The arrangements made by sir Harry Burrard did not remain in force a long time. Early on the morning of the 22d, sir Hew Dalrymple disembarked and assumed the chief command. Thus, in the short space of twenty-four hours, during which a battle was fought, the army fell successively into the hands of three men, who, coming from different quarters, with different views, habits, and information, had not any previous opportunity of communing even by letter, so as to arrange a common plan of operations; and they were now brought together at a critical moment, when it was more than probable they must all disagree, and that the public service must suffer from that want of vigour which is inherent to divided councils; for when sir Hew Dalrymple was appointed to the command, sir Arthur Wellesley was privately recommended to him by the minister as a person who should be employed with more than usual confidence; and this unequivocal hint was backed up with too much force Proceedings of the Board of Inquiry. by the previous reputation and recent exploits of the latter, not to produce some want of cordiality; for sir Arthur could not do otherwise than take the lead in discussing affairs of which he had more than laid the foundation, and sir Hew would have forfeited all claims to independence in his command, if he had not exercised the right of judging for himself between the conflicting opinions of his predecessors.
After receiving information upon the most important points, and taking a hasty view of the situation of the army; although the wounded were still upon the Sir H. Dalrymple’s Narrative.
Court of Inquiry. ground, and that the wains of the commissariat were employed in removing them, sir Hew decided to advance upon the 23d, and gave orders to that effect; but, at the same time, he entirely agreed in opinion with sir Harry Burrard, that the operation was a perilous one, which required the concentration of all the troops, and the application of all his means, to bring to a good conclusion; and for this reason he did not rescind the order directing sir John Moore to fall down to Maceira. This last measure was disapproved of by sir Arthur, who observed that the provisions on shore would not supply more than eight or nine days consumption for the troops already at Vimiero; that the country would be unable to furnish any assistance, and that the fleet could not be calculated upon as a resource because the first of the gales common at that season of the year would certainly send it away from the coast, if it did not destroy a great portion of it. Sir Hew thought the evil of having the army separated, would be greater than the chance of distress from such events. His position was certainly difficult; the bishop of Oporto had failed in his promise of assisting the troops with Proceedings of the Board of Inquiry. draft cattle, as indeed he did in all his promises. Both the artillery and commissariat were badly supplied with mules and horses; the cavalry was a nullity; and the enemy was, with the exception of his immediate loss in killed and wounded, suffering nothing from his defeat, which, we have seen, did not deprive him of a single position necessary to his defence.
Sir Hew, while weighing this state of affairs, was informed that general Kellerman, escorted by a strong body of cavalry, was at the outposts, and demanded an interview. It appears, that Junot having regained Thiebault. Torres Vedras and occupied Mafra with half his army, received news from Lisbon that gave him great uneasiness: the symptoms of an immediate explosion in that city threatened him with destruction, and he hastened to extricate himself while there was yet time. Sending forward a false account of a victory, he followed it up by a reinforcement for the garrison, and immediately afterwards called a council of war to advise with upon the measures fittest to pursue towards the English. It is an old and a sound remark, that “a council of war never fights,” and Kellerman’s mission was the result of the above consultation.
That general being conducted to the quarters of the commander-in-chief, demanded a cessation of arms, and proposed the ground-work of a convention under which Junot offered to evacuate Portugal without further resistance. Nothing could be more opportune than this proposition, and sir Hew Dalrymple readily accepted of it as an advantage which would accrue, without any drawback to the general cause of the Peninsula. He knew, from a plan of operations sketched by the chief of the French engineers, colonel Bory de St Vincent, and taken by the Portuguese, that Junot possessed several very strong positions in front of Lisbon, and that a retreat either upon Almeida, or across the river upon Elvas, was not only within the contemplation of that general, but considered in this report as a matter of course, and perfectly easy of execution. Hence the proposed convention was an unexpected advantage offered in a moment of difficulty, and the only subject for consideration was the nature of the articles proposed by Kellerman as a basis for the treaty. Sir Hew was of necessity ignorant of many important details which bore upon the question, and he naturally had recourse to sir Arthur Wellesley for information. The latter, Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry. taking an enlarged view of the question in all its bearings, coincided with the opinion of the former as to the sound policy of agreeing to a convention by which a strong French army would be quietly got out of a country that it had complete military possession of, and by which not only a great moral effect in favour of the general cause would be produced, but likewise an actual gain made both of men and time, for the farther prosecution of the war in Spain. By the convention, he observed,
1º. That a kingdom would be liberated, with all its fortresses, arsenals, &c., and that the excited population of the Peninsula might then be pushed forward in the career of opposition to France, under the most favourable circumstances.
2º. That the Spanish army of Estremadura, which contained the most efficient body of cavalry in the Peninsula, (being first reinforced with the four or five thousand Spanish soldiers who were prisoners on board the vessels in the Tagus), would be enabled to unite with the other patriot armies at a critical period, when every addition of force must tend to increase the confidence, and forward the impulse, which the victory of Baylen, and the flight of Joseph, had given to the Spaniards; and, finally, that the sacrifice of lives to be expected in carrying the French positions in Portugal, all the difficulties of reducing Ibid. the fortresses, and the danger of losing a communication with the fleet, would be avoided by this measure; the result of which would be as complete as the most sanguine could expect from the long course of uncertain and unhealthy operations which must follow a rejection of the proposal. But, completely coinciding, as he did, with the commander-in-chief, as to the utility of the measure itself, he differed with him as to the mode of proceeding, and a long discussion (in which sir H. Burrard took a part) followed the opening of Kellerman’s mission. Sir Arthur’s first objection was, that, in point of form, Kellerman was merely entitled to negotiate a cessation of hostilities. But sir Hew Dalrymple judged, that as the good policy and the utility of the convention were recognised, it would be unwise to drive the French to the wall for the sake of a trivial ceremony. Wherefore the proposition was accepted, and the basis of a definitive treaty was arranged, subject, however, to the final approbation of sir Charles Cotton, without whose concurrence it was not to be binding.
Articles 1st and 2d declared the fact of the armistice, and provided for the mode of future proceedings.
Article 3d indicated the river Sizandre as the line of demarcation between the two armies. The position of Torres Vedras to be occupied by neither.
Article 4th. Sir Hew Dalrymple engaged to have the Portuguese included in the armistice, and their boundary line was to extend from Leria to Thomar.