Ruffin’s division was placed in advance, and Villatte’s in rear, of the artillery; but the former kept one regiment close to the ravine.
Lapisse occupied some low table-land, opposite to Sherbrooke’s division.
Latour Maubourg’s cavalry formed a reserve to Lapisse; and general Beaumont’s cavalry formed a reserve to Ruffin.
On the English side, general Hill’s division was concentrated; the cavalry was massed behind the left, and the parc of artillery and hospitals established under cover of the hill, between the cavalry and Hill’s division.
COMBAT ON THE MORNING OF THE 28TH.
About daybreak, Ruffin’s troops were drawn up, two regiments abreast, supported by a third, in columns of battalions; and, in this order, went forth against the left of the British, a part directly against the front, and a part from the valley on the right, thus embracing two sides of the hill. Their march was rapid and steady; they were followed by Villatte’s division, and their assault was preceded by a burst of artillery, that rattled round the height, and swept away the English ranks by whole sections. The sharp chattering of the musketry succeeded, the French guns were then pointed towards the British centre and right, the grenadiers instantly closed upon general Hill’s division, and the height sparkled with fire. The inequalities of the ground broke the compact formation of the troops on both sides, and small bodies were seen here and there struggling for the mastery with all the virulence of a single combat; in some places the French grenadiers were overthrown at once, in others they would not be denied, and reached the summit; but the reserves were always ready to vindicate their ground, and no permanent footing was obtained. Still the conflict was maintained with singular obstinacy; Hill himself was wounded, and his men were falling fast; but the enemy suffered more, and gave back, step by step at first, and slowly, to cover the retreat of their wounded; but, finally, unable to sustain the increasing fury of the English, and having lost above fifteen hundred men in the space of forty minutes, the whole mass broke away in disorder, and returned to their own position, covered by the renewed play of their powerful artillery.
To this destructive fire no adequate answer could be made, for the English guns were few, and of small calibre; and when sir Arthur Wellesley desired a reinforcement from Cuesta, the latter sent him only two pieces; yet even those were serviceable, and the Spanish gunners fought them gallantly. The principal line of the enemy’s retreat was by the great valley, and a favourable opportunity for a charge of horse occurred; but the English cavalry, having retired, during the night, for water and forage, were yet too distant to be of service. However, these repeated efforts of the French against the hill, and the appearance of some of their light troops on the mountain, beyond the left, taught the English general that he had committed a fault in not prolonging his flank across the valley; and he hastened to rectify it. For this purpose, he placed the principal mass of his cavalry there, with the leading squadrons looking into the valley, and, having obtained, from Cuesta, general Bassecour’s division of infantry, posted it on the mountain itself, in observation of the French light troops. Meanwhile, the duke of Albuquerque, discontented with Cuesta’s arrangements, came, with his division, to sir Arthur Wellesley, who placed him behind the British, thus displaying a formidable array of horsemen, six lines in depth.
Immediately after the failure of Ruffin’s attack, king Joseph, having, in person, examined the whole position of the allies, from left to right, demanded of Jourdan and Victor if he should deliver a general battle. The former replied that the great valley and the mountain being unoccupied, on the 27th, Marshal Jourdan. sir Arthur Wellesley’s attention should have been drawn to the right by a feint on the Spaniards; that, during the night, the whole army should have been silently placed in column, at the entrance of the great valley, ready, at daybreak, to form a line of battle, on the left, to a new front, and so have attacked the hill from whence Victor had been twice repulsed. Such a movement, he said, would have obliged the allies to change their front also, and, during this operation, they might have been assailed with hopes of success. But this project could not now be executed; the English, aware of their mistake, had secured their left flank, by occupying the valley; and the mountain and their front was inattackable. Hence, the only prudent line was to take up a position on the Alberche, and await the effect of Soult’s operations on the English rear.
Marshal Victor opposed this counsel; he engaged to carry the hill on the English left, notwithstanding his former failures, provided the fourth corps would attack the right and centre at the same moment; and he finished his argument by declaring that, if such a combination failed, “It was time to renounce making war.”