The prospect of drawing Russia again into hostilities which might free Corea from the Japanese yoke shows the weak spot in the Russo-Chinese negotiations of Ignatieff in 1860 (p. 371). In the delimitation of frontiers then made, a strip of country containing nearly 3,000 square miles, called Han-do, or Island Circuit, between the Tumen and its affluent, the Hai-lan River, which, beginning about seventy-five miles from the sea, flows nearly parallel, was left as neutral territory to be uninhabited. This region is shown on the maps (pp. 210, 365), and though the Chinese characters describe an island, it is interfluvial only. In reality the land, being very fertile, did in course of time attract many settlers, both Chinese and Corean. When Russia began to assert her strenuous policy in the Far East, she demanded that this neutral strip should be cleared of Coreans, or that all settlers in this region between the rivers should be enrolled as Chinese subjects. The Japanese War coming on in 1904, nothing further was done. Since Russia, by the Portsmouth treaty, controls the railways of Kirin, she may by holding this region control the trade routes to the seaboard. [[505]]
Here then was the bait to make the Russian bear bite. One of the Kims, an anti-Japanese ultra-conservative, secured a commission from the Corean Emperor appointing him virtually governor of this Hai-lan region. At Vladivostok, through the infamous pro-Russian Li Yong Ik and M. Pavloff, the late envoy of the Czar in Corea, the Court of St. Petersburg was to be sounded on the possibility of gaining control of this strategic territory.
If it be asked, what ground of hope Kim Hseung-mun had of success, it must be remembered that while all other foreign consuls in Corea, under the new order of things, had received their exequaturs, or authorizations, from the Emperor of Japan, the new Russian Consul-General, M. Plancon, claimed that he should be recognized by the Corean and not the Japanese emperor, thus ignoring Corea’s denunciation of her old treaty with China and the convention of November 17, 1905. The Russian envoy, for a little while or until he withdrew his contention, consciously or unconsciously, gave encouragement to the Corean conspirator, Kim. This whole plot to embroil Russia and Japan was frustrated, getting no further than the palace, while the surrender of Choi in Chulla Do was made sure by the arrest, on the night of June 8th, of the chief conspirators as they were leaving the palace. The Liberals had turned state’s evidence.
Without impeaching the Corean Emperor, the Japanese Government removed his evil advisers and resolved to persevere in using what authority he still possesses for the good of the Corean people—as their protectors see it.
That policy requires the public finance of Corea to be known in ledgers and budgets, with strict accountability for every dollar; the purging of the palace, and the thorough differentiation of Court and Government, and of the “boudoir” from the council table; the creation of a public school system; the building of a railway from Ping An to Gen san; a coinage and stable monetary system; the reform of prison methods and the judiciary; the reclamation of the vast quantities of waste land; the encouragement of all moral forces; the development of trade, commerce, and industry; and last, but not least, the severe handling of unprincipled and truculent Japanese; or, in general, a policy of righteousness and conciliation that must overcome the traditional hatred between the Coreans and the Japanese. To make the [[506]]yang-ban get to work and earn their own living will be the great blessing to this long-oppressed land. If Japan can satisfy the enlightened judgment of the world that Corea is exploited for the good primarily of the Coreans and not the Japanese, humanity will approve and rejoice. The accomplished author of “The Passing of Korea,” which contains the severest arraignment of the Japanese thus far made, passes this verdict on the situation:
“The Koreans have awakened to the fact that this, which should have been their first consideration many years ago, is now their last resort, and they are clamoring for education.… Korea can gain nothing by holding back and offering to the plans of Japan a sulky resistance. They are face to face with a definite condition, and theories as to the morality of the forces which brought about the condition are wholly academic.” [[507]]
[1] See “The Mikado’s Empire,” pp. 533–535, and p. 682, of the eleventh edition, 1906, for the five points of prediction made at Hartford, Conn., February 8, 1904. ↑ [a] [b]
[2] See the long letter in the London Times of August 8, 1906, from an unimpeachable authority—the author of the Oriental Series, nearly forty years in the Far East. [↑]