The allies held the centre, being only one day’s march asunder; but their force, when concentrated, was not more than forty-seven thousand men. The French could not unite in under three days, but their combined forces exceeded ninety thousand [Appendix, No. 1], section 4. men, of which fifty-three thousand were under Soult; and this singular situation was rendered more remarkable by the ignorance in which all parties were as to the strength and movements of their adversaries. Victor and the king, frightened by Wilson’s partizan corps of four thousand men, were preparing to unite at Mostoles, while Cuesta, equally alarmed at Victor, was retiring from Talavera. Sir Arthur Wellesley was supposed, by Joseph, to be at the head of twenty-five thousand British; and the former, calculating on Soult’s weakness, was marching, with twenty-three thousand Spanish and English, to engage fifty-three thousand French; while Soult, unable to ascertain the exact situation of either friends or enemies, little suspected that the prey was rushing into his jaws. At this moment the fate of the Peninsula hung by a thread, which could not bear the weight for twenty-four hours; yet fortune so ordained that no irreparable disaster ensued.
Plate 8.
The Battle of
TALAVERA,
at the period of the final Attack
on the 28th July 1809.
London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829.
At five o’clock in the evening of the third, it was known at the English head-quarters that the French were near Naval Moral, and, consequently, between the allies and the bridge of Almaraz.
At six o’clock, letters from Cuesta advised sir Arthur that the king was again advancing, and that, from intercepted despatches addressed to Soult, it appeared that the latter must be stronger than was supposed; hence, Cuesta said that, wishing to aid the English, he would quit Talavera that evening: in other words, abandon the British hospitals!
To this unexpected communication sir Arthur replied that the king was still some marches off, and that Venegas should be directed to occupy him on the Upper Tagus; that Soult’s strength was exceedingly overrated, and Victor’s movements not decided enough to oblige the Spanish army to quit Talavera. Hence he required that Cuesta should at least wait until the next morning, to cover the evacuation of the English hospitals. But, before this communication reached Cuesta, the latter was in full march; and, at day-break on the 4th, the Spanish army was descried moving, in several columns, down the valley towards Oropesa, where Bassecour’s division soon after joined it from Centinello, and, at the same time, the cavalry patroles found the French near Naval Moral.
Sir Arthur Wellesley having, by this time, seen the intercepted letters himself, became convinced that Soult’s force was not overrated at thirty thousand; and the duke of Dalmatia, who had also intercepted some English letters, learned that, on the first of August, the allies were still at Talavera, and ill-informed of his march. Thus, the one general perceived his danger and the other his advantage at the same moment.