As we close again, in the autumn of A.D. 1904, our story of the once “hermit nation,” the Japanese, confronted with the practical difficulties of assuming a real protectorate over Corea, while nominally but sincerely striving to maintain her independence, are still determined to control the peninsula as a vital possession. One hundred miles of the Seoul-Fusal railway are in operation. The sound of the blasting night and day in the deep rock-cuts near Seoul announce their purpose to finish speedily a highway of steel to the Chinese frontier. The real purpose of the war is the integrity of China, upon which depends the safety of Japan, perhaps even the political salvation of Asia. [[497]]
[1] See Fifteen Years Among the Topknots, by L. H. Underwood (1904). [↑]
CHAPTER LIII.
COREA A JAPANESE PROTECTORATE.
Having been responsible for two great foreign wars fought by Japan, it was natural that at the end of each campaign the position of Corea among nations should be notably altered. The war with the Middle Kingdom blew to pieces the Chinese doctrine of universal sovereignty, besides making the once vassal state independent. In name, at least, Corea was made an empire. The war with Russia annihilated the dogma so long held in Europe, that Asiatic nations exist for conquest and spoliation, with the corollary that “the break-up of China” was imminent. Japanese success in the war of 1894–95 was a vindication of the American doctrine as expounded by men from the United States during a century, and formulated by John Hay—“China for the Chinese.”
Had Corea been a state fitted, by the power of unselfish patriotism and love of industry among her leaders, to survive amid modern political and economic conditions, Japan’s triumph over Russia would have made her all the stronger. Her independence would have been assured, had the virtue of her own sons responded to the opportunity.
On the contrary, the history of Corea since 1866, as outlined on these pages, reveals the fatal weakness of the ruling class in Corea. Instead of giving themselves to patriotic sacrifice and personal industry, the yang-ban, or men of privilege, have made their capital a hot-bed of intrigue and Corea the storm centre of the Far East. Instead of developing their own strength and the nation’s resources, they have plied the arts of cunning and the crafts of the weak. Yet modern civilization, rich in powerful governments, has no place for the weak. Least of all is self-chosen weakness allowable.
Being neither skilful merchants like the Chinese, nor brave warriors like the Japanese, the Corean noblemen—on whom lies [[498]]the burden of responsibility—might at least have imitated the good example of their island neighbors. In Japan the outstanding event of modern times was the renunciation, in 1871, by 400,000 knights or gentry, of their hereditary pensions paid out of the public treasury.[1] After this sacrifice, made in the interests of true patriotism, they put off their swords and silk petticoats, got to work, paid taxes, and began to earn an honest living. Even China has broken with her unsocial past and conceit of perfection, and has entered upon the path of modern civilization.