This was an act of state on the part of Germany, for the territory was vacant in the eye of International Law. Britain had done nothing to enforce her claims over the territory, though she had ample justification. So early as 1796 Captain Alexander of the Star sloop landed at Angra Pequena and “took possession in His Majesty’s name by hoisting the King’s colours, firing three volleys and turning over the soil.” Unfortunately, Great Britain had persistently neglected all opportunities to place the matter beyond reasonable doubt, so there was nothing left for her but to acquiesce in the German expansion with the best grace possible, and a reluctant recognition was given to the German claims, although European Colonial opinion in South Africa recognised the action of Germany as nothing less than an unnecessary and unwelcome intrusion. An Anglo-German Commission, consisting of Sir Sidney Shippard and a German representative, was appointed to investigate the claims of British subjects who had secured concessions on the coast in the vicinity of Angra Pequena before the German occupation and to discuss the interests of the various parties involved in the annexation. Matters were at length adjusted in a fairly satisfactory manner. The Report of the Commissioners was never published, twenty-five copies only being printed, of which twelve were sent to Berlin, twelve to London, and one was retained by the High Commissioner for South Africa.
In a statement made to the Reichstag on June 23rd, 1884, Bismarck said it was the intention of the Government to issue for Angra Pequena (renamed Luderitz Bay by Herr Luderitz) an Imperial Letter of protection similar to the Royal Charter granted by England to the East India Company. When defining his colonial policy at a later time he affirmed that it was not to found provinces but “mercantile settlements which would be placed under the protection of the Empire.” The subsequent history of South-West Africa affords a striking commentary on what proved to be a characteristic Bismarckian utterance. Unfortunately, Great Britain took the declaration at its face value.
Angra Pequena was but a starting point for large extensions of territory, and German eyes were soon turned in the direction of Damaraland. When rumours of designs on the country reached Cape Town, Mr. W. C. Palgrave was sent to Walvis Bay to make inquiries and to learn what measures, if any, should be taken in order to protect colonial interests and the rights of Her Majesty’s subjects north of the Orange River. On arriving at Walvis Bay Mr. Palgrave was requested by Kamaherero to visit him at Okahandja, and there, without inducement of any kind, the Herero Chief handed the Commissioner a Deed of Cession of Damaraland dated December 29th, 1884, giving “our whole country” over to Great Britain. Mr. Palgrave accepted the cession for transmission to England, but the British Government subsequently declined the offer and stated that it would have no objection to the extension of the German Protectorate “inland as far as the 20th degree of East longitude.” Was not Germany a “friendly Power”? Kamaherero then appealed to the Aborigines Protection Society, and stated that he had given his country to the British in 1876 and in 1884, yet the Germans threatened to seize it and bring war and destruction upon his people. But no help was forthcoming from Great Britain, and accordingly in the following year Germany seized the country.
These developments were viewed with considerable pride in Germany, for the early period of colonisation was characterised by immense national enthusiasm. The perfervid Pan-Germanists and the sword-rattling Chauvinists fanned the flame, and for a time the whole nation was “Colony mad.” No consideration whatever was paid to the fact that the newly acquired possessions in South-West Africa had long been widely recognised as British commercial dependencies. Small wonder that the startled colonists in South Africa rubbed their eyes in amazement at the displays of German high politics.
Among the events which call for brief notice during this period mention must be made of a characteristic Boer trek which took place from the Transvaal into Damaraland in 1873. A party of farmers journeyed with their families and stock across the waterless wastes of the Kalahari Desert to seek out a new home. They endured the most horrible sufferings and their line of march was a line of the graves of their dead. A relief expedition went up from Cape Town to their assistance in 1879, and some 300 of them were found in great straits in North Damaraland. They subsequently trekked into Portuguese territory.
In 1885 W. W. Jordan, a trader, attempted to establish a Republic in South Ovamboland. He purchased land from a Chief, cut it up into farms, secured the co-operation of a few other Europeans, established a Council and named the area Upingtonia in honour of Sir Thomas Upington, the Cape politician; but in the following year Jordan was murdered by natives, and the “Republic” came to an end.
Chapter VII
THE GERMAN OCCUPATION
During the early years of the German occupation the seat of Government was at Otjimbingue, where Dr. Goering, the Imperial Commissioner, had a handful of soldiers to assist him in the work of administration. In 1890 K. von François was appointed Commissioner and Military Commander, and as the few troops in the country had been reinforced, he proceeded to seize the territory around Windhoek, and two years later the first settlers from Germany arrived to make their homes at Windhoek, destined to be the new capital. François set about the task of subjugating the natives in typical Prussian fashion, and apparently adopted a policy of colonisation by the Mauser. In 1893 he stormed the stronghold of Hendrik Witbooi, the Hottentot leader, and the country was forthwith plunged into prolonged and costly wars. Even after Witbooi’s defeat other tribes carried on a most harassing guerilla campaign. In 1902 the Bondelswaarts rose, and in the following year the Hereros revolted. The farms of white settlers were devastated, and men and women were cruelly murdered, but, significantly enough, British and Boer farmers were not molested. In 1904, General von Trotha, who had done his utmost to suppress the rising, greatly exasperated at the failure of many of his “drives,” entered on a campaign of extermination. He issued a proclamation in which it was stated that “within the German border every Herero, with or without a rifle, with or without cattle, will be shot.” The record of the period which followed is a most sanguinary one. Thousands of Hereros were destroyed, and thousands more were driven out into the parched desert wastes, where they died of thirst, and where for several years after long lines of white bones lay bleaching in the sun, marking the track the stricken people had tried to follow across the wilderness. In “Peter Moor,” a narrative of the campaign written by a German soldier, some significant sidelights are thrown on the methods adopted in this campaign. Dealing with one incident the writer describes the foodless, waterless condition of the country, and how the soldiers stealthily surrounded a party of the enemy, men, women and children; and he proceeds: “We then led the men away to one side and shot them. The women and children, who looked pitiably starved, we hunted into the bush.” It is said that no less than 40,000 Hereros were destroyed in these wars.
Probably very few natives would have been left alive in the country had von Trotha been permitted to continue his work of destruction, but the repeal of his famous proclamation was ordered by Bismarck, and he was superseded by Herr von Lindequist in 1905. Von Lindequist issued a general amnesty to the Hereros, and wisely set aside reserves for those who surrendered. This conciliatory policy had an instant effect on the Hereros; but the Hottentots continued the struggle until 1907. The land of the Hereros was appropriated by the Government and made fiscal domain.
The campaign was a costly one for Germany, since it involved the loss of many hundreds of lives and an expenditure of some £30,000,000. At the height of the campaign there were 19,000 Germans in the field, with a large number of Dutch auxiliaries responsible for the transport arrangements.