This last-mentioned general reached Espinosa, as we have seen, on the evening of the 9th, with six divisions, including Romana’s infantry, who also dragged with them six guns of a small calibre. The separation of the fourth division at Abellana, the deserters, and the losses sustained in battle, had reduced the army below twenty-five thousand fighting men. The parc of ammunition and the artillery, guarded by two thousand infantry, were behind Reynosa, at Aquilar del Campo, on the road to Leon. Blake’s position was strong, and he hoped to remain in it for some days unmolested. His left wing, composed of the Asturians, and the first division, occupied some heights which covered the road of St. Andero. The centre, consisting of the third division and the reserve, formed a line across the road of Reynosa, which led through Ibid. Espinosa directly to the rear. The second division was established on a commanding height, a little on the right hand of the town; Romana’s infantry were posted in a wood, two miles in advance of the right; and the vanguard, with six guns, formed a reserve behind the centre of the position.
BATTLE OF ESPINOSA.
At two o’clock in the afternoon of the 10th, the head of marshal Victor’s columns drove back Romana’s infantry[18], and seized the wood; but the Spaniards, reinforced by the third division, renewed the combat. A second French column, however, opened its fire upon the Spanish centre, thus weakened by the advance of the third division; and at the same time some light troops ascending the heights on the left, menaced that wing of Blake’s army. The contest on the right was maintained with vigour, and the Spaniards, supported by the fire of the six guns in their centre, appeared to be gaining ground, when the night closed and put an end to the action, leaving the French in possession of the wood, and of a ridge of hills, which, at the distance of a cannon-shot, run parallel to the centre of the position. Generals St. Roman and Riquielmé were mortally wounded this day on the Spanish side.
At daylight the next morning, Victor, who had relieved his left with fresh troops during the night, renewed the attack. General Maison throwing out a cloud of skirmishers along the front of the Spanish centre and left wing, under cover of their fire, passed rapidly to his own right, and fell upon the Asturians and the first division. Blake, observing this movement, detached a column of grenadiers to reinforce the latter, and advanced in person with three regiments from the centre to take Maison in flank during his march. It was too late. Three Asturian generals fell at the first fire, and the troops of that kingdom fled without waiting for the enemy. They were soon followed by the first division, and Maison, continuing his course without a check, intercepted the line of retreat by St. Andero, and also that by the town of Espinosa. In the mean time, the French troops posted on the parallel ridge before spoken of, attacked the centre, and the division in the wood advancing against the right of the Spaniards, their whole army gave way in terrible confusion and distress, and crowded towards the river Trueba, which encircled the rear of the position. Some tried the fords, some rushed to the town, others fled to the right and left; but the weather was bad, the roads deep, the country rugged and difficult, and the overthrow was fatal. Those who escaped went to their own provinces, carrying dismay into the remotest parts of Gallicia, Asturias, Leon, and Castille. The guns, the baggage, and ammunition, fell into the hands of the French. Blake himself reached Reynosa on the 12th, and there rallied about seven thousand fugitives, but without arms, without spirit, and without hope.
The line of retreat by Aguilar del Campo, where his artillery remained, was still open to him; and he proposed to remain at Reynosa as long as the enemy would permit him; to restore order, and then to retire through Leon upon sir David Baird’s division, the head of which was now near Astorga. But his total ignorance of the French operations and strength again misled him. He looked only to the side of Espinosa, and already Soult’s cavalry was upon his line of retreat, and the duke of Dantzic was hastening by the valley S.
Journal of Operations, MS. of Villarcayo towards Reynosa. Upon the 13th, he was attacked by the advanced guard of the second corps, and being now utterly confounded, he fled with four or five thousand men through the valley of Cabuerniga, and took refuge at Arnedo, in the heart of the Asturian mountains. There the marquis of Romana joined him, and assumed the command of all that remained of the unfortunate army of the left.
Blake being thus disposed of, the fourth French corps, after a halt of a few days to refresh the troops, took the road of Carrion and Valladolid; but Soult recalling his detachments, concentrated the second corps at Reynosa, seized St. Ander, and captured a quantity of English stores; leaving a division there under general Bonnet, he then spread his columns over the whole of the Montagna, pursuing, attacking, and dispersing every body of Spaniards that yet held together, capturing their baggage, and filling all places with alarm. After some partial actions with unconnected parties, every thing military belonging to the patriots was driven over the snowy barrier of the Asturian hills; and Soult having left a detachment at St. Vincent de Barqueira, scoured the banks of the Deba, took the town of Potes, and overrun S.
Journal of Operations, MS. Leon with his cavalry as far as Sahagun and Saldaña. Meanwhile the duke of Belluno quitting Espinosa, joined the emperor, whose head-quarters were fixed at Burgos, after the defeat of Belvedere.
The battles of Espinosa and Gamonal, and the subsequent operations of marshal Soult, laid the north of Spain prostrate, and secured the whole coast from St. Sebastian to the frontier of the Asturias. By a judicious arrangement of small garrisons, and moveable columns, the provinces of Guipuscoa, Navarre, Biscay, and the Baston de Laredo were fettered; the communication of the army with France could no longer be endangered by insurrections in the rear; and the wide and fertile plains of Old Castille and Leon were thrown open to the French, and forbidden to the separated divisions of the British army. These great advantages, the result of Napoleon’s admirable combinations, the fruits of ten days of active exertion, obtained so easily, and yet so decisive of the fate of the campaign, prove the weakness of the system upon which the Spanish and British governments were at this time acting; if that can be called a system where no one general knew what another had done—was doing—or intended to do.
Burgos, instead of Vittoria, was now become the pivot of operations, and the right of his army being secured, the emperor prepared to change his front, and bear down against the armies of Castaños and Palafox, with a similar impetuosity; but it was first necessary to ascertain the exact situation of the British force. Napoleon believed that it was concentrated at Valladolid, and he detached three divisions of cavalry and twenty-four pieces of artillery, by Lerma and Palencia, with orders to cross the Douero, to turn the flank of the English, threaten their communications with Portugal, and thus force them to retire. It was soon discovered that the heads of their columns had not penetrated beyond Salamanca and Astorga, and that many days must elapse before they could be concentrated, and in a condition to act offensively. Certain of this fact, the emperor let loose his three divisions of cavalry, and eight thousand horsemen sweeping over the plains, vexed all Leon and Castille. The authorities showed no firmness; the captain-general, Pignatelli, fled in consternation; the people submissive and fearful, displayed no enthusiasm, and disconcerted by the rapid movements of the French, spread a thousand confused and contradictory reports. The incursions of the cavalry extended to the neighbourhood of Astorga, to Benevente, Zamora, Toro, Tordesillas, and even to the vicinity of Salamanca. Such was the fear, or the Sir John Moore’s Papers. apathy of the inhabitants, that thirty dragoons were sufficient to raise contributions at the gates of the largest towns; and after the overthrow of Espinosa was known, ten troopers could safely traverse the country in any direction.
The front of the French army being now changed, the second corps, hitherto the leading column of attack, became a corps of observation, covering the right flank, and protecting the important point of Burgos, where large magazines were establishing, and upon which the reinforcements continually arriving from France were directed. The exact situation of the other corps was as follows: The first corps, the guards, and a part of the reserve, were at Burgos; and Ney, with the sixth, occupied Aranda de Douero; the march of his force from the Ebro had been made with a view to intercept the army of Estremadura on the side of Madrid; but the sudden destruction of that body of troops having rendered this precaution useless, Ney was equally well placed to cut the communication of Castaños with the capital. General Lagrange occupied Logroña, and Moncey, with three divisions of infantry and his light cavalry, was at Lodosa. The Spanish army of the centre was consequently turned and cut off from Madrid even before Castaños was aware that the campaign had commenced.
In passing the mountains near Tolosa, marshal Lasnes, duke of Montebello, fell from his horse, and was left at Vittoria; his hurts were dangerous, but Baron Larrey’s Surgical Campaigns. a rapid and interesting cure being effected by wrapping him in the skin of a sheep newly slain, the emperor directed him to assume the command of Lagrange’s division and Colbert’s light cavalry, to unite them with the third corps at Lodosa, and to fall upon Castaños in front. At the same time he ordered Ney to ascend the course of the Douero with the light cavalry and two divisions of the sixth corps, to connect his left with the right of Lasnes, and to gain Agreda by the road of Osma and Soria, from whence he could intercept the retreat of Castaños, and place himself on the rear of the Spanish army. To support this operation, the first corps, and Latour Maubourg’s division of heavy cavalry being drawn from the reserve, proceeded by Lerma and Aranda, and from thence slowly followed the direction of Ney’s march. The emperor, with the guards, and the remainder of the reserve, continued at Burgos, the citadel was repaired and armed, magazines were formed, and arrangements made to render it the great dépôt of the army. All the reinforcements coming from France were directed upon this town, and proclamations were issued assuring the country people of protection if they would be tranquil and remain in their houses.