The natural pride and arrogance of the Spaniards were greatly aided by the timid and false operations of king Joseph. Twenty days after the evacuation [Appendix, No. 6.] of Madrid, that monarch was at the head of above fifty thousand fighting men, exclusive of eight thousand employed to maintain the communications, and to furnish the garrisons of Pampeluna, Tolosa, Irun, St. Sebastian, and Bilbao.
The French army of Catalonia, seventeen thousand in number, was, as we have seen, distinct from the king’s command; but a strong reserve, assembled at Bayonne, under general Drouet, supplied him with reinforcements, and was itself supported by drafts from the depôts in the interior of France.
Six thousand men, divided into several moveable columns, watched the openings of the Pyrenees, from St. Jean Pied de Port to Rousillon, and guarded the frontier from Spanish incursions; and a second reserve, composed of Neapolitans, Tuscans, and Piedmontese, was commenced at Belgarde, with a view of supporting Duhesme in Catalonia.
How the king quelled the nascent insurrection at Bilbao, and how he dispersed the insurgents of the valleys in Aragon, I have already related. After those operations the French army was re-organized and divided into three grand divisions and a reserve. Marshal Bessieres retained the command of the right wing; marshal Moncey assumed that of the left; and marshal Ney arriving at this period from Paris, took charge of the centre; while the reserve, chiefly composed of detachments from the imperial guard, remained near the person of the king. The old republican general, Jourdan, a man whose day of glory belonged to another era, re-appeared upon the military stage, and filled the office of major-general to the army.
With such a force, and so assisted, there was nothing in Spain, turn which way he would, capable of opposing king Joseph’s march; but the incongruity of a camp with a court is always productive of indecision and of error; the truncheon does not fit every hand, and the French army soon felt the inconvenience of having at its head a monarch who was not a warrior. Joseph remained on the defensive; but he did not understand the force of the maxim, “that offensive movements are the foundation of a good defence.” He held Bilbao, but he abandoned Tudela Napoleon’s notes. [Appendix, Nos. 4] and [5.] contrary to the advice of the generals who had conducted the operations on that side, and in its place Milagro, a small town, situated upon the rivers Arga and Aragon, just above their confluence with the Ebro, was by him chosen as the position of battle for the left wing. As long as Bessieres held Burgos in force, his cavalry commanded the valley of the Douero, menaced Palencia and Valladolid, and scouring the plains, kept Blake and Cuesta in check. Instead of reinforcing a post so advantageous, the king relinquished Burgos as a point beyond his line of defence, and Bessieres’ troops were posted in successive divisions behind it, as far as Puente Lara on the Ebro. Ney’s force lined that river down to Logroña; the reserve was quartered behind Miranda; and Trevino, a small obscure place, was chosen as the point of S.
Journal of the king’s operations. MS. battle, for the right and centre. In this disadvantageous situation the army, with some trifling changes, remained from the middle of August until late in September. During that time the artillery and carriages of transport were repaired, magazines were collected, the cavalry remounted, and the preparations made for an active campaign when the reinforcements should arrive from Germany.
The line of resistance thus offered to the Spaniards, evinced a degree of timidity which the relative strength of the armies by no means justified; the left of the French evidently leaned towards the great communication with France, and seemed to refuse the support of Pampeluna. Tudela was abandoned, and Burgos resigned to the enterprise of the Spaniards. All this indicated fear, a disposition to retreat if the enemy advanced. The king complained with what extreme difficulty he obtained intelligence; yet he neglected by forward movements to feel for his adversaries. Wandering as it were in the dark, he gave a loose to his imagination, and conjuring up a phantom of Spanish strength, which had no real existence, anxiously waited for the development of their power, while they were exposing their weakness by a succession of the most egregious blunders.
Joseph’s errors did not escape the animadversion of his brother, whose sagacity enabled him, although at a distance, to detect, through the glare of the insurrection, all the inefficiency of the Spaniards; but, despising them as soldiers, he dreaded the moral effect produced by their momentary success, and he was preparing to crush the rising hopes of his enemies. Joseph’s retreat, and subsequent position, therefore, displeased him; and he desired his brother to check the exultation of the patriots, by acting upon a bold and well-considered plan, of which he sent him the outline.
His notes, dictated upon the occasion, are replete with genius, and evince his absolute mastery of the art of war. “It was too late,” he said, “to discuss the question, whether Madrid should have been retained or abandoned? Idle to consider, if a position, covering [Appendix, No. 5.] the siege of Zaragoza, might not have been formed; useless to examine, if the line of the Douro was not better than that of the Ebro for the French army. The line of the Ebro was actually taken, and it must be kept; to advance from that river without a fixed object would create indecision; this would bring the troops back again, and produce an injurious moral effect; but why abandon Tudela? Why relinquish Burgos? Those towns were of note, and of reputation; the possession of them gave a moral influence, and moral force constituted two-thirds of the strength of armies. Tudela and Burgos had also a relative importance; the first possessing a stone bridge, was on the communication of Pampeluna and Madrid. It commanded the canal of Zaragoza. It was the capital of a province. When the army resumed offensive operations, their first enterprise would be the siege of Zaragoza; from that town to Tudela, the land carriage was three days, but the water carriage was only fourteen hours; wherefore to have the besieging artillery and stores at Tudela was the same as to have them at Zaragoza. If the Spaniards got possession of the former, all Navarre would be in a state of insurrection, and Pampeluna exposed. Tudela then was of vast importance; but Milagro was of none. It was an obscure place, without a bridge, and commanding no communication; in short, it was without interest, defended nothing! led to nothing! A river,” said this great commander, “though it should be as large as the Vistula, and as rapid as the Danube at its mouth, is nothing, unless there are good points of passage, and a head quick to take the offensive. The Ebro as a defence was less than nothing, a mere line of demarcation! and Milagro was useless. The enemy might neglect it, be at Estella, and from thence gain Tolosa, before any preparation could be made to receive him; he might come from Soria, from Logroña, or from Zaragoza. Again, Burgos was the capital of a province, the centre of many communications, a town of great fame, and of relative value to the French army. To occupy it in force, and offensively, would threaten Palencia, Valladolid, Aranda, and even Madrid. It is necessary,” observed the emperor, “to have made war a long time to conceive this. It is necessary to have made a number of offensive enterprises to know how much the smallest event, or even indication, encourages or discourages, and decides the adoption of one enterprise instead of another.” “In short, if the enemy occupies Burgos, Logroña, and Tudela, the French army will be in a pitiful position. It is not known if he has left Madrid; you are ignorant of what has become of the Gallician army, and we have reason to suspect that it may have been directed upon Portugal; in such a state to take up, instead of a bold, menacing, and honourable position like Burgos, a confined shameful one like Trevino, is to say to the enemy, you have nothing to fear, go elsewhere, we have made our dispositions to go farther, or we have chosen our ground to fight; come there, without fear of being disturbed. But what will the French general do if the enemy marches the next day upon Burgos? Will he let the citadel of that town be taken by six thousand insurgents? or if the French have left a garrison in the castle, how can four or five hundred men retire in such a vast plain? and, from that time, all is gone; the enemy master of the citadel, it cannot be retaken; if, on the contrary, we should guard the citadel, we must give battle to the enemy, because it cannot hold out more than three days, and if we wish to fight a battle, why should Bessieres abandon the ground where we wish to fight? These dispositions appear badly considered, and when the enemy shall march, our troops will meet with such an insult as will demoralize them if there are only insurgents or light troops advancing against them. If fifteen thousand insurgents enter into Burgos, retrench themselves in the town, and occupy the castle, it will be necessary to calculate a march of several days to enable us to post ourselves there, and to retake the town, which cannot be done without some inconvenience. If, during the time, the real attack is upon Logroña or Pampeluna, we shall have made countermarches without use, which will have fatigued the army. If we hold it with cavalry only, is it not to say we do not intend stopping, and to invite the enemy to come there? It was the first time,” he said, “that an army had quitted all its offensive positions to take up a bad defensive line, and to affect to choose its field of battle, when the thousand and one combinations which might take place, and the distance of the enemy, did not leave a probability of being able to foresee if the battle would take place at Tudela, between Tudela and Pampeluna, between Soria and the Ebro, or between Burgos and Miranda;” and then followed an observation which may be studied with advantage by those authors who, unacquainted with the simplest rudiments of military science, censure the conduct of a general, and are pleased, from some obscure nook, to point out his errors to the world; authors who, profoundly ignorant of the numbers, situation, and resources of the opposing armies, pretend, nevertheless, to detail with great accuracy the right method of executing the most difficult and delicate operations of war. As the rebuke of Turenne, who frankly acknowledged to Louvois that he could pass the Rhine at a particular spot if the latter’s finger were a bridge, has been lost upon such men, perhaps the more recent opinion of Napoleon may be disregarded. “But it is not permitted,” says that consummate general, “it is not permitted, at the distance of three hundred leagues, and without even a state of the situation of the army, to direct what should be done!”
After having thus protected himself from the charge of presumption, the emperor proceeded to recommend certain dispositions for the defence of the Ebro. The Spaniards, he said, were not to be feared in the field; twenty-five thousand French in a good position would suffice to beat all their armies united, and this opinion he deduced from the events of Dupont’s campaign, of which he gave a short analysis. Let Tudela, he said, be retrenched if possible, at all events it should be occupied in force, and offensively towards Zaragoza. Let the general commanding there collect provisions on all sides; secure the boats, with a view to future operations when the reinforcements should arrive, and maintain his communication with Logroña by the right bank if he can, but certainly by the left. Let his corps be considered as one of observation; if a body of insurgents only approach, he may fight them, or keep them constantly on the defensive by his movements against their line or against Zaragoza. If regular troops attack him, and he is forced across the Ebro, let him then manœuvre about Pampeluna until the general-in-chief has made his dispositions for the main body. In this manner no prompt movement upon Estella and Tolosa can take place, and the corps of observation will have amply fulfilled its task. Let marshal Bessieres, with all his corps united, and reinforced by the light cavalry of the army, encamp in the wood near Burgos; let the citadel be well occupied, the hospital, the dépôts, and all encumbrances sent over the Ebro; let him keep in a condition to manœuvre, be under arms every day at three o’clock in the morning, and remain until the return of his patroles. He should send parties to a great extent, as far as two days’ march. Let the corps of the centre be placed at Miranda and Briviesca, and all the encumbrances be likewise sent across the Ebro behind Vittoria. This corps should be under arms every morning, and send patroles by the road of Soria, and wherever the enemy may be expected. It must not be lost sight of, that these two corps, being to be united, they should be connected as little as possible with Logroña, and consider the left wing as a corps detached, having a line of operations upon Pampeluna, and a separate part to act. Tudela is preserved as a post contiguous to the line. Be well on the defensive, he continues, in short, make war, that is to say, get information from the alcaldes, the curates, the posts, the chiefs of convents, and the principal proprietors, you will then be perfectly informed; the patroles should always be directed upon the side of Soria, and of Burgos, upon Palencia, and upon the side of Aranda. They could thus form three posts of interception, and send three reports of men arrested; these men should be treated well, and dismissed, after they had given the information desired of them. Let the enemy then come, and we can unite all our forces; hide our marches from him, and fall upon his flank at the moment he is meditating an offensive movement.
With regard to the minor details, the emperor thus expressed himself: “Soria is not, I believe, more than two short marches from the actual position of the army; that town has constantly acted against us; an expedition sent there to disarm it, to take thirty of the principal people as hostages, and to obtain provisions, would have a good effect. It would be useful to occupy St. Ander. It will be of advantage to move by the direct road of Bilbao to St. Ander. It will be necessary to occupy and disarm Biscay and Navarre. Every Spaniard taken in arms there should be shot[17]. The manufactories of arms at Palencia should be watched, to hinder them from working for the rebels. The port of Pancorbo should be armed and fortified with great activity; ovens, and magazines of provisions and ammunition, should be placed there. Situated nearly half way between Madrid and Bayonne, it is an intermediate post for the army, and a point of support for troops operating towards Gallicia. The interest of the enemy,” he resumes, “is to mask his forces. By hiding the true point of attack, he operates in such a manner, that the blow he means to strike is never indicated in a positive way, and the opposing general can only guess it by a well-matured knowledge of his own position, and of the mode in which he makes his offensive system act, to protect his defensive system. We have no accounts of what the enemy is about; it is said that no news can be obtained, as if this case was extraordinary in an army, as if spies were common: they must do in Spain, as they do in other places. Send parties out. Let them carry off, sometimes the priest, sometimes the alcalde, the chief of a convent, the master of the post or his deputy, and, above all, the letters. Put them under arrest until they speak. Question them twice each day, or keep them as hostages. Charge them to send foot messengers, and to get news. When we know how to take measures of vigour and force, it is easy to get news. All the posts, all the letters, must be intercepted. The single motive of procuring intelligence will be sufficient to authorise a detachment of four or five thousand men, who will go into a great town, will take the letters from the post, will seize the richest citizens, their letters, papers, gazettes, &c. It is beyond doubt, that even in the French lines, the inhabitants are all informed of what passes; of course, out of that line, they know more; what, then, should prevent you from seizing the principal men? Let them be sent back again without being ill treated. It is a fact, that when we are not in a desert, but in a peopled country, if the general is not well instructed, it is because he is ignorant of his trade. The services which the inhabitants render to an enemy’s general, are never given from affection, nor even to get money. The truest method to obtain them is by safeguards and protections to preserve their lives, their goods, their towns, or their monasteries!”