Such is now the practice of naval war, that the necessary order of battle, and the fabric of our ships, very seldom permit the assault of boarding, unless in single actions. No captain ought therefore to abandon his station in the line, under any pretence whatsoever, unless his ship is too much disabled to continue the combat. The small quantity of sail carried on this occasion will permit the bulk of the fleet, altho’ somewhat impaired, to continue their cannonade a long time without quitting the line.
An ambition to distinguish himself should never seduce any captain to break the line, in order to atchieve any distant enterprize, however the prospect may flatter him with success. He ought to wait the signal of the admiral or his commanding officer; because it is more essential to preserve the regularity of a close line, which constitutes the principal force of the fleet, than to prosecute a particular action, which, although brilliant in itself, has seldom any material consequences, unless its object is to seize a flag-ship, and even this can only be justified by success[[22]].
The various exigencies of the combat call forth the skill and resources of the admiral, to keep his line as complete as possible, when it has been unequally attacked; by ordering ships from those in reserve, to supply the place of others which have suffered greatly by the action; by directing his fire-ships at a convenient time to fall aboard the enemy; by detaching ships from one part of the line or wing which is stronger, to another which is greatly pressed by superior force, and requires assistance. His vigilance is ever necessary to review the situation of the enemy from van to rear, every motion of whom he should, if possible, anticipate and frustrate. He should seize the favourable moments of occasion, which are rapid in their progress, and never return. Far from being disconcerted by any unforeseen incident, he should endeavour, if possible, to make it subservient to his design. His experience and reflection will naturally furnish him with every method of intelligence to discover the state of his different squadrons and divisions. Signals of enquiry and answers; of request and assent; of command and obedience; will be displayed and repeated on this occasion. Tenders and boats will also continually be detached between the admiral and the commanders of the several squadrons or divisions.
As the danger presses on him, he ought to be fortified by resolution and presence of mind, because the whole fleet is committed to his charge, and the conduct of his officers may, in a great degree, be influenced by his intrepidity and perseverance. In short, his renown or infamy may depend on the fate of the day.
If he conquers in battle, he ought to prosecute his victory as much as possible, by seizing, burning, or destroying the enemies ships. If he is defeated, he should endeavour by every resource his experience can suggest, to have as many of his fleet as possible; by employing his tenders, &c. to take out the wounded and put fresh men in their places; by towing the disabled ships to a competent distance, and by preventing the execution of the enemies fire-ships. In order to retreat with more security, he may judge it expedient to range his fleet into the form of an half-moon, placing himself in the center. By this disposition the enemy’s ships which attempt to fall upon his rear, will at once expose themselves to the fire of the admiral, and his seconds, in a disadvantageous situation; a circumstance which will serve to facilitate the escape of his own ships, and retard the pursuit of those of his adversary.
If his fleet is too much extended by this arrangement, the wings or quarters are easily closed, and the half-moon rendered more complete; in the midst of which may be placed his store-ships, tenders, &c. In flying, or retreating, the uncertainty of the weather is to be considered: it may become calm, or the wind may shift in his favour. His schemes may be assisted by the approach of night, or the proximity of the land; since he ought rather to run the ships ashore, if practicable, than suffer them to be taken afloat, and thereby transfer additional strength to the enemy. In short, nothing should be neglected that may contribute to the preservation of his fleet, or prevent any part of it from falling into the hands of the conqueror.
By what we have observed, the real force, or superiority, of a fleet consists less in the number of vessels, and the vivacity of the action, than in good order, dexterity in working the ships, presence of mind, and skilful conduct in the captains.
ENSIGN, pavillon de pouppe, (enseigne, Fr.) a large standard, or banner, hoisted on a long pole erected over the poop, and called the ensign-staff.
The ensign is used to distinguish the ships of different nations from each other, as also to characterise the different squadrons of the navy.
The British ensign in ships of war is known by a double cross, viz. that of St. George and St. Andrew, formed into an union, upon a field which is either red, white, or blue.