The weakness of the Spaniards’ position is apparent. If Palafox, crossing the Aragon at Sanguessa, advanced towards Pampeluna, Moncey would be on his left flank and rear; if he turned against Moncey, the garrison of Pampeluna would fall upon his right. If Castaños, to favour the attack of Palafox, crossed the Ebro at Logroña, Ney, being posted at Guardia, was ready to take him in flank; if the two wings endeavoured to unite, their line of march was liable to be intercepted at Tudela by Moncey, and the rear of Castaños attacked by Ney, who could pass the Ebro at Logroña or Lodosa. If they remained stationary, they might easily be beaten in detail. Any other than Spanish generals would have been filled with apprehension Sir John Moore’s Papers.
Colonel Graham’s Correspondence. on such an occasion. But Palafox and Castaños, heedless of their own danger, tranquilly proceeded to arrange a plan of offensive operations singularly absurd. They agreed that the army of the centre, leaving a division at Lodosa and another at Calahorra, should make a flank march to the right, and take a position along the Aragon, the left to be at Tudela, the right at Sanguessa; that is, with less than twenty thousand men to occupy fifty miles of Ibid.
Col. Doyle’s Correspondence. country close to a powerful enemy. In the meantime, Palafox, with the Aragonese, crossing the river at Sanguessa, was to extend in an oblique line to Roncesvalles, covering the valleys of Talay, Escay, and Roncal, with his centre, and reinforcing his army by the armed inhabitants, who were ready to flock to his standard. Blake was invited to operate, in combination with them, by Guipuscoa, and to pass in the rear of the whole French army, so as to unite with Palafox, and thus cut off the enemy’s retreat into France, and intercept his reinforcements at the same time.
Castaños returned to Tudela on the 23d, and proceeded to Logroña on the 25th; the grand movement being to commence on the 27th. But on the 21st, Grimarest had pushed forward strong detachments across the Ebro to Mendavia, Andosilla, Sesma, and Carcur, and one over the Ega to Lerim. The Castillian outposts also occupied Viana on the left bank of the Ebro. The Aragonese divisions were already closing upon Sanguessa, and a multitude of peasants crowded to the same place in the hope of obtaining arms and ammunition. Moncey, deceived by this concourse of persons, estimated the force in Sanguessa at twenty thousand, when, in fact, it was only S.
Journal of the king’s operations, MS. eight thousand regular troops. His report, and the simultaneous movements of the Spaniards on both extremities, made the king to apprehend a triple attack from Logroña, Lodosa, and Sanguessa. He immediately reinforced Ney with a division (Merlin’s) of Bessieres’ corps, and directed him to clear the left bank of the Ebro, while a second division (Bonnet’s) of Bessieres descended the right bank from Haro to Briones. A division of Moncey’s corps, stationed at Estella, received orders to follow the course of the Ega, and second Ney’s operations; and a part of the garrison of Pampeluna, posted at Montreal and Salinas, was commanded to advance upon Nardues, and make a demonstration against Sanguessa.
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Explanatory Sketch
of the
FRENCH & SPANISH POSITIONS
the 26th Octr. 1808.
London. Published March 1828, by John Murray, Albermarle Street.
When Castaños arrived at Logroña these operations were in full activity. Ney had advanced on the 24th, driven back the Castillian outposts, crowned the height opposite that town on the 25th, and was cannonading the Spaniards’ position. On the 26th, he renewed his fire briskly until twelve o’clock, at which time Castaños, after giving Pignatelli strict orders to defend Whittingham’s Correspondence. MS. his post unless he was turned by a force descending the right bank of the Ebro, proceeded himself to Lodosa and Calahorra. As the road winded by the river, the Spanish general was exposed to the fire of light troops posted in a wood on the opposite side, but escaped without injury. Meanwhile the French from Estella falling down the Ega, drove the Spanish parties Colonel Graham’s Correspondence. MS. out of Mendavia, Andosilla, Carcur, and Sesma; and Grimarest retired from Lodosa to La Torre with such precipitation, that he left colonel Cruz, a valuable officer, with a light battalion, and some volunteers, at Lerim. A squadron of cavalry escaped, but Cruz, with the infantry, being surrounded in a convent, was, after a creditable resistance, taken. Pignatelli, regardless of Castaños’ orders, retired from Logroña, and abandoned all his guns at the foot of the Sierra Ibid. de Nalda, only a few miles from the enemy, then crossing the mountains gained Centruenigo in such disorder, that his men continued to arrive for twenty-four hours consecutively. On the right, O’Neil skirmished with the garrison of Pampeluna, and lost six men killed, and eight wounded; but, in the Spanish fashion, announced, that, after a hard action of many hours, the enemy was completely overthrown. On the 27th, Merlin’s division rejoined Bessieres at Miranda, and Bonnet, retiring from Briones, took post in front of Pancorbo. Castaños, incensed at the ill conduct of the Castillians, dismissed Pignatelli, and incorporated his troops with the Andalusian divisions. Fifteen hundred men of the latter, commanded by the Conde de Cartoajal, being sent back to Nalda, recovered the lost guns, and brought them safe to Centruenigo.
Internal dissensions succeeded to external troubles. Palafox arrogantly censured Castaños, and a cabal, of which general Coupigny appears to have been the principal mover, was formed against the latter. The junta, exasperated that Castaños had not already driven the enemy beyond the frontier, encouraged his traducers, and circulated slanderous accusations themselves, as if his inaction alone enabled the French to remain in Spain. Don Francisco Palafox, brother of the captain-general, and a member of the supreme junta, was sent to head-quarters avowedly to facilitate, but really to interfere with, and control the military operations. He arrived at Alfaro on the 29th, accompanied by Coupigny and the conde de Montijo, a turbulent, factious man, shallow and vain, but designing and unprincipled. Castaños waited Castaños’ Vindication. upon the representative of the government, and laid before him the denuded state of the army, and the captain-general, Palafox, coming up from Zaragoza, a council of war was held at Tudela on the 5th of November. The rough manner in which the troops were driven from the left bank of the Ebro was not sufficient to divert the attention of the Spanish generals from the grand project of gaining the rear of the French army. The council agreed to persevere, although certain advice was received that the enemy were strengthened by thirty thousand fresh men. Colonel Graham’s Correspondence. MS. Deeming it, however, fitting, that Blake should act the first, it was resolved to await his time, but, as an intermediate operation, it was agreed that the army of the centre, leaving six thousand men at Calahorra, and a garrison at Tudela, should cross the Ebro and Whittingham’s Correspondence. MS. attack Caparosa. French parties were, however, pushed as far as Voltierra, and in the skirmishes which ensued, the conduct of the Castillian battalions was discreditable.
Joseph Palafox returned to Zaragoza, and the deputy separated himself from Castaños. The loss sustained by desertion and the previous combats was considerable, but some Murcian levies, and a part of the first and third Andalusian divisions joined the army of the centre, which now mustered twenty-six thousand infantry, and nearly three thousand cavalry under arms, with fifty or sixty pieces of artillery. The positions of the army extended from Calahorra, by Ibid. Haro, to Tudela. La-Peña held the first town with five thousand men; Grimarest and Caro commanded eight thousand at the second; and head-quarters, with thirteen thousand five hundred men, were fixed in the last. Cartoajal remained with eleven hundred in the Sierra de Nalda, and eight hundred were posted at Ansejo.
In pursuance of the plan arranged, the troops were in movement to cross the Ebro, when despatches from Blake announced that he had met with some disaster on the 31st, the extent of which he did not communicate. This news arrested the attack; and the preposterous transactions that ensued, resembled the freaks of Caligula rather than the operations of real war. First, it was arranged that the army should abandon Tudela, and take a position in two lines, the extremities of the one to rest on Calahorra and Amedo, the second to extend from Alfaro to Fitero. Graham’s Correspondence. MS. The deputy ordered O’Neil, with the army of Aragon, to occupy the latter of these lines forthwith, but O’Neil refused to stir without instructions from the captain-general. This was on the 9th, on the 10th the plan was changed. Castaños fixed his head-quarters at Centruenigo, and the deputy proposed that O’Neil should descend the right bank of the Aragon river, and attack Caparosa in the rear; that the troops in Tudela should attack it in front; and that a division should make a demonstration of passing the Ebro in boats, opposite to Milagro, in order to favour this attack. Castaños assented. On the 12th a division assembled opposite Milagro, and La-Peña with two divisions marched against Caparosa. Suddenly, the whimsical deputy sent them orders to repair to Lodosa, forty miles higher up the Ebro, and attack the bridge at that place, while Grimarest crossing in the boats at Calahorra, should ascend the left bank of the Ebro, and take it in rear. La-Peña and Villarcayo, confounded Castaños’ Vindication by this change, wrote to Castaños for an explanation. This was the first intimation that the latter, who was lying sick at Centruenigo, received of the altered dispositions. He directed his lieutenants to obey; but being provoked beyond endurance, wrote sharply to the junta, demanding to know who was to command the army; and after all this insolence Graham’s Correspondence. MS. and vapouring on the part of Francisco Palafox, no operation took place at all. He declared, that his intention was merely to make a demonstration, ordered the troops to their quarters, and then, without assigning any reason, deprived La-Peña of his command, and appointed Cartoajal in his place.
It was at this time that sir John Moore’s letter arrived; but Castaños, no longer master of his own operations, could ill concert a plan of campaign with the general of another army. He could not even tell what troops were to be at his nominal disposal; for the Estremaduran force, originally destined for his command, was now directed by the junta upon Burgos, and the remainder of his own first and third division was detained in Madrid. His enemies, especially Montijo, were active in spreading reports to Vindication of Castaños. his disadvantage; the deserters scattered over the country declared that all the generals were traitors, and the people of the towns and villages, deceived by the central junta, and excited by false rumours, respected neither justice nor government, and committed the most scandalous excesses.