History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2

by William Francis Patrick Napier

Sir Arthur Wellesley was joined by thirty-eight thousand Spaniards, under Cuesta, and he calculated upon twenty-six thousand, under Venegas; while from twenty to twenty-five thousand others were acting in Gallicia and Leon.

Sir John Moore was urged to throw himself into the heart of Spain, to aid a people represented as abounding in courage and every other military virtue. Judging of what he could not see by that which was within his view, he doubted the truth of these representations, and thinking that a powerful army, commanded by a man of the greatest military genius, was likely to prove formidable, he was unwilling to commit his own small force in an unequal contest. Nevertheless, feeling that some practicable demonstration of the difficulties to be encountered was required by the temper of the times, he made a movement, too delicate and dangerous to be adopted, unless for a great political as well as military purpose.

To relieve the southern provinces, and to convince the English government and the English public that they had taken a false view of affairs, were the objects of his advance to the Carrion river; but, although he carried his army forward with a boldness that marked the consciousness of superior talents, he never lost sight of the danger he was incurring by exposing his flank to the French emperor. To obviate this danger as much as possible, he established a second line of retreat upon Gallicia, and he kept a watchful eye upon the cloud gathering at Madrid. Arrived in front of Soult’s corps, and being upon the point of attacking him, the expected storm burst, but, by a rapid march to Benevente, Moore saved himself from being taken in flank and rear and destroyed. Benevente was, however, untenable against the forces brought up by Napoleon, and, the retreat being continued to Coruña, the army, after a battle, embarked.

It was objected—1º. That Moore should have gone to Madrid;—2º. That he should have fought at Astorga, at Villa Franca, and at Lugo, instead of at Coruña;—3º. That he overrated the strength of the enemy, and undervalued the strength and enthusiasm of the Spaniards; and that, being of a desponding temper, he lost the opportunity of driving the French beyond the Ebro, for, that a battle gained (and it was assumed that a battle must have been gained had he attacked) would have assuredly broken the enemy’s power, and called forth all the energies of Spain.

Sir John Moore reasoned that the Spanish enthusiasm was not great, that it evaporated in boasting and promises, which could not be relied upon; that the British army was sent as an auxiliary, not as a principal force; and that the native armies being all dispersed before he could come to their assistance, the enemy was far too strong to contend with single handed; wherefore, it was prudent to re-embark, and to choose some other base of operations, to be conducted upon sounder views of the actual state of affairs, or to give up the contest altogether; for that little or no hope of final success could be entertained, unless the councils and dispositions of the Spaniards changed for the better. He died; and the English ministers, adopting the reasoning of his detractors, once more sent an auxiliary army to Spain; although the system still existed which he had denounced as incompatible with success.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, a general of their own choice, and assuredly a better could not have been made, was placed at the head of this army; and, after giving Soult a heavy blow on the Douro, he also advanced to deliver Spain. Like sir John Moore, he was cramped for want of money; and, like sir John Moore, he was pestered with false representations, and a variety of plans, founded upon short sighted views, and displaying great ignorance of the art of war; but, finally, he adopted, and, as far as the inveterate nature of the people he had to deal with would permit, executed a project, which, like sir John Moore’s, had for its object to overpower the French in his front, and, by forcing them to concentrate, relieve the distant provinces; and give full play to the enthusiasm of the Spaniards.

When sir John Moore advanced, there were no Spanish armies to assist him; the French were above three hundred and twenty thousand strong, and of these two hundred and fifty thousand were disposable to move against any point; moreover, they were commanded in person by Napoleon, of whom it has been said by the duke of Wellington, that his presence, alone, was equal to forty thousand good troops.

When sir Arthur Wellesley advanced, the French forces in the Peninsula did not exceed two hundred and sixty thousand men, of which only one hundred thousand could be brought to bear on his operations; and he was assisted by sixty thousand Spaniards, well armed, and tolerably disciplined. His plans were certainly laid with great ability upon the data furnished to him; but he trusted to Spanish promises and to Spanish energy, and he did not fail to repent his credulity; nevertheless, he delivered and gained that battle which sir John Moore had been reproached for not essaying; but it was found that a veteran French army, even of inferior numbers, was not to be destroyed, or even much dispirited, by one defeat; and while this battle was fighting, Soult, with fifty thousand men, came down upon the flank and rear of the English, a movement precisely similar to that which Napoleon had made from Madrid upon the flank and rear of sir John Moore. This last general saved himself by crossing the Esla, in the presence of the French patroles; and in like manner, sir Arthur evaded destruction by crossing the Tagus, within view of the enemy’s scouts, so closely timed was the escape of both.

When sir John Moore retreated, the Spanish government, reproaching him, asserted that the French were on the point of ruin, and Romana, even at Astorga, continued to urge offensive operations.