The ridge of mountains which separate the valley of the Tagus from Castile and Leon being, as has been already related, impracticable for artillery, except at the passes of Baños and Perales, it was supposed that the twenty thousand men under Beresford and the duke del Parque would be sufficient to block those lines of march, and that Romana, moving by the Tras os Montes, might join the duke del Parque, and thus thirty thousand men, supported by two fortresses, would be ready to protect the flank of the British army in its march from Plasencia towards Madrid. A vain calculation, for Romana remained ostentatiously idle at Coruña, and sir Arthur Wellesley, never having seen the Spanish troops in action, thought too well of them; and having had no experience of Spanish promises he trusted them too far; and, at the same time, made a false judgement of the force and position of his adversaries. The arrival of the sixth corps at Astorga and of the fifth at Valladolid were unknown to him: the strength of the second corps, and, perhaps, the activity of its chief, were also underrated. Instead of fifteen or twenty thousand harassed French troops, without artillery, there were seventy thousand fighting-men behind the mountains!
The 27th of June, the English army, breaking up from the camp of Abrantes, and, being organized in the following manner, marched into Spain:—
| Artillery. | ||||
| Six brigades, | 30 | guns, | comd. by maj.-gen. Howorth. | |
| Cavalry. | ||||
| Three brigades, | 3047 | sabres, | comd. by lt.-gen. Payne. | |
| Infantry. | ||||
| 1st div. of | 4 brigades, | 6023 | bayonets, | comd. by lt.-gen. Sherbrooke. |
| 2d do. | 2 do. | 3947 | do. | do. maj.-gen. Hill. |
| 3d do. | 2 do. | 3736 | do. | do. m.-gen. Mackenzie. |
| 4th do. | 2 do. | 2957 | do. | do. br.-gen. Campbell. |
| — | — | ——– | ||
| 5 divs. | 13 brigades, | 19710 | sabres and bayonets. | |
| — | — | 1287 | Engineers, artillery, and waggon-train. | |
| ——– | ||||
| Grand total | 20997 | men, and 30 pieces of artillery. | ||
| ——– | ||||
Besides this force, the 40th regiment, so long detained at Seville by Mr. Frere, had arrived in Lisbon, and the troops on their march from that city, being somewhat less than eight thousand bayonets, were organized in three brigades, commanded by major-general Lightfoot and brigadier-generals Robert and Catlin Craufurd. But the leading brigade, under Robert Craufurd, only quitted Lisbon on the 28th of June.
The army moved by both banks of the Tagus; one column proceeding through Sobreira Formosa, the other by Villa Velha, where a boat-bridge was established. The 1st of July the head-quarters were at Castello Branco, and from thence the troops continued their route, in one column, by Moralejo and Coria; but a flanking brigade, under general Donkin, was directed through Ceclaven and Torijoncillos, and explored the country between Zarza Mayor and the Tagus. The 8th, the head-quarters were established at Plasencia. The 10th, the army arrived at that place, and was, soon after, joined by a regiment of cavalry and two battalions of infantry from Lisbon.
At this period Cuesta was at Almaraz, and Victor, of whose intermediate movements it is time to take notice, was at Talavera de la Reyna. When that marshal had retired from Torremocha, the valley Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS. of the Tagus was exhausted by the long sojourn of the fourth and first corps; but the valley of Plasencia was extremely fertile, and untouched, and the duke of Belluno, whose troops, weakened by the tertian sickness, required good nourishment, resolved to take post there, and keep a bridge at Bazagona, on the Tietar, by which he could, in two marches, fall upon Cuesta, if he ventured to pass the Tagus at Almaraz. At Plasencia, also, he could open a communication with the second and fifth corps, and observe closely the movements of the English army on the frontier of Portugal. The bridge at Bazagona was finished on the 21st of June, and the French light troops were scouring the country towards Plasencia, when the king, who had already withdrawn a division of infantry and a large part of the cavalry of the first corps to reinforce the fourth, ordered the duke of Belluno to retire instantly to Talavera, leaving rear-guards on the Tietar and at Almaraz. This order, which arrived the 22d of June, was the result of that indecision which none but truly great men, or fools, are free from; the first, because they can see their way clearly through the thousand difficulties that encumber and bewilder the mind in war; the last, because they see nothing.
On the present occasion, general Sebastiani had reported that Venegas was reinforced, and ready to penetrate by La Mancha; and the king, swayed by this false information, disturbed by the march of Cuesta, and still more by Blake’s advance against Zaragoza (the result of which was then unknown), St. Cyr. became so alarmed that he commanded St. Cyr to move into Aragon, repaired himself to Toledo, with his guards and reserve, withdrew the light cavalry and a division of infantry from Victor, obliged that marshal to fall back on Talavera; and even commanded Mortier to bring up the fifth corps from Valladolid to Villa Castin, near Avila, although, following Napoleon’s orders, it should have gone to Salamanca.
In the hope of meeting Venegas, Joseph penetrated as far as the Jabalon river, in La Mancha; and as the Spaniard, fearful of the tempest approaching him, took shelter in the Morena, the king, leaving some posts of the 4th corps at Toledo, restored the light cavalry to the first corps, and, with his guards and reserve, returned to Madrid. But, while he had been pursuing a shadow, Victor was exposed to great danger; for the Jabalon is six long marches from Madrid, and hence, for ten days, the duke of Belluno, with only two divisions of infantry and two thousand cavalry, in all about fourteen thousand men, had remained at Talavera without any support, although sixty thousand men were marching against him from different points.