This position enabled him to preserve his communication with Loison open, but as it uncovered Peniché, the fourth Swiss regiment, with the exception of the flank companies, was sent to regarrison that important point, and at the same time three hundred men were detached to the right by Bombarral, Cadaval, and Segura, to obtain intelligence of Loison.
That general, having made a demonstration on the side of Thomar the 11th, ascertained that Leria was in the hands of the British, and fell back the same day upon Torres Novas, then following the course of the Tagus he arrived at Santarem upon the 13th, but in such an exhausted state, that he was unable to renew his march until the 15th. Sir Arthur Wellesley’s first movement had thus cut the line of communication between Loison and Laborde, caused a loss of several forced marches to the former, and obliged the latter to risk an action with more than twice his own numbers.
As the hostile troops approached each other, the Portuguese chiefs became alarmed, notwithstanding the confident language of their public manifestos and the bombastic style of their conversation, an internal conviction that a French army was invincible pervaded all ranks of the patriots. The leaders, aware of their own deficiency, and incredulous of the courage of the English soldiers, dreaded the being committed in a decisive contest, because a defeat (which they expected) would deprive them of all hope to make terms with the victors, whereas by keeping five or six thousand men together, they could at any time secure themselves by a capitulation. The junta of Oporto also, who were already aiming at supreme authority, foresaw that in the event of a successful battle, it would be more advantageous for their particular views, to be provided with an army untouched and entirely disconnected with a foreign general, and Freire being well instructed in the secret designs of his party, resolved not to advance a step beyond Leria; but, to cover his real motives, he required the British commander to supply him with provisions, choosing to forget the magazine which he had just appropriated to himself, and as readily forgetting the formal promises of the bishop of Oporto, who had undertaken to feed the English army.
This extraordinary demand, that an auxiliary force just disembarked should nourish the native soldiers, instead of being itself fed by the people, was met by sir Arthur Wellesley with a strong remonstrance. He easily penetrated the secret motive which caused it, but feeling that it was important to have a respectable Portuguese force acting in conjunction with his own, he first appealed to the honour and patriotism of Freire, and warmly admonished him, that he was going to forfeit all pretension to either, by permitting the British army to fight without his assistance; but this argument had no effect upon don Bernardim. He parried the imputations against his spirit and zeal by pretending that his intention was to operate independently on the line of the Tagus; and after some further discussion, sir Arthur, as a last effort, changed his tone of rebuke to one of conciliation, and recommended to him not to risk his troops by an isolated march, but to keep in the rear of the British, and wait for the result of the first battle. This advice was so agreeable to Freire, that at the solicitation of captain Trant, a military agent, he consented to leave fourteen hundred infantry, and two hundred and fifty cavalry, under the immediate command of the English general.
The defection of the native force was a serious evil. It shed an injurious moral influence, and deprived sir Arthur of the aid of troops whose means of gaining intelligence, and whose local knowledge, might have compensated for his want of cavalry. Nevertheless, continuing his own march, his advanced guard entered Caldas the 15th, and that day also Junot reluctantly quitted Lisbon, with a reserve composed of two thousand infantry, six hundred cavalry, and ten pieces of artillery, carrying with him his grand parc of ammunition, and a military chest, containing forty thousand pounds. General Travot was left at Lisbon, with above seven thousand men, of which number two battalions were formed of stragglers and convalescents. Thiebault. He occupied both sides of the Tagus, distributing two thousand men in Palmela, the Bugio fort, and on the heights of Almada, in order to protect the shipping from the insurgents of the Alemtejo, who, under the orders of the Monteiro Mor, were again gathering at Setuval. A thousand French he kept on board the vessels of war, to guard the Spanish prisoners and the spare powder; with two thousand four hundred he garrisoned the citadel and supported the police. A thousand were distributed in the forts of Belem, St. Julians, Cascaes, and Ericeia (the last named place is situated to the northward of the rock of Lisbon, and commands a small harbour a few miles west of Mafra), and a thousand were at Santarem, protecting a large depôt of stores; thus, if the garrisons of Elvas, Peniché, and Almeida be included, nearly one half of the French army was, by Junot’s combinations, rendered inactive, and those in the field were divided into three parts, without any certain point of junction in advance, yet each too weak singly to sustain an action. The duke of Abrantes seems to have reigned long enough in Portugal to forget that he was merely the chief of an advanced corps, whose safety depended upon activity and concentration.
The French reserve was transported to Villa Franca by water, from whence it was to march to Otta; but the rope ferry-boat of Saccavem being removed by the natives, it cost twenty-four hours to throw a bridge across the creek at that place. On the 17th the troops were on their march, when Junot hastily recalled them to Villa Franca. This retrograde movement was occasioned by a report that the English had landed near the capital. When the falsehood of this rumour became known, the reserve resumed the road to Otta, under the command of general Thiebault, Junot himself pushing forward to Alcoentre, where he found Loison, and assumed the personal direction of that general’s division.
Sir A. Wellesley’s Despatch.
During this time, sir Arthur Wellesley was pressing La Borde. The 15th he caused the post at Brilos to be attacked, and the piquets to be driven out of Obidos. Two companies of the 95th, and two of the 5th battalion, 60th, were employed in the former operation; they carried the windmill without loss, but pursued the retiring enemy with such inconsiderate eagerness, that at the distance of three miles from their support, they were outflanked by two superior bodies of French, and were only saved by the opportune advance of general Spencer. Two officers and twenty-seven men were killed and wounded in this slight affair, which gave a salutary check to the rashness, without lowering the confidence of the troops.