In pursuance of this opinion, Soult ordered Mortier to approach Ciudad Rodrigo, with the double view of preparing for the siege and covering the quarters of refreshment so much needed by the second corps after its fatigues. Ney also was directed to march with the sixth corps, by the left bank of the Esla, to Zamora; but the spirit of discord was strong, and it was at this moment that the king, alarmed by Sebastiani’s report, drew the fifth corps to Villa Castin; while marshal Ney, holding it imprudent to uncover Astorga and Leon, mortified, also, at being placed under the orders of another marshal, refused to move to Zamora. Soult, crossed by these untoward circumstances, sent the division of light cavalry, under his brother, and one of infantry, commanded by Heudelet, from Zamora and Toro to Salamanca, with orders to explore the course of the Tormes, to observe Alba and Ledesma, and especially to scour the roads leading upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Plasencia: these troops relieved a division of dragoons belonging to Kellerman, who was still charged with the general government of the province.
The 10th of July, the march of the British upon Plasencia became known, and it was manifest that sir Arthur had no design to act north of the Douro; wherefore the duke of Dalmatia resolved to advance, with the remainder of the second corps, to Salamanca, and, partly by authority, partly by address, he obliged Ney to put the sixth corps in movement for Zamora, leaving Fournier’s dragoons to cover Astorga and Leon. Meanwhile, king Joseph, having returned from his fruitless excursion against Venegas, was at first incredulous of the advance of sir Arthur Wellesley and Cuesta, but he agreed to Soult’s project against Ciudad Rodrigo, and ordered Mortier to return to Valladolid, where that marshal arrived, with his first division, on the 16th of July: his second division, under general Gazan, halted, however, at Medina del Campo and Nava del Rey, on the route from Salamanca to Valladolid, and an advanced guard was sent forward to Alba de Tormes.
The 13th of July, Soult, being assured that the British army was on the eastern frontier of Portugal, and that considerable reinforcements had been disembarked at Lisbon, became certain that sir Arthur meant to operate by the line of the Tagus; wherefore, he again addressed the king to move him to an immediate siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, promising to have the three corps under his own command in full activity in fifteen days, provided his demands were complied with, the most important being—1º. The formation of a battering-train;—2º. The concentration of an immense number of detachments, which weakened the active corps;—3º. A reinforcement of fifteen or twenty thousand conscripts, drawn from France, to enable the old troops, employed on the line of communication, to join the corps d’armée. The first corps should, he said, continue to watch the Spanish army of Estremadura, S.
Journal of Operations MSS. and be prepared either to prevent it from uniting with the English to disturb the siege, or to join the first, second, and sixth corps, and give battle, if that should become necessary. The siege might thus be pressed vigourously, Ciudad would fall, Almeida be next invested, and the communications of the English army, with Lisbon, threatened.
The 17th, the king replied, through marshal Jourdan, that he approved of the plan, but had not means to meet several of Soult’s demands, and he proposed that the latter should reinforce Kellerman and Bonnet, with ten thousand men, to enable them to seize the Asturias, and thus strengthen the communications with France. This drew from the duke of Dalmatia the following remonstrance:—“Under present circumstances we cannot avoid some sacrifice of territory. Let us prepare, first, by concentrating, on a few points capable of defence and covering the hospitals and depôts which may be on the extremity of our general position. This will not be so distressing as it may appear, because the moment we have beaten and dispersed the enemy’s masses we shall recover all our ground.” Then reiterating his own advice, he concluded thus:—“I conceive it impossible to finish this war by detachments. It is large masses only, the strongest that you can form, that will succeed.” It is remarkable that sir Arthur Wellesley, writing at this time, says, “I conceive that the French are dangerous only when in large masses.”
Meanwhile, Heudelet’s division, having pushed back the advanced guards of the duke del Parque upon Ciudad Rodrigo, ascertained that a great movement of troops was taking place near that city, and that sir Arthur Wellesley, advancing quicker than was expected, had already reached Plasencia; wherefore, on the 18th, Soult directed Mortier to march upon Salamanca with the fifth corps, and, at the same time, reinforced Heudelet’s division with Merle’s; the latter’s place, at Zamora, being supplied by a division of the sixth corps, the remainder of which continued on the Esla, fronting the Tras os Montes. Thus, not less than fifty thousand men were at or close to Salamanca, with their cavalry-posts pointing to the passes of Baños, on the very day that sir Arthur Wellesley crossed the Tietar to effect his junction with Cuesta. Yet, neither through the duke del Parque, nor Beresford, nor the guerillas, nor the peasantry, did intelligence of this formidable fact reach him!
Having put the three corps in motion, Soult despatched general Foy to Madrid, with information of sir Arthur’s march, and to arrange the future combinations of the two armies. “It is probable,” he said, “that the concentration of my army at Salamanca will oblige the English general to change his plan; but, if he shall already have advanced on the road to Madrid, we should assemble all our forces, both on the Tagus and on this side, fall upon him altogether, and crush him. Thus, his campaign will be finished, and our operations may go on with advantage.”
Foy arrived, the 22d, at Madrid; and, a few hours afterwards, intelligence reached the king that the allies were at Talavera, in front of the first corps, and that sir Robert Wilson (whose strength was much exaggerated) was at Escalona. The die was now cast; Joseph directed Soult to march immediately upon Plasencia, then, leaving general Belliard, with only three thousand men, in the Retiro, set out himself, with his guards and reserve, by the road of Mostoles, to join Victor at Talavera. The 23d, being at Naval-Carneiro, he received notice that the first corps would retreat that night to Torrijos, and, in two days, would be behind the Guadarama river; whereupon, turning to the left, Joseph descended the Guadarama to Vargas, and effected his junction with the duke of Belluno on the 25th.
During this time, Sebastiani, who had been watching Venegas near Damyel, deceived that general, and, returning to Toledo by forced marches, left three thousand men there, with the design of obliging him to cross the Tagus, at Aranjues. With the remainder of the fourth corps Sebastiani joined the king: and thus nearly fifty thousand fighting men and ninety pieces of artillery were concentrated, on the morning of the 26th, behind the Guadarama, and within a few miles of Cuesta’s advanced guard. But, on the side of the allies, the main body of the Spaniards was at St. Ollalla; Sherbrooke with two divisions and the cavalry, at Casalegas; and the rest of the English in Talavera. So that, while the French were concentrated and in full march to attack; the allies were separated in four nearly equal and unconnected parts, of which three were enclosed, as it were, in a net, between the Alberche and the Tagus! On such an occasion Napoleon would have been swift and deadly.
In retiring upon Toledo, instead of Madrid, the duke of Belluno showed himself an able commander. Toledo was the strategic pivot upon which every movement turned. It was the central point, by holding which the army of Venegas was separated from the allies on the Alberche. If the latter advanced, Soult’s operations rendered every forward step a stride towards ruin. If, leaving Venegas to his fate, they retired, it must be rapidly, or there would be neither wisdom nor safety in the measure. The king knew that Foy would reach Soult the 24th, and as that marshal had already assembled his army about Salamanca, which was only four days’ march from Plasencia, he might be in the valley of the Tagus by the 30th; hence, to insure complete success, the royal army needed only to keep the allies in check for four or five days. This was the plan that Soult had recommended, that the king promised to follow, and that marshal Jourdan strenuously supported. The unskilful proceedings of Cuesta and Venegas, the separation of the allies, the distressed state of the English army, actually on the verge of famine, (a circumstance that could hardly be unknown to Victor,) greatly facilitated the execution of this project, which did not preclude the king from punishing the folly of the Spanish general, whose army, scattered and without order, discipline, or plan, so strongly invited an attack.