Much of the trouble is due to the desire of Turkish officials and soldiers to secure the daughters of Christian families for their harems. Is it any wonder, then, that the women of Bulgaria and Macedonia have taken the sword in their own hands and defended their homes and their persons with the courage and the strength of men? We read of a band of Bulgarian Amazons who performed such prodigies of valor in one of the revolutions years ago that, when they were finally overcome, the Turks impaled them alive before the gates of the governor’s palace and placed their heads upon the town walls.
The rebellious provinces have a population of about 4,000,000, three-fourths of whom are Christians and one-fourth Turks. Almost two-thirds are of Bulgarian ancestry, and, naturally, the people of Bulgaria have a deeper sympathy for them than have those of other nations. A portion of Macedonia formerly belonged to Servia and the remainder to Bulgaria. If it were understood that, in the event of emancipation from Turkish rule, the province would be divided upon ancient lines, the Serbs would doubtless lend their assistance and reënforce the Bulgarians; but unless some such understanding can be reached in advance the Serbs might resist Bulgaria, because of neighborly jealousy, and aid Turkey to suppress the revolt by making war upon Bulgaria. The present committee advocates Macedonian independence on the same basis as that of Servia, Bulgaria and Roumania, and its local newspaper organ asserts that it would be the crime of crimes to involve these three nations in a war.
Entirely disinterested judgment would suggest that the province of Rumelia should be placed under the protection of Austria, Germany or England; or, if that could not be permitted, that it should be governed by the Swiss, the Danes or the Dutch, who have no political interests at stake. The people are not fit for self-government, while the old policy of trying to reform the Turkish administration is criminal folly. Improvement will appear, however, the moment the curse of centuries is withdrawn, and the ground left free for wise, honest and just administration. Peaceful Moslems should, of course, be permitted to pursue their vocations and practice their religious rites, as in Bosnia. Religious freedom should be the fundamental condition, but the Turkish pashas and bashi-bazouks, and every official of Islam faith should be compelled to disappear, never to return.
If Russia could be induced to extend her influence in Armenia, which no other power can approach without crossing foreign territory, and permit Austria to control the Balkan Peninsula, there might be peace; but Russia is indifferent to the Armenians, because they do not belong to her race, nor profess her religion, while the populations of the Balkan States are almost exclusively Slavs and members of the orthodox Greek Church. Whatever may be said of the political aggressiveness of the Russians, it cannot be denied that the rulers, statesmen and people of that empire have always shown active sympathy for oppressed Christians, and there is not the slightest doubt that Alexander II. entered upon the war with Turkey in 1877 as if it were a holy crusade. The religious relation gives Russia an advantage over Austria, because the latter is a Roman Catholic country, and very few members of that faith are found in Bulgaria or the Turkish provinces. Neither Russia nor Austria would consent to British domination in the Balkans, but they might yield their own claims in favor of a protectorate by one of the smaller nations, such as Switzerland, Denmark or the Netherlands.
II
THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT
The Sultan of Turkey is a good deal like President Cleveland, in that he tries to look after the details of his government himself. President Cleveland used to sit up all night sometimes examining the recommendations of postoffice candidates because he felt a personal responsibility in the selection of good men, which he could not delegate to the officials of the postoffice department. He used to read all the evidence and other documents connected with pardon cases, because he could not trust the judgment of the attorney-general and the officials in the department of justice. He frequently sent for the papers relating to Indian contracts, public lands and other matters of business which no President before him ever investigated personally, but he knew more about what was going on, and had more influence with his own administration, as President Lincoln used to say, than any other man. The Sultan of Turkey has a similar disposition, but a different motive. He trusts nobody, although everybody succeeds finally in deceiving him. He endeavors to do everything himself and to attend to all the details, but never goes anywhere and is compelled to depend upon his ministers and other subordinates to see that his orders are carried out. Therefore most of his labor is wasted and the people suffer the consequences.
For example, recently a bridge over a river in Asia Minor was carried away by a flood and the people came down to Constantinople with a petition for a new one, because all such things are within the Sultan’s personal jurisdiction and can only be done by his orders. He read the petition and heard the committee, and, casting his eyes over the map they had submitted, suggested that the new bridge be built at another place. It was somewhat distant from the old one and in a situation more liable to danger from floods. At the same time it was very inconvenient for the public; but nobody dare tell the Sultan so, or even question the accuracy of his judgment. So a new bridge was erected at the new location and a few weeks later it was carried away like the first. The people came back to the Sultan. He refused to receive them and sent word that he had given them a new bridge and that they ought to be thankful and ask no more of him. Since then the population of that district has been compelled to cross the river in small boats because the government will not build another bridge for them and will not allow them to build one for themselves. That is about the way the government of Turkey is managed; a fair sample of maladministration that applies to every department.
Up the Golden Horn is a navy yard, with a fine marble building for the headquarters of the admiralty, a school for the education of officers, barracks for the accommodation of sailors, a hospital for the sick, and a long line of sheds and shops for the construction and repair of ships, and an enormous amount of money is expended annually for the maintenance of ships which are supposed to be in commission, but cannot be used because their engines, boilers and other machinery are useless. Some of them have no smoke-stacks. They lie at anchor where the Sultan can see them through a glass from a certain point in the park that surrounds his palace, and he supposes them to be in full commission and ready for active service. He gives the minister of marine every year money to pay for coal that is never bought, for provisions and other supplies for crews that do not exist, and for repairs that are never made. The shops are idle and empty, although he believes them to be filled with busy workmen. According to the official register, the Turkish navy consists of eighteen cruisers of from 2,000 to 8,000 tons, twelve coast-defense ships, six gunboats and twenty-six torpedo boats, but all are useless except a few small torpedo and gunboats stationed at different ports along the coast. The annual allotment of money for the supplies of the navy is about $3,200,000, but, according to the popular impression, a very small part of it is ever applied to the purpose for which it is intended. The navy yard on the Golden Horn is the most extraordinary marine morgue in existence. Long rows of vessels of the most antiquated pattern lie side by side, stripped of their machinery and equipments and fit only to be knocked to pieces for junk. Students of marine architecture will find there types of vessels that have not been used for a century, and the Sultan still appropriates money to maintain them. But even the most modern vessels, built during the late war with Greece, have been stripped of everything portable by officers and sailors whose wages have not been paid. The Sultan does not know anything about it. He depends upon his minister of marine, who gives him such information as he thinks advisable, and is supposed to rob him right and left.
Hassan Pasha has the reputation of being the richest and the most corrupt official in the Turkish government. He is supposed to be worth $4,000,000 or $5,000,000, all of which he has acquired while in the service of the government. He has great influence with the Sultan. The latter considers him one of his most loyal and efficient officers and trusts him implicitly. It is said that Hassan would like to resign and enjoy his money in London or Paris, but dare not do so. The moment he suggested any such idea the Sultan’s suspicions would be excited, and it would be dangerous for Hassan to retire, because his successor would discover what has been going on in the navy department, and Hassan’s head and his money would both be in danger. Many other pashas are very rich, but they send their money out of the country as a precaution, for they never know when they may forfeit their sovereign’s favor, and that usually means the confiscation of their estates and perhaps decapitation or imprisonment for life. When a prominent man disappears in Turkey no questions are asked. It is impolitic to be inquisitive.
Said Pasha, the grand vizier, is believed to be an honest man. He is one of the few prominent officials of the government who has not amassed a fortune while in office. For his honesty and other reasons he has many bitter and revengeful enemies. Six years ago, when he was grand vizier, he endeavored to punish certain influential pashas for robbing the government. They engaged in a conspiracy against him and got the ear of the Sultan, who believed their statements, and sent the Kapu-aghasi, chief of the white eunuchs and first officer of the imperial bedchamber—the Sultan’s most confidential man—to summon Said Pasha to his presence. The Kapu-aghasi is always an unwelcome messenger, because the Sultan trusts him when he will trust nobody else. When he carries a message it has unusual significance.