Now the Asturian deputies arrived in London the 6th of June.
The 20th of August (the battle of Vimiero being then unfought, and, consequently, the fate of the campaign in Portugal uncertain,) the English minister invited sir Hew Dalrymple to discuss three plans of operations in Spain, each founded upon data utterly false, and all objectionable in the detail. He also desired that sir Arthur Wellesley should go to the Asturias to ascertain what facilities that country offered for the disembarkation of an English army; and the whole number of troops disposable for the campaign (exclusive of those already in Portugal) he stated to be twenty thousand, of which one half was in England and the other in Sicily. He acknowledged that no information yet received had enabled the cabinet to decide as to the application of the forces at home, or the ulterior use to be made of those in Portugal, yet, with singular rashness, the whole of the southern provinces, containing the richest cities, finest harbours, and most numerous armies, were discarded from consideration, and sir Hew Dalrymple, who was well acquainted with that part of Spain, and in close and friendly correspondence with the chiefs, was directed to confine his attention to the northern provinces, of which he knew nothing.
The reduction of Junot’s army in Portugal, and the discomfiture of Joseph’s on the Ebro, were regarded as certain events. The observations of the minister were principally directed, not to the best mode of attacking, but to the choice of a line of march that would ensure the utter destruction or captivity of the whole French army; nay, elated with extravagant hopes and strangely despising Napoleon’s power, he instructed lord William Bentinck to urge the central junta to an invasion of France, as soon as the army on the Ebro should be annihilated.
Thus it appears that the English ministers were either profoundly ignorant of the real state of affairs, or that with a force scattered in England, Portugal, and Sicily, and not exceeding forty-five thousand men, they expected in one campaign, first to subdue twenty-six thousand French under Junot, and then destroying eighty thousand under Joseph, to turn the tide of war, and to invade France.
The battle of Vimiero took place, and sir Arthur Wellesley naturally declined a mission more suitable to a staff captain than a victorious commander; but before sir Hew’s answer, exposing the false calculations of the minister’s plans, could be received in England, a despatch, dated the 2d of September, announced the resolution of the government to employ an army in the northern provinces of Spain, and directed twenty thousand men to be held in readiness to unite with other forces to be sent from England; nevertheless, this project also was so immature, that no intimation was given how the junction was to be effected, whether by sea or land; nor had the ministers even ascertained that the Spaniards would permit English troops to enter Spain at all; for three weeks later, lord William Bentinck, writing from Madrid, says, “I had an interview with Florida Blanca: he expressed his surprise that there should be a doubt of the Spaniards wishing for the assistance of the English army.” Such also was the confusion at home, that lord Castlereagh repeatedly expressed his fears lest the embarkation of Junot’s troops should have “absorbed all the means of transport” in the Tagus, when a simple reference to the transport office in London would have satisfied him, that although the English army should also be embarked, there would still remain a surplus of twelve thousand tons.
When the popular cry arose against the convention of Cintra, the generals in chief were recalled in succession, as rapidly as they had been appointed; the despatches addressed to one generally fell into the hands of his successor; but the plans of the ministers becoming at last mature, on the 6th of October sir John Moore was finally appointed to lead the forces into Spain. At this period the head of the grand French army was already in the passes of the Pyrenees, and the hostile troops on the Ebro coming to blows. The Spaniards were weak and divided, and the English were forty marches from the scene of action; yet, said the minister to sir John Moore, “there will be full time to concert your plan of operations with the Spanish generals before the equipment of your army can be completed.” Was this the way to oppose Napoleon! Could such proceedings lead to ought but disaster! It has been said, that sir Hew Dalrymple’s negligence was the cause of this delay; that he should have had the troops in readiness: but that general could not prudently incur the expense of equipping for a march, an army that was likely to be embarked; he could not, in short, divine the plans of the ministers before they were formed; and it is evident that the error attaches entirely to the government.
The incapacity of the Spanish generals has been already sufficiently exposed by occasional observations in the narrative; their faults, glaring and fatal, call for no further remark; but the exact combinations, the energy and rapidity of the French emperor, merit the most careful examination; his operations were not, as they have been generally considered, a pompous display of power, to create an appearance of conquest that was unreal, not a mere violent irruption with a multitude of men, but a series of skilful and scientific movements, worthy of so great a general and politician. It is true that his force was immense, and that the Spaniards were but contemptible soldiers; but he never neglected the lessons of experience, nor deviated from the strictest rules of art. With astonishing activity, and when we consider the state of his political relations on the continent, we may add, with astonishing boldness, he first collected ample means to attain his object, then deceiving his enemies with regard to his numbers, position, and intentions, and choosing his time with admirable judgment, he broke through the weak part of their line, and seized Burgos, a central point, which enabled him to envelop and destroy the left wing of the Spaniards before their right could hear of his attack, the latter being itself turned by the same movement, and exposed to a like fate. This position also enabled him to menace the capital, to keep the English army in check, and to cover the formation of those magazines and stores which were necessary to render Burgos the base and pivot of further operations.
Napoleon’s forces were numerous enough to have attacked Castaños and Palafox, while Blake was being pursued by the first and fourth corps; but trusting nothing to chance, he waited for twelve days, until the position of the English army was ascertained, the strength of the northern provinces quite broken, and a secure place of arms established. Then leaving the second corps to cover his communications, and sending the fourth corps into the flat country, to coast, as it were, the heads of the English columns on his right, and to turn the passes of the Carpentino mountains, he caused the Spanish right wing to be destroyed, and himself approached the capital, at a moment when not a vestige of a national army was left, when he had good reason to think that the English were in full retreat, when the whole of his own corps were close at hand, and consequently when the greatest moral effect could be produced, and the greatest physical power concentrated at the same time to take advantage of it. Napoleon’s dispositions were indeed surprisingly skilful; for although marshal Lefebre’s precipitation at Zornoza, by prolonging Blake’s agony, lost six days of promise, it is certain that reverses in battle could neither have checked the emperor, nor helped the Spaniards.
For if Soult had been beaten at Gamonal, Napoleon was close at hand to support the second corps, and the sixth corps would have fallen upon the flank and rear of the Spaniards.
If the first corps had been defeated at Espinosa, the second and fourth corps, and the emperor’s troops, would have taken Blake in flank and rear.