WILLIAM H. SEWARD, SECRETARY OF STATE
From a photograph by Brady
Upon April 1, after the new administration had been in control for a little more than three weeks, under the title "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration," he submitted the most extraordinary proposition that appears among the archives of the Department of State. Assuming that he, and not Lincoln, was responsible for the conduct of the administration and the management of the government; writing as if he were the Prime Minister and Lincoln an impotent king; he laid down his plan of action and the line of policy he intended to pursue. He proposed that Lincoln should practically relinquish his Presidential responsibilities and authority; that he should repudiate the party that had elected him; that he should ignore the principles upon which the Presidential campaign had been fought and surrender the moral triumph of the victory; that he should convene Congress and declare war against Great Britain, Russia, France, and Spain, and endeavor to negotiate for an offensive and defensive alliance with Canada, Mexico, and Central America against Europe. The following is the text:
"SOME THOUGHTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S CONSIDERATION, APRIL 1, 1861.
"First. We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet without a policy, either domestic or foreign.
"Second. This, however, is not culpable, and it has even been unavoidable. The presence of the Senate, with the need to meet applications for patronage, have prevented attention to other and more grave matters.
"Third. But further delay to adopt and prosecute our policies for both domestic and foreign affairs would not only bring scandal on the administration, but danger upon the country.
"Fourth. To do this we must dismiss the applicants for office. But how? I suggest that we make the local appointments forthwith, leaving foreign or general ones for ulterior and occasional action.
"Fifth. The policy at home. I am aware that my views are singular, and perhaps not sufficiently explained. My system is built upon this idea as a ruling one,—namely, that we must
"Change the question before the public from one upon slavery, or about slavery, for a question upon UNION OR DISUNION:
"In other words, from what would be regarded as a party question, to one of patriotism or union.
"The occupation or evacuation of Fort Sumter, although not in fact a slavery or a party question, is so regarded. Witness the temper manifested by the Republicans in the free States, and even by the Union men in the South.
"I would therefore terminate it as a safe means for changing the issue. I deem it fortunate that the last administration created the necessity.
"For the rest, I would simultaneously defend and re-enforce all the ports in the Gulf, and have the navy recalled from foreign stations to be prepared for a blockade. Put the island of Key West under martial law.
"This will raise distinctly the question of union or disunion. I would maintain every fort and possession in the South.
"FOR FOREIGN NATIONS.
"I would demand explanations from Spain and France, categorically, at once.
"I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central America to rouse a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this continent against European intervention.
"And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France,
"Would convene Congress and declare war against them.
"But whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of it.
"For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct it incessantly.
"Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active in it, or
"Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree and abide.
"It is not my especial province; but I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility."
It is impossible for any one to conceive the feelings of the President when he read this boastful and insolent document. But his self-control was so perfect, his anxiety to preserve harmony among those who were trying to save the Union was so great, and his patience so limitless that he returned the memorandum to Mr. Seward with the following firm and conclusive but courteous rebuke, and the subject was never alluded to again by either of them:
"Executive Mansion, April 1, 1861.
"Hon. W. H. Seward.
"My Dear Sir: Since parting with you, I have been considering your paper dated this day, and entitled 'Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration.' The first proposition in it is, 'First. We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet without a policy, either domestic or foreign.'
"At the beginning of that month, in the inaugural, I said, 'The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government, and to collect the duties and imposts.' This had your distinct approval at the time; and taken in connection with the order I immediately gave General Scott, directing him to employ every means in his power to strengthen and hold the forts, comprises the exact domestic policy you now urge, with the single exception that it does not propose to abandon Fort Sumter.
"Again, I do not perceive how the reinforcement of Fort Sumter would be done on a slavery or party issue, while that of Fort Pickens would be on a more national and patriotic one.
"The news received yesterday in regard to San Domingo certainly brings a new item within the range of our foreign policy; but up to that time we have been preparing circulars and instructions to ministers and the like, all in perfect harmony, without even a suggestion that we had no foreign policy.
"Upon your closing proposition—that 'whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of it.
"'For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct it incessantly.
"'Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active in it, or
"'Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree and abide.'—I remark that if this must be done, I must do it. When a general line of policy is adopted, I apprehend that there is no danger of its being changed without good reason, or continuing to be a subject of unnecessary debate; still, upon points arising in its progress I wish, and suppose I am entitled to have, the advice of all the Cabinet.
"Your obedient servant,
"A. Lincoln."
The President never revealed this amazing incident to anybody but Mr. Nicolay, and it was never suspected by any member of his Cabinet until the correspondence was published by Nicolay and Hay in the Century Magazine, nearly thirty years after. Mr. Seward recognized his master at last and wrote his wife, "Executive force and vigor are rare qualities. The President is the best of us."
From that time there were no serious differences between the President and his Secretary of State, although they frequently differed upon matters of policy as well as details of administration. Mr. Seward was loyal, devoted, and always respectful to his chief.
The same cannot be said of Secretary Chase. He also had been a rival of Lincoln for the Presidential nomination in 1860, and had gone into the Cabinet feeling that his supporters from Ohio had made Lincoln's nomination possible and that he was entitled to special consideration for that reason. He supported Lincoln cordially through the campaign, and among the first telegrams of congratulation received by the President-elect was one from him which read, "I congratulate you and thank God. The great object of my wishes and labors for nineteen years is accomplished in the overthrow of the slave power. The space is now clear for the establishment of the policy of freedom on safe and firm grounds. The lead is yours. The responsibility is great. May God strengthen you for your great duties."