During the night Soult retreated in two columns, one by the main road, the other on the left of it, guided by fires lighted on different hills as points of direction. Next day he reached St. Gaudens with D’Erlon’s and Reille’s corps, while Clausel, who had retreated across the fields, halted at Monrejean, and was there rejoined by Pierre Soult’s cavalry. This march of more than thirty miles was made with a view to gain Toulouse in the most rapid manner; for Soult having now seen Wellington’s infantry and his five thousand horsemen, and hearing from his brother that the fourth division and Vivian’s cavalry were on his right, feared they would cut him off from Toulouse—his great depôt, the knot of all his future combinations, and the only position where he could hope to make a successful stand with his small army.
The allies pursued in three columns, but their marches were short. However, at St. Gaudens four squadrons of French cavalry were overtaken and overthrown by two squadrons of the 13th Dragoons; they galloped in disorder through St. Gaudens, yet rallied on the other side and were again broken and pursued for two miles, many being sabred and above a hundred taken prisoners. In this action the veteran Major Dogherty of the 13th was seen charging between his two sons at the head of the leading squadron.
On the 23rd Hill was at St. Gaudens, Beresford at Puymauren, Wellington at Boulogne.
The 24th Hill was in St. Martory, Beresford in Lombez, Wellington at Isle en Dodon.
The 25th Hill entered Caceres, Beresford reached St. Foy, and Wellington was at Samatan.
On the 26th Beresford, marching in order of battle by his left, his cavalry skirmishing to the right, took post on the Auch road behind the Aussonnelle stream, facing the French army, which was on the Touch covering Toulouse. The allies thus took seven days to march what Soult had done in four; but the two armies being thus again brought together in opposition with a common resolution to fight, it is fitting to show how the generals framed their combinations.
Operations on the Garonne. (March, 1814.)
Soult, a native of these parts, had chosen Toulouse as a strategic post, because that ancient capital of the south, having fifty thousand inhabitants, commanded the principal passage of the Garonne, was the centre of a great number of roads on both sides of that river, and the chief military arsenal of the south of France. There he could most easily feed his troops, assemble, arm, and discipline the conscripts, control and urge the civil authorities with more power, and counteract the machinations of the discontented; it also gave him command of various lines of operations. He could retire upon Suchet by Carcassonne, or towards Lyons by Alby. He could go behind the Tarn and defend successively that river and the Lot, or even retreat upon Decaen’s army near Bordeaux, and thus draw the allies down the right bank of the Garonne as he had before drawn them up the left bank; assured that Wellington must follow him, and with weakened forces, as it would be necessary to leave troops in observation of Suchet.
Thus reasoning, he placed a separate body of troops recently assembled by General Loverdo from the interior, at Montauban, with orders to construct a bridge-head on the left of the Tarn. This secured the passage of that river, a point of assembly for detachments observing the Garonne below Toulouse, and the command of several great roads. But to hold Toulouse was a great political object. It was the last point connecting him at once with Suchet and Decaen; while he held it, the latter general and the partizans organized in the mountains about Lourdes could act, each on their own side, against Wellington’s long lines of communication. At Toulouse Suchet could aid him, either with his whole force, or by a detachment to the Upper Garonne, where General Lafitte had collected seven or eight hundred national guards and other troops: Suchet, however, though strongly urged, treated this proposition, as he had done those before made, with contempt.
Toulouse was not less valuable as a position of battle.