Bertoletti, an Italian, commanded the fortress and was supposed to be disaffected, yet be proved himself a loyal and energetic officer. His garrison, sixteen hundred strong, five hundred being privateer seamen and Franco-Spaniards, served him well, and when Murray occupied the Olivo and Loretto heights the first day, and the town was bombarded in the night by the navy, the fire was returned so sharply that the flotilla suffered most. Two batteries were then opened the 6th, but were found too distant, and a third was commenced six hundred yards from Fort Royal. The 8th a practicable breach was made in that outwork, yet the assault was deferred, and some pieces removed to play from the Olivo; whereupon the besieged, finding the fire slacken, repaired the breach at Fort Royal and increased the defences. The subsequent proceedings cannot be understood without reference to the relative positions of the French and allied armies.
Tarragona was situated on one of a cluster of rocks terminating a range descending to the sea, but, with the exception of that range, surrounded by an open country called the Campo de Tarragona, itself environed by very rugged mountains, through which several roads descend into the plain.
Westward there were only two carriage-ways from Tortoza. One direct, by the Col de Balaguer to Tarragona; the other circuitous, leading by Mora, Falcet, Momblanch and Reus. The capture of San Felippe blocked the first, the second was in bad order, and at best only available for small mountain-guns.
Northward there was a carriage-way leading from Lerida, which united with that from Falcet at Momblanch.
Eastward was the royal causeway from Barcelona, running through Villa Franca and Torredembarra, and after passing Villa Franca sending two branches to the right, one through the Col de Cristina, the other through Col de Leibra.
Between these various roads the mountains were too rugged to permit cross communications; troops coming from different sides could only unite in the Campo de Tarragona; where Murray, who had fifteen thousand fighting men, and Copons, who had six thousand regulars and the irregular division of Manso, could present twenty-five thousand combatants.
Copons indeed told Murray, that his troops could only fight in position, and he would not join in any operation to endanger his retreat into the mountains; but his force, the best in Spain, was now at Reus and the Col de Balaguer, ready to harass and oppose any French corps which should attempt to descend into the Campo. Murray could also calculate upon seven or eight hundred seamen and marines to aid him in the siege, or in a battle near the shore, and he expected three thousand fresh troops from Sicily. Sir Edward Pellew, commanding the great Mediterranean fleet, promised to distract the French by a descent eastward of Barcelona, and a general rising of the Somatenes might have been effected: those mountaineers were indeed all at his disposal, to procure intelligence, to give timely notice of the French marches and impede them by breaking up the roads.
The French power was greater yet more scattered. On the west Suchet, coming with nine thousand men from Valencia, was to be reinforced by Pannetier’s brigade and some troops from Tortoza, up to eleven or twelve thousand men with artillery; but the fall of San Felippe de Balaguer barred his only carriage-way, and the road by Mora and Momblanch, which remained open, was long and bad. On the eastern side Maurice Mathieu could bring seven thousand men with artillery from Barcelona; Decaen could move from the Ampurdam with an equal number, and thus twenty-five thousand men in all might finally bear upon the allied army.
Suchet had more than a hundred and sixty miles to march, and Maurice Mathieu was to collect his forces from various places, and march seventy miles after Murray had disembarked; nor could he stir at all until Tarragona was actually besieged, lest the allies should reëmbark and attack Barcelona. Decaen had in like manner to look to the security of the Ampurdam, and was one hundred and thirty miles distant. Wherefore the English general could calculate upon ten days’ clear operations after investment, before even the heads of the enemy’s columns could issue from the hills bordering the Campo; and it was possible that Suchet might endeavour to cripple the Spaniards in his front at Valencia before he marched to the succour of Tarragona. Eastward, and westward also, the royal causeway was in places exposed to the fire of the naval squadron; and though the first siege of Tarragona had shown that an army could not be there stopped by this fire, it was an impediment not to be left out of the calculation. Thus, a central position, possession of the enemy’s point of junction, the initial movement, the good-will of the people, and the aid of powerful flank diversions belonged to Murray: superior numbers and better soldiers to the French, since the allies, brave and formidable to fight in a position, were not well constituted for general operations.
Tarragona, if the resources for an internal defence be disregarded, was a weak place. A simple revetment three feet and a half thick, without ditch or counterscarp, covered it on the west; the two outworks of Fort Royal and San Carlos, slight obstacles at best, were not armed or even repaired until after the investment; and the garrison, too weak for the extent of rampart, was oppressed with labour. Here then, time being precious to both sides, ordinary rule should have been set aside for daring operations, and Murray’s troops were brave. They had been acting together for nearly a year, and after the fight at Castalla became so eager, that an Italian regiment, which at Alicant was ready to go over bodily to the enemy, now volunteered to lead the assault on Fort Royal. This confidence was not shared by their general: up to the 8th his proceedings were ill-judged, and his after operations disgraceful to the British army.