson, the agent of England in this unprecedented outrage—these are his words. “In the present disturbed state of the continent of Europe it was impossible to distinguish any longer between a neutral and an enemy, but by her becoming an ally or an open foe. That something therefore was required beyond an ordinary presumption of the real disposition of every state; and that whilst the influence of an implacable enemy predominated over every power within his reach, (France is alluded to) and either checked or converted into immediate hostility every engagement or inclination unfavorable to his interest, it was impossible to consider the ordinary covenants (that is the law of nations and treaties,) of any neutral nation either as a sufficient security for her own independence, or of those who confide in her neutrality. It becomes the duty of England, therefore, to discriminate in these circumstances between rights paramount and invariable, binding upon all states, and rights which might be suffered to relax and yield to that state of expediency in which a certain course of measures might involve the existence of a nation.”

Such was the detestable and odious sophistry which might be as well applied to cover and excuse any other species of atrocity, and which was followed by the bombardment and conflagration of Copenhagen, the murder of its citizens, and the seizure and plunder of its fleet and naval arsenal. La loi des plus forts, or the law of the strongest, so often tramples down national rights, that necessity drives those to the adoption of questionable measures, who would otherwise remain strictly neutral; whilst others again, from being contiguous to contending armies, resort to various pretences, in order to remain in an armed condition for the purpose of taking advantage at a critical moment. Of this description was the system of armed neutrality which Pope Leo X. is recorded to have pursued. When Francis I. king of France, was engaged in a war with the Swiss Cantons, respecting the Milanese, his holiness resolved to remain neuter, or at least affected to be so, although he was strongly invited by both parties to take an active and decisive part. He drew his troops towards the frontiers of the Milanese, under a pretext of covering the ecclesiastical states, but in reality for the purpose of being at hand when the two armies should come to a decisive engagement, of unexpectedly falling upon the victorious army at the close of an obstinate and bloody battle, of driving it out of Italy, becoming master of Lombardy, and finally establishing himself as the arbiter of the country. But all these imaginary triumphs of the Pope soon disappeared. His troops, which had already reached the frontiers of the Milanese, no sooner learned, that the Swiss had been totally routed by the French, than they were panic-struck, and dispersed in the greatest disorder, as if they were conscious of being engaged in a crooked and illegal cause.