Soult’s base and place of arms was Bayonne, from whence roads spread out to the Pyrenees like a fan. Two only were great causeways. One, on the French left hand, run to St. Jean Pied de Port; the other, on their right, run along the sea-coast through St. Jean de Luz to Irun. Between these points, a distance of nearly forty miles, the space was filled transversely by a double range of mountain ridges nearly parallel to each other, on which the armies were posted; not in a continuous line, for there were no direct lateral communications, but as the passes and inaccessible peaks governed the dispositions. Thus on the French left, at St. Jean Pied de Port, Foy occupied with fifteen thousand men an entrenched camp in front of that fortress, and was opposed by Hill’s right wing, which was planted at the head of the Val Carlos, in the Roncesvalles and Alduides; but Foy could only communicate by a circuitous road, leading across the Nive river at Cambo, with the French centre, entrenched, under D’Erlon, at Ainhoa and Urdax, opposite the Maya passes, and menacing the Bastan, where Hill’s left was posted.
At Urdax the Nivelle river bisected the French positions, and then, turning to the left, run to St. Jean de Luz. The line of their right centre, beyond that river, was under Clausel, and thrown forward to Vera, along another batch of mountainous ridges, which, touching on the Bidassoa, lined its right bank to the bridge of Behobia near Iran.
From Clausel’s right to the mouth of the Bidassoa, Soult’s right wing, under Reille, guarded the French territory.
Clausel’s ground comprised the Great La Rhune mountain, two thousand seven hundred feet high, whose bleak rocky head overlooked everything around, and from whose flanks the positions of Sarre shot out on the French left, and on their right the Commissari, Bayonette, and Mandale ridge—the two first overhanging Vera, the last lining the Bidassoa down to San Marcial and Irun.
Opposed to Clausel Wellington held, first the Atchiola mountain on the left of Maya, then the Echallar ridges as far as the Ivantelly mountain facing Sarre, and the Santa Barbara ridge abutting on the Bidassoa at Vera, facing the Bayonette and Commissari. On the left bank of the Bidassoa he occupied the flanks of the Peña de Haya to San Marcial, from whence his redoubts, as before noticed, run along the river to the Jaizquibel.
Soult had commenced a chain of entrenched camps and redoubts along his whole line, and in the low country, from the end of the Mandale to the sea, was constructing a double chain of entrenched positions and camps bearing many names and to be noticed in the narrative. These works were approaching completion when Wellington resolved to seize the Great La Rhune with its dependents on both flanks, at the same time forcing the passage of the Lower Bidassoa in face of Soult’s entrenchments. Thus he would establish his left in the French territory, from Sarre to the sea, and bring within his own lines the Rhune, the Commissari, and Bayonette mountains, which would give him a salient menacing point of impregnable strength towards France, and shorten his lateral communication on both flanks of those mountains. It would also give entire command of a road running up the Bidassoa from Irun to Vera, and secure the port of Fuenterabia, which, though bad in winter, was desirable for a general whose supplies came from the ocean, and who with scanty means of transport had to sustain the perverse negligence always, and often the hostility of the Spanish authorities.
He had designed to force the passage in the middle of September before the French works were advanced, but his pontoons were delayed by a negligence of orders; the weather then became bad, and the attempt, which depended upon the state of the tides and fords, was of necessity deferred to the 7th of October.
Great subtlety was to be combined with wonderful boldness, for the Bidassoa was broad and tidal below Irun, and the ridges lining it above that point rough and terrible to assail; both water and mountain line were strengthened with works, incomplete indeed, but already of strength in defence; the river was also to be passed and the positions beyond carried between tides, or the troops would be swallowed by the returning flood. Hence to mislead Soult, to support the blockade of Pampeluna, and to ascertain Foy’s true position and strength at St. Jean Pied de Port, which menaced anew that blockade, Wellington brought up Del Parque’s army from Tudela to Pampeluna, transferred the Andalusians at the latter place to Giron at Echallar, and directed Mina to gather his irregulars around the Roncesvalles: then repairing himself to that quarter on the 1st of October, he surprised a French post on the Ayrola rock, cut off a scouting party in the Val de Baygorry, and swept away two thousand sheep.
These movements awakened Soult’s jealousy. He expected an invasion of France without being able to ascertain from what quarter, and at first, deceived by false information that Cole had reinforced Hill, thought Mina’s troops and the Andalusians were used to mask an attack by the Val de Baygorry. The arrival of the light cavalry in the Bastan, Wellington’s presence at Roncesvalles, and the loss of the Ayrola post, seemed to confirm this; but he knew that pontoons were at Oyarzun, and the deserters, very numerous at this time, said the real object was the Great Rhune. On the other hand, a French commissary, taken at San Sebastian and exchanged after remaining twelve days at Wellington’s head-quarters, assured him nothing there indicated a serious attack. This weighed much, because the negligence about the pontoons, and the wet weather, had caused a delay contradictory to the reports of the spies and deserters. It was also beyond calculation that Wellington, merely to please the allied sovereigns in Germany, should thereby seek to establish his left wing in France, when the most obvious line for a permanent invasion was by his right and centre, and there was no apparent cause for deferring his operations.
The cause of the procrastination, namely, the state of the tides and fords on the Lower Bidassoa, was necessarily impenetrable, and Soult finally inclined to think the only design was to secure the blockade of Pampeluna by menacing the French, and impeding their entrenchments which were now becoming strong. Nevertheless, as all the deserters and spies came with the same story, he recommended increased vigilance along the whole line; yet so little did he anticipate the real project, that on the 6th he reviewed D’Erlon’s divisions at Ainhoa and remained that night at Espelette, doubting if any attack was intended, and having no fear for his right. But Wellington could not diminish his troops on the side of Roncesvalles, lest a force should unite at St. Jean Pied de Port to raise the blockade of Pampeluna; and at Maya, Hill was already menacing Soult between the Nive and the Nivelle: it was therefore only with his left wing and left centre, and against the French right, that he could act while Pampeluna held out.