On the French side, marshal Bessieres collected his scattered columns at Palencia; his plan, founded upon instructions from Bayonne, was to make a S.
Journal of Bessieres’ Operations. MSS. rapid movement against Cuesta, in the hope of beating him, while Blake was still behind Leon; then wheeling to his right, to attack and drive the Napoleon’s Notes, [Appendix, No. 2.] Gallicians back to the mountains, to overrun the flat country with his numerous cavalry, to open a communication with Portugal, and after receiving certain reinforcements then preparing for him, to subdue Gallicia, or assist Junot, as might seem most fitting at the time.
At this period the king was on his journey to Madrid, and the military system of Napoleon was brought to its first great crisis; for unless Bessieres was successful, there could be no sure footing for the French in the capital, and as Madrid was the base of Moncey’s and Dupont’s operations, the farther prosecution of their plans depended upon the result of the approaching struggle in the plains of Leon. Napoleon, foreseeing this crisis, had directed Savary to occupy Segovia, to send general Gobert’s division Ibid. to Valladolid, and to hold Vedel’s and Frere’s, the one in La Mancha, a few marches from the capital, and the other at San Clemente, a central point connecting Moncey, Dupont, and Madrid. But Savary, unable to estimate justly the relative importance of the different operations, sent Vedel and Gobert into Andalusia to reinforce Dupont, when he should rather have recalled the latter to the northern side of the Sierra Morena; he caused Frere, as we have seen, to quit San Clemente, and march by Requeña against Valencia, at the moment when Moncey was retiring from that city through Murcia to San Clemente, and thus dispersed and harassed his reserves by long marches to the south without any definite object when the essential interests were at stake in the north; and now, struck with fear at the approach of Cuesta and Blake, whose armies he had hitherto disregarded, he precipitately recalled Frere, Vedel, Gobert, and even Dupont to Madrid, too late to take part with Bessieres in the coming battle, but exactly timed to frustrate Moncey’s projects, and, as we shall hereafter find, to ensure the ruin of Dupont. In this manner steering his vessel before every wind that blew, he could not fail of storms.
Greatly was Napoleon discontented with these errors; he relied, and with reason, on the ability of Bessieres for a remedy; but to Savary he sent the following instructions, dated the 13th of July:
“The French affairs in Spain would be in an excellent state if Gobert’s division had marched upon Valladolid, and Frere’s had occupied San Clemente, with a moveable column, three or four marches upon the route of general Dupont. Gobert having been directed upon Dupont, Frere being with Moncey, harassed and enfeebled by marches and countermarches, the position of the French army is become less advantageous.
“Marshal Bessieres is this day at Medina del Rio Seco with fifteen thousand men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery; the 15th or 16th he will attack Benevente, open a communication with Portugal, drive the rebels into Gallicia, and seize upon Leon. If his operations succeed thus, and in a brilliant manner, the position of the French army will again be as good as it was.
“If general Cuesta retires from Benevente without fighting, he will move by Zamora and Salamanca to gain Avila and Segovia, certain that then Bessieres cannot pursue him, as, in that case, he would be menaced by the army of Gallicia, whose advanced guard is at Leon. The general who commands at Madrid must then be able to assemble six or seven thousand men and march upon Cuesta; the citadel of Segovia must be occupied by three or four hundred convalescents, with some guns and six weeks biscuit. It was a great fault not to have occupied this citadel when the major-general ordered it; of all the possible positions, Segovia is the most dangerous for the army; the capital of a province, situated between two routes, it deprives the army of all its communications, and the enemy once posted in the citadel, the French army cannot dislodge him. Three or four hundred convalescents, a good commandant, and a squad of artillery, will render the castle of Segovia impregnable for some time, and will insure to the army the important position of Segovia.
“If general Cuesta throws himself into Gallicia without fighting or suffering a defeat, the position of the army will become better; of course it will be still better if he does so after having suffered a defeat.
“If marshal Bessieres faces Cuesta at Benevente without attacking him, or if he is repulsed by him, his object will always be to cover Burgos, and to hold the enemy in check as long as possible; he could, perhaps, be reinforced with the three hundred troops of the line which accompany the king, but then there would be no room for hesitation. If Bessieres retires without a battle, he must be reinforced instantly with six thousand men. If he retreats after a battle wherein he has suffered great loss, it will be necessary to make great dispositions; to recall Frere, Gobert, Caulaincourt, and Vedel by forced marches to Madrid; to withdraw Dupont into the Sierra Morena, or even bring him nearer to Madrid (keeping him always, however, seven or eight marches off), then crush Cuesta and all the Gallician army, while Dupont will serve as an advanced guard to hold the army of Andalusia in check.”
Before Bessieres could collect his troops, Blake effected a junction with Cuesta at Benevente. Three plans were open to those generals:
1º. To remove into the mountains, and take a position covering Gallicia.