Rain again fell heavily in the night, and, though the morning broke fair, neither side seemed inclined to recommence hostilities; but the advanced posts being very close to each other at ten o’clock a quarrel arose. For Soult observing the fresh regiments of the first division close to his posts, imagined the allies were going to attack him, and reinforced his front; this caused an English battery to fall into a like error, it opened on the advancing troops and in an instant the whole line of posts was engaged. Soult then brought up a number of guns, the firing continued without object for many hours, and four hundred men of a side were killed or wounded, although the great body of the French army remained concentrated and quiet on the ridge between Barrouilhet and Bussussary.
Wellington, expecting Soult would finally abandon his attack to fall on Hill, had sent Beresford orders to reinforce the latter with the sixth division by the new bridge if necessary; and also with the seventh division by Ustaritz without waiting for further instructions; yet now, seeing Soult’s tenacity, he drew the seventh division again towards Arbonne. Beresford had however made a movement towards the Nive, and this, with the march of the seventh and some changes in the position of the fourth division, caused Soult to believe the allies were gathering with a view to attack his centre on the morning of the 13th; and it is remarkable that the deserters, at this early period, told him the Spaniards had re-entered France, although orders to that effect were not, as we shall find, given until the next day. Convinced then that his bolt was shot on that side of the Nive, he left two divisions and Villatte’s reserve in the entrenched camp, and marched with the other seven to Mousserolles, intending to fall upon Hill.
That general had pushed his scouting parties far abroad, and when Sparre’s horsemen arrived at Mousserolles on the 12th, Pierre Soult advanced from the Bidouze river with all his light cavalry, and being supported by General Paris drove the allies’ posts from Hasparen. Colonel Vivian, who commanded there, ordered Major Brotherton to charge with the 14th Dragoons across the bridge. It was an ill-judged order, and the impossibility of succeeding was so manifest, that when Brotherton, noted throughout the army for his daring, galloped forward, only two men and one subaltern, Lieutenant Southwell, passed the narrow bridge with him and they were all taken except one man who was killed. Vivian charged with his whole brigade to rescue them, but in vain, and he fell back to Urcurray upon Morillo’s Spaniards; Hill then put a British brigade in march to support him on the 12th, yet recalled it at sunset, because he had then discovered Soult’s columns passing the Nive by the boat-bridge above Bayonne.
Wellington, feeling the want of numbers, now brought forward a division of Gallicians to St. Jean de Luz, and one of Andalusians from the Bastan to Itzassu, and to prevent plunder fed them from the British magazines. The Gallicians were to support Hope, the Andalusians to protect the rear of the army from General Paris and Pierre Soult.
Hill now took a position of battle on a front of two miles.
His left, composed of the 28th, 34th and 39th Regiments under General Pringle, occupied a wooded ridge crowned by the château of Villefranque, where it covered the new pontoon bridge of communication, but was separated from the centre by a small stream forming a chain of ponds in a deep marshy valley.
His centre was on both sides of the high road, near the hamlet of St. Pierre, on a crescent-shaped height, broken with rocks and close brushwood on the left hand; on the right hand inclosed with high and thick hedges, one of which, at the distance of a hundred yards, covered part of the line and was nearly impassable. Here Barnes’s British brigade of the second division were posted, the 71st Regiment being on the left, the 50th in the centre, the 92nd on the right. Ashworth’s Portuguese were posted in advance immediately in front of St. Pierre, with skirmishers occupying a small wood covering their right. Twelve guns under Ross and Tullock were in the centre, looking down the great road; and half a mile in rear Lecor’s Portuguese and two guns were in reserve.
The right, under Byng, was composed of the 3rd, 57th, 31st, and 66th. The first-named was posted on a height running parallel with the Adour, called the ridge of Old Moguerre because a village of that name was on the summit; pushed in advance, this regiment could only be assailed by crossing a narrow swampy valley, the upper part of which was held by Byng with the remainder of the brigade, his post being also covered by a great mill-pond.
One mile in front of St. Pierre a range of counter heights were held by the French, but the basin between was broad, open, and commanded by the fire of the allies. All parts were too heavy and enclosed for the action of cavalry, and the French infantry could only approach in force on one narrow front of battle along the high road, until within cannon-shot, but then two narrow difficult lanes branched off to the right and left, crossing the swampy valleys on each side, and leading, the one against the allies’ right, where the 3rd Regiment was posted; the other against their left.
In the night of the 12th rain swelled the Nive and carried away the bridge of communication; it was soon restored, but for the time Hill was cut off from the rest of the army; and while seven French divisions of infantry, furnishing thirty-five thousand combatants, approached him in front, an eighth under General Paris, and the cavalry of Pierre Soult, menaced him in rear. To meet those in his front he had only fourteen guns and fourteen thousand men in position; to check those on his rear but four thousand Spaniards and Vivian’s cavalry at Urcurray.