But previous to these successes, so threatening had been the aspect of affairs in Germany, that the imperial guards had been recalled from Vittoria, and hurried to the Danube, the great reserve of infantry was, as we have seen, struck off the rolls of the army in Spain, and the skeletons of the fourth squadrons of every cavalry regiment were ordered to return to their depôts in France. Even the fifth corps, under Mortier, then on its way to Valladolid from Zaragoza, was directed to halt, and hold itself in readiness to march for Germany; and thus, while Victor was reluctant to move, while Ney was demanding more troops to preserve Gallicia, and while the fate of the second corps was unknown, the whole army was actually diminished by forty thousand men, and fifteen thousand more were paralysed with regard to offensive operations.
These things rendered Joseph timid. Madrid, it was argued in his councils, was of more consequence than Lisbon. Soult might be already at the latter place; or, if not, he might extricate himself from his difficulties, for the capital of Spain must be covered. In pursuance of this reasoning, Sebastiani was forbidden any forward movement; and the duke of Belluno, whose army was daily wasting with the Guadiana fever, took a position at Torre-Mocha, a central point between Truxillo, Merida, and Alcantara. His cavalry Semelé’s Journal of Operations MS. posts watched all the passages over the Guadiana and the Tagus; and his communications with Madrid, between the Tietar and the Tagus, were protected by twelve hundred men, detached for that purpose by the king.
But one timid measure in war generally produces another. The neighbourhood of the English force at Castel Branco increased the energy of the Spanish insurgents, who infested the valley of the Tagus, and communicated secretly with those of the Sierra de Guadalupe; hence, Victor, alarmed for his bridge at Almaraz, sent a division there the 22d of May; and, as from that period until the 10th of June, he remained quiet: his campaign, which had opened so brilliantly, was annulled. He had neither assisted Soult, nor crushed Cuesta, nor taken Badajos nor Seville; yet he had wasted and lost, by sickness, more men than would have sufficed to reduce both Lisbon and Seville. The Spaniards were daily recovering strength and confidence; and sir Arthur Wellesley, after defeating Soult, had full leisure to return to the Tagus, and to combine his future operations with the Spanish armies in the south.
Information that Lapisse had forced the bridge of Alcantara reached the English general on the night of the 17th. That part of the army which was still behind Salamonde received immediate orders to retrace their steps to Oporto; and when the retreat of Soult by Orense was ascertained, the remainder of the troops, including three Portuguese brigades under Beresford, followed the same route. Colonel Trant was then appointed military governor of Oporto; and it was thought sufficient to leave Sylveira with some regular battalions and militia to defend the northern provinces; for Soult’s army was considered a crippled force, which could not for a long time appear again in the field; a conclusion drawn, as we shall see, from false data, and without due allowance being made for the energy of that chief.
As the army proceeded southward, the contracted scope of Lapisse’s movements was ascertained. Colonel Mayne was directed again to take post at Alcantara; and a reinforcement of five thousand men having landed at Lisbon, the rapidity of the march slackened. Passing by easy journeys through Coimbra, Thomar, and Punhete, the troops reached Abrantes the 7th of June, and encamped on the left bank of the Tagus; but there was sickness and a great mortality in his ranks.
From the moment of his arrival in Portugal, sir Arthur Wellesley had looked to the defeat of Victor as the principal, and the operation against Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence,
Parl. Papers, 1810. Soult as the secondary, object of the campaign; and the English government, acceding to his views, now gave him a discretionary power to enter the nearest provinces of Spain, if Portugal should not thereby be endangered. In his correspondence with the junta and with Cuesta, he had strongly urged the necessity of avoiding any serious collision with the enemy until the British troops could act in concert with the Spanish armies. This advice, approved of by the junta, was attended to by Cuesta; insomuch that he did not seek a battle, but he exposed his advanced posts, as if in derision of the counsel; and, disdainful of the English general’s abilities, expressed his belief that the latter had no desire to act heartily, “because,” said he, “the system of the British appears to be never to expose their troops; owing to which, they never gain decisive actions by land.”
Cuesta’s knowledge of the enemy’s strength and positions was always inaccurate, and his judgement false; hence he himself not only never gained any decisive action, but lost every army entrusted to his command. He was discontented with the movement against Soult, asserting that his hold of Gallicia would only be strengthened thereby, unless that favourite folly of all Spanish generals were adopted, namely, surrounding the enemy, without regarding whether the troops to be surrounded were more or less numerous than the surrounders. Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, affirmed that if Soult were first driven over the Minho, a combined attack afterwards made upon Victor would permanently deliver Gallicia; and this plan being followed, Gallicia was abandoned by the French, and they never returned to that province.
When the English army was again free to act, Cuesta was importunate that a joint offensive operation against Victor should be undertaken; but, obstinately attached to his own opinions, he insisted upon tracing the whole plan of campaign. Yet his views were so opposed to all sound military principles, that sir Arthur, although anxious to conciliate his humour, could scarcely concede the smallest point, lest a vital catastrophe should follow. Valuable time was thus lost in idle discussions which might have been employed in useful action; for the return of the British army from the Douro had falsified Victor’s position at Torremocha. That marshal, as late as the 10th of June, had only one division guarding the bridge at Almaraz; and it was difficult for him to ascertain the movements of sir Arthur Wellesley, covered, as they were, by the Tagus, the insurgents, and Mackenzie’s corps of observation: hence, by rapid marches, it was possible for the English general, while Victor was still at Torremocha, to reach the valley of the Tagus, and cutting the first corps off from Madrid, to place it between two fires.
Semelé’s Journal of Operations MS.
This did not escape the penetration of either commander; but sir Arthur was forced to renounce the attempt, partly because of the sick and harassed condition of his troops, the want of shoes and [Appendix, No. 16]. money, and the difficulty of getting supplies; but chiefly that Cuesta’s army was scattered over the open country, between the defiles of Monasterio and the Guadiana, and, as he refused to concentrate Parliamentary Papers, 1810. or retire, Victor might have marched against and crushed him, and yet found time to meet the British on the Tietar. Early in June, however, marshal Beresford was, with three brigades, directed upon Castello Branco, and the duke of Belluno, immediately taking the alarm, and being also assured, by despatches from Madrid, of Soult’s retreat, resolved to re-cross the Tagus. But, previous to commencing this movement, he resolved to secure his flank, by causing the bridge of Alcantara to be destroyed.