An Universal Dictionary of the Marine / Or, a Copious Explanation of the Technical Terms and Phrases Employed in the Construction, Equipment, Furniture, Machinery, Movements, and Military Operations of a Ship. Illustrated With Variety of Original Designs of Shipping, in Different Situations; Together With Separate Views of Their Masts, Sails, Yards, and Rigging. to Which Is Annexed, a Translation of the French Sea-terms and Phrases, Collected from the Works of Mess. Du Hamel, Aubin, Saverien, &c.

by William Falconer

The large ships, having greater solidity of frame, are better calculated to resist the effects of battle and tempest. In general also, they sail better than the small ones, except in fine weather; for in a fresh wind, when the sea becomes agitated, they have always the superiority.

The fire-ships do not succeed so well against large ships as the smaller ones: the artillery will sink them, or oblige them sooner to relinquish their design; and they are easily towed away by the great long boats.

The line of a fleet, which has abundance of capital ships, need not be so much enclosed as that of an enemy who has fewer. The former may be also less numerous, without being weaker.

An open line will, on many occasions, work more easily than one which is more enclosed; and if it is less numerous, the movements thereof are more expeditious; the signals better attended; the general order more exactly preserved; and the ships less liable to be separated. Hence it will be less embarrassed by a change of wind, and the order will be sooner re-established.

A less numerous line will more readily approach or escape from an enemy, or a hostile shore; and, finally, when cruizing in a smaller space, it will not be so much contracted.

From the preceding reflections it results, that the line, which contains more capital ships, will be stronger than one more numerous, if composed of smaller ships. This reflection however does not exclude a certain number of the third and fourth rates, which are necessary in all naval armaments[^[38]].

As the hostile fleets are drawn up in two opposite lines, with their sides to the wind, it is evident that one must be to the leeward of the other, as appears in fig. 8. plate [V]. Both situations however have their defects as well as advantages.

The advantages of a weather-line are generally, that it may approach the enemy so as to determine the time and distance of action. If it is more numerous than the lee-line, it may easily appoint a detachment to fall upon the van and rear of the latter, and enclose it between two fires. It is little incommoded by the fire or smoke of the cannon, and may dispatch the fire-ships, under cover of the smoke, upon the disabled ships of the lee-line; or wheresoever they may occasion perplexity and disorder, by obliging the enemy to break the line and bear away.

The weather-line has nevertheless its defects, which sometimes counterbalance the advantages above recited. If the sea is rough, and the wind boisterous, it cannot readily fight with the lower-deck battery. It cannot decline the action without the dangerous expedient of forcing through the enemy’s line: and if it keeps the wind, the lee-line may enclose, and totally destroy it, especially if it is inferior in number to the latter; or if the ships thereof are in bad condition; for it then can find no other resource but in the dexterity of its manœuvres, unless it is favoured by the wind, or any oversight of the enemy. The disabled ships of the weather-line must tack, to avoid falling into the enemy’s fleet; and if they are much shattered, they may be altogether separated from their own fleet, particularly if they are in the rear of the line.

The line to leeward has also its advantages, which have occasionally been preferred to those of the weather-line. The ships of the former may use the guns of their lower decks, without the hazard of taking in much water at the ports in stormy weather; whereas the line to windward dare not open them, without the greatest danger. If the lee-line, although more numerous, cannot so easily double upon the van and rear of the enemy, and inclose them between two fires, it may nevertheless have opportunities of tacking, and cutting off a part of the enemy’s rear, by obliging them to bear away, or separate from the rest. The disabled ships to leeward are much more readily removed from the line than those to windward, without being obliged to tack and continue exposed to the enemy’s fire: they bear away, and remain at a competent distance from the fleet in a state of safety. Finally, the lee-line can with more facility avoid the action than its adversary; a circumstance which is extremely favourable to an inferior squadron.