The valley of the Tagus, into which the army was about to plunge, is intersected by several rivers, with rugged banks and deep channels; but their courses being very little out of the parallel of the Tagus, the Alberche is in a manner enclosed by the Tietar. Now, sir Robert Wilson, with four thousand Portuguese and Spanish troops, had ascended the right bank of the latter river, and gained possession of the passes of Arenas, which lead upon Avila, and of the pass of San Pedro Bernardo, which leads upon Madrid. In this position he covered the Vera Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS. de Plasencia, and threatened Victor’s communications with the capital. The French marshal was alarmed; and a movement of the whole army in the same direction would have obliged him to abandon the Lower Alberche, because, two marches from Arenas, in the direction of Escalona and Macqueda, would have placed sir Arthur Wellesley between the first corps and Madrid. But, on the other hand, the line of country was too rugged for rapid movements with a large body; and it was necessary first to secure a junction with Cuesta, because Victor, having recovered his third division on the 7th of July, was again at the head of twenty-five thousand men. With such a force he could not be trusted near the Spaniards; and the British general resolved to cross the Tietar at the Venta de Bazagona, and march by Miajadas upon Oropesa.
The 16th, two companies of the staff corps, with a working party of five hundred men, marched from Plasencia to Bazagona, to throw a bridge over the Semelé’s Journal of the First Corps’ Operations. Tietar. The duke of Belluno had wasted many days in dragging up fifteen pontoons from the Tagus, to form his bridge at that place; and when he retired upon Talavera, he destroyed the greatest part of the equipage; but the English officer employed on this occasion pulled down an old house in the neighbourhood, felled some pine trees in a wood three miles distant; and, uniting intelligence with labour, contrived, without other aid than a few hatchets and saws, in one day, to throw a solid bridge over the Tietar.
The 18th, the army crossed that river, and taking the route of Miajadas, reached Talayuela.
The 19th, the main body halted at Centinello and Casa de Somas. The advanced posts at Venta de St. Juliens.
The 20th, the troops reached Oropesa; but as their marches had been long, and conducted through a difficult country, they halted the 21st; on which day, Cuesta, who had moved from Almaraz by Naval Moral and Arzobispo, passed Oropesa, and united his whole force at Velada, except a small detachment, which marched along the south bank of the Tagus, to threaten the French by the bridge of Talavera.
The duke of Belluno, aware of these movements, had supported his posts at Talavera with a division of infantry, which was disposed in successive detachments behind that town. His situation appeared critical; because the allies, covered by the Alberche, might still gain a march and reach Escalona before him; and from thence either push for Madrid, by the pass of Brunete, or, taking post at Maqueda, cut him off from the capital. But his sources of information were sure; and he contented himself with sending a regiment of hussars to Cazar de Escalona, to watch the Upper Alberche, and to support the moveable column opposed to sir Robert Wilson.
The 21st, the allies being between Oropesa and Velada, Victor recalled all his foraging parties, altered his line of retreat from the Madrid to the Toledo road, removed his parc from St. Ollalla to Cevolla, and concentrated two divisions of infantry behind the Alberche.
The 22d, the allies moved in two columns, to drive the French posts from Talavera; and Cuesta, marching by the high road, came first up with the enemy’s rear-guard, near the village of Gamonal; but then commenced a display of ignorance, timidity, and absurdity, that has seldom been equalled in war; the past defeats of the Spanish army were rendered quite explicable; the little fruit derived from them by marshal Victor quite inexplicable. General Latour Maubourg, with two thousand dragoons, came boldly on to the table-land of Gamonal, and sustaining a cannonade, not only checked the head of the Spanish leading column, but actually obliged general Zayas, who commanded it, to display his whole line, consisting of fifteen thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry; nor did the French horsemen give back at all, until the appearance of the red uniforms on their right informed them that it was time to retire. Then, and not till then, Latour Maubourg, supported by some infantry, retreated behind the Alberche, and without loss, although many batteries, and at least six thousand Spanish horse, were close on his rear; but the latter could never be induced to make even a partial charge, however favourable the opportunity, and by two o’clock the whole French army was safely concentrated on its position. Ruffin’s division on the left touched the Tagus, and protected the bridge over the Alberche, which was more immediately defended by a regiment of infantry and fourteen pieces of artillery. Villatte’s and Lapisse’s divisions, drawn up in successive lines, on some high ground that overlooked the surrounding country, formed the right; the heavy cavalry were in second line near the bridge; and in this situation Victor rested the 22d and 23d.
It was at all times difficult to obtain accurate information from the Spaniards by gentle means; hence, the French were usually better supplied with intelligence than the British; while the native generals never knew any thing about the enemy, until they felt the weight of his blows. Up to this period, sir Arthur’s best sources of information had been the intercepted letters of the French; and now, although the latter had been in the same position, and without any change of numbers since the 7th, the inhabitants of Talavera could not, or would not, give any information of their strength or situation; nor could any reasonable calculation be formed of either, until some English officers crossed the Tagus, and, from the mountains on the left bank of that river, saw the French position in reverse.
The general outline of an attack was, however, agreed upon for the next morning, but the details were unsettled; and when the English commander came to arrange these with Cuesta, the latter was gone to bed. The British troops were under arms at three o’clock the next morning, but Cuesta’s staff were not aroused from slumber until seven o’clock; and the old man finally objected to fight that day, alleging, among other absurd reasons, that it was Sunday. But there was something more than absurdity in these proceedings. Victor, who was not ignorant of the weak points of his own position, remained tranquil the 23d, being well assured that no attack would take place, for it is certain that he had a correspondence with some of the Spanish staff; and the secret discussions between sir Arthur Wellesley and Cuesta, at which only one staff officer of each party was present, became known to the enemy in twenty-four hours after; indeed, Cuesta was himself suspected of treachery by many, yet apparently without reason.